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iv	Abstract	On	A-and	B-Theories	of	time	
by	Edward	Freeman	Adviser:	Professor	Michael	Levin	Our	metaphysical	notion	of	temporality	is	exhausted	by	the	concepts	of	fluid	and	static	time.		Following	James	Ellis	McTaggart,	philosophers	refer	to	these	times	as	the	A-series	and	B-series	respectively.		To	have	a	metaphysical	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	as	such,	therefore,	separate	arguments	against	the	reality	of	both	temporal	series	are	required.		In	the	dissertation,	I	shall	offer	a	number	of	both	types	of	arguments.		In	the	first	chapter,	McTaggart’s	program	is	assessed.		It	is	concluded	that	McTaggart	has	an	argument	against	the	reality	of	the	A-series,	but	does	not	have	one	against	the	reality	of	the	B-series.		In	the	second	chapter,	additional	arguments	against	the	reality	of	the	A-series,	as	well	as	against	hybrid	A/B	series,	are	presented.		In	the	third	chapter,	it	is	argued	that	the	B-series	is	as	unreal	as	its	counterpart,	the	A-series,	is.		This	outcome	leaves	us	with	the	following	philosophical	predicament:	on	the	one	hand,	our	philosophical	notion	of	time	is	exhausted	by	the	concepts	of	fluid	and	static	time;	on	the	other	hand,	neither	concept,	nor	any	of	their	amalgamation,	is	adequate	to	give	us	a	coherent	metaphysical	theory	of	time.		The	dilemma,	I	believe,	is	a	sufficient	reason	for	the	conclusion	that	time,	as	it	is	conceived	by	philosophers,	is	not	part	of	physical	reality.		 	
v	Preface	The	history	of	human	knowledge	presents	us	with	many	cases	of	reason	going	against	our	ordinary	sense-experience	and	commonsense	judgments.		Take,	for	instance,	the	sun’s	celestial	movements.		Even	nowadays,	when	the	knowledge	that	the	sun	does	not	rise	and	set	is	a	commonplace,	we	still	state	with	strait	faces	that	the	sun	rises	and	sets	at	certain	times	of	the	day.		Such	is	the	binding	force	of	our	sensory	experience	that	in	our	everyday	goings	our	ancient	geocentric	bias	totally	eclipses	our	modern	understanding	of	the	cosmos.		Analogously,	I	hold,	time	is	an	illusion	stemming	from	our	psychological	predisposition	to	perceive	things	and	events	as	necessarily	temporally	ordered.		In	actual	fact,	however,	time	is	no	more	and	no	less	than	“a	necessary	representation	given	a	priori.”1		That	is	my	conviction.		But	my	goal	in	this	thesis	is	more	modest.		I	do	not	argue	that	time	as	such	is	unreal	(though	I	believe	it	is).		My	nonexistence	claim	is	limited	to	two	basic	metaphysical	concepts	of	time,	viz.	the	notions	of	A-and	B-time.		I	shall	argue	that	neither	the	concept	of	A-time	nor	the	concept	of	B-time	nor,	by	extension,	any	of	their	various	amalgamations,	is	theoretically	viable.		My	arguments	in	these	pages	are	only	against	these	two	metaphysical	concepts	of	time.		And	since	the	metaphysics	of	time	is	in	effect	exhausted	by	these	two	concepts	of	temporality,	I	conclude	that	time,	as	it	is	conceived	by	philosophers,	is	nonexistent.	
																																																																				1	Immanuel	Kant,	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	(1781),	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen	W.	Wood	(trans.),	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	A31.	
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Chapter	I:	McTaggart’s	Argument	
	
1.1 McTaggart’s	A-series/B-series	Distinction	1.1.1 At	the	outset	of	the	last	century,	an	article	appeared	in	Mind.		Despite	its	overall	sophistic	tenor	and	a	number	of	technical	shortcomings,	it	would	exert	a	strong	sway	over	the	subsequent	generations	of	analytical	metaphysicians.		The	article	was	James	Ellis	McTaggart’s	“The	Unreality	of	Time.”2		As	its	title	implies,	McTaggart	argues	that	time	is	not	part	of	concrete	reality.		Specifically,	he	argues	that	since	our	metaphysical	notion	of	time	is	constituted	by	two	fundamental	concepts	of	temporality,	the	concepts	of	fluid	and	static	time;	he	dubbed	them	the	A-series	and	the	B-series	respectively,	and	since	on	his	view	neither	concept	is	theoretically	viable,	he	concludes	that	time	as	such	is	nothing	but	an	illusion	arising	from	our	perception	of	essentially	atemporal	reality,	“Whenever	we	perceive	anything	in	time	–	which	is	the	only	way	in	which,	in	our	present	experience,	we	do	perceive	things	–	we	are	perceiving	it	more	or	less	as	it	really	is	not”	(NE,	§333).3	
																																																																				2	J.	M.	E.	McTaggart,	“The	Unreality	of	Time,”	Mind	17	(1908),	457-74.		A	somewhat	augmented	version	of	the	essay	makes	up	Chapter	XXXIII	of	McTaggart’s	unfinished	magnum	opus	The	Nature	of	Existence,	C.	D.	Broad	(ed.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1927).		I	will	be	quoting	primarily	from	The	
Nature	of	Existence,	abbreviated	as	NE,	and	indicating	section	numbers	instead	of	page	numbers.		I	will	abbreviate	“The	Unreality	of	Time”	as	UT,	followed	by	page	number.	3	This	is	essentially	a	Hegelian	view	of	time	as	opposed	to	Kantian	one	according	to	which	time	is	nothing	but	a	cognitive	construct	superimposed	on	reality.		McTaggart	is	explicit	about	that	his	idea	of	temporal	order	resembles	that	of	Hegel	rather	than	that	of	Kant:		“Hegel	regarded	the	order	of	temporal	series	as	a	reflection,	though	a	distorted	reflection,	of	something	in	the	real	nature	of	the	timeless	reality,	while	Kant	does	not	seem	to	have	contemplated	the	possibility	that	anything	in	the	nature	of	the	noumenon	should	correspond	to	the	time-order	which	appears	in	the	phenomenon”	(NE,	§350).	
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Nowadays,	almost	no	philosopher	endorses	this	sweeping	metaphysical	thesis.4		Most	do	see	fluid	time	as	entirely	illusory.		The	rest	is	split	between	those	who	believe	to	the	contrary	and	those	who	hold	fluid	and	static	times	to	be	equally	real.5		Yet,	as	I	shall	argue	in	this	study,	McTaggart	is	essentially	right;	the	truth	is	that	neither	concept	of	time,	nor	any	of	their	amalgamations,	is	grounded	in	reality.	McTaggart	begins	his	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time	with	his	celebrated	distinction	between	two	fundamental	concepts	of	time.		On	the	one	hand,	we	envisage	time	as	the	flow	from	the	future,	through	the	present,	and	into	the	past,	this	is	McTaggart’s	A-series.6		On	the	other	hand,	we	conceptualize	time	as	a	static	sequence	of	moments	standing	in	earlier	than/later	than	relations;	this	is	McTaggart’s	B-series:	
																																																																				4	T.	L.	S.	Sprigge,	“The	Unreality	of	Time,”	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	92	(1992),	pp.	1-19	and	present	undertaking,	at	least	as	far	as	the	two	metaphysical	conceptions	of	time	are	concerned,	are	rather	rare	exceptions.		Mathematicians	and	physicists,	on	the	other	hand,	are	more	open	to	the	idea	of	the	unreality	of	time.		Consult,	for	instance,	Gödel’s	“A	Remark	about	the	Relationship	between	Relativity	Theory	and	Idealistic	Philosophy”	in	Albert	Einstein:	Scientist-Philosopher,	P.	A.	Schilpp	(ed.)	(Evanston,	Ill:	Library	of	Living	Philosophers,	1949),	and	more	recent	J.	Barbour,	The	End	of	Time	(Oxford,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999).	5	The	most	prominent	B-	time	theorists	are:	B.	Russell,	“On	the	Experience	of	Time,”	The	Monist	25	(1915),	pp.	212-33,	D.	C.	Williams,	“The	Myth	of	Passage,”	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	48	(1951),	pp.457-72,		W.	V.	Quine,	“Identity,	Ostension,	and	Hypostasis,”	in	From	a	Logical	Point	of	View	(Evanston:	Harper	&	Row,1963),	J.	J.	Smart,	“The	River	of	Time,”	Mind	58	(1949),	pp.	483-94,		D.	H.	Mellor,	Real	
Time	II	(London:	Routledge,	1998),	T.	Sider,	Four-Dimensionalism	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	2001).		The	A-time	theorists	are	lesser	in	numbers,	but	not	in	stature;	among	them	we	find	A.	Prior,	Past,	
Present,	and	Future	(Oxford:	The	Clarendon	Press,	1967),	P.	Geach,	“Some	Problems	about	Time”	in	
Logic	Matters	(Berkeley	&	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press,	1972),	Q.	Smith,	Language	and	
Time	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1993).		Among	hybrid	A/B-time	theorists,	the	following	names	stand	out:	C.	D.	Broad,	Scientific	Thought	(New	York:	Harcourt,	Brace	and	Company,	1923),	G.	Schlesinger,	Aspects	of	Time	(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	Company,	1980),	M.	Tooley,	Time,	Tense	
and	Causation	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1997).	6	An	alternative,	yet	ontologically	equivalent	image	of	temporal	passage	would	be	that	of	the	world	flowing	in	time	from	the	past,	through	the	present,	and	into	the	future.		Basically,	the	difference	between	these	two	images	of	temporal	passage	is	that	either	we	conceive	of	the	world	as	a	stationary	object	and	of	time	as	a	wind,	of	a	sort,	unceasingly	blowing	from	the	future;	or	we	envisage	the	world	as	itself	inexorably	moving	from	the	province	of	the	past	into	the	land	of	the	future,	riding,	as	it	were,	the	tidal	wave	of	time.		On	the	two	temporal	passage	metaphors	consult,	for	instance,	J.	J.	Smart	(1949)	who	speaks	of	“the	metaphor	of	time	as	a	river	which	flows	or	a	sea	through	which	we	sail.”	
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Positions	in	time,	as	time	appears	to	us	prima	facie,	are	distinguished	in	two	ways.		Each	position	is	Earlier	than	some,	and	Later	than	some	of	the	other	positions.…		In	the	second	place,	each	position	is	either	Past,	Present,	or	Future....		For	the	sake	of	brevity	I	shall	give	the	name	of	the	
A	series	to	that	series	of	positions	which	runs	from	the	far	past	through	the	near	past	to	the	present,	and	then	from	the	present	through	the	near	future	to	the	far	future,	or	conversely.		The	series	of	positions	which	runs	from	earlier	to	later,	or	conversely,	I	shall	call	the	B	series	(NE,	§§305-306).7	Ever	since	McTaggart’s	articulation	of	the	A-time/B-time	distinction,	efforts	to	defend	either	the	A-	or	B-temporal	ontology,	or	to	bring	about	a	synthesis	of	the	two,	have	largely	been	defining	the	metaphysical	debate	concerning	the	nature	of	time.		The	fluid/static	distinction	is,	of	course,	an	ancient	one;	it	harks	back	to	the	Parmenidean/Heraclitean	dispute.		Parmenides	thought	of	reality	as	essentially	static,	thus	taking	temporal	passage	to	be	an	illusion.		Heraclitus,	on	the	other	hand,	thought	of	the	ultimate	reality	to	be	in	continuous	state	of	flux.		A	century	later,	Aristotle	contemplated	both	possibilities	and	“distinguished	before	and	after	and	tied	time	to	what	is	countable,	presaging	B-series	accounts;	he	also	investigated	the	now,	presaging	A-series	accounts.”8		At	the	outset	of	the	Middle	Ages,	Saint	Augustine	was	deeply	puzzled	by	the	notion	of	temporal	transience	and	wondered	whether	or	not	it	
																																																																				7	McTaggart	also	theorizes	about	the	C-series;		in	fact,	the	bulk	of	Book	VI	of	The	Nature	of	Existence	is	devoted	to	elucidation	of	the	nature	of	this	series,	the	only	series	which	McTaggart	deems	to	be	real	albeit	non-temporal.		Because	an	exposition	of	McTaggart’s	C-series	is	orthogonal	to	my	present	purposes,	I	shall	not	take	up	the	subject	in	this	thesis.		It	is	the	A-	and	B-series	that	is	my	immediate	concern.	8	P.	Turetzky,	Time	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge,	1998),	p.118.	
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would	make	more	sense	to	hold	the	concept	of	static	time.9		But	it	is	in	McTaggart	that	we	first	find	the	contrast	between	the	two	notions	of	temporality	being	fully	employed	in	a	philosophical	analysis	of	the	nature	time.		Indeed,	McTaggart	has	shown	us	“how	many	of	the	most	important	questions	about	time	are	really	question	about	his	two	series.”10	Regrettably,	in	the	literature	on	the	topic,	the	A/B	distinction	is	often	watered	down	to	signify	no	more	than	a	mere	phenomenological/ontological	divide.		Yet,	it	is	quite	clear	that	McTaggart	takes	the	difference	between	his	two	temporal	series	to	be	strictly	ontological.		In	his	theory	of	non-temporality	unlike,	say,	in	that	of	Kant’s,	phenomenology	plays	second	fiddle	to	metaphysics.11		As	such,	McTaggart’s	main	objective	is	to	the	core	metaphysical;	he	sets	out	to	show	that	neither	the	A-	nor	B-conception	of	time	is	grounded	in	reality.		1.1.2 While	the	concept	of	the	B-series	is	fairly	straightforward	(which,	of	course,	as	we	shall	see	in	Chapter	III,	does	not	preclude	it	from	being	metaphysically	problematic),	it	is	unclear	whether	the	A-series	can	be	thought	of	as	a	genuine	series;	at	least	it	is	not	clear	whether	it	can	be	thought	of	as	such	in	a	strict	sense	of	the	term.		This	fact	gives	rise	to	a	dilemma.		If	we	do	not	take	the	A-series	to	be	a	genuine	series,	
																																																																				9	St	Augustine,	The	Confections,	Book	XI.	10	D.	H.	Mellor	“The	Time	of	Our	Lives,”	in	Philosophy	at	the	New	Millennium,	Anthony	O’Hear	(ed.),	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	pp.	45-59.	11	To	be	sure,	for	McTaggart,	both	the	A-	and	B-series	are	phenomenon	bene	fundata.		(McTaggart	utilizes	here	Leibniz’s	terminology).		Be	it	as	it	may,	his	target	is	not	our	perception	of	temporal	reality	
per	se;	it	is	temporal	reality	itself,	or	rather	the	essentially	atemporal	nature	of	reality.		As	such,	concerns	pertaining	to	temporal	experience,	which	are	imbedded	in	McTaggart’s	temporal	metaphysics,	are	orthogonal	to	the	main	thrust	of	his	argument	which,	all	things	considered,	is	a	metaphysical	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time.	
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then	the	A-series/B-series	distinction	disintegrates;	at	best,	it	demarcates	not	two	distinct	types	of	temporal	series,	but	a	temporal	series	and	something	else.		If,	conversely,	we	take	the	A-series	to	be	a	series	in	a	strict	sense	of	the	term,	then	it	seems	that	we	can	hardly	distinguish	it	from	the	B-series	because	in	this	case	the	A-series	is	as	static	as	the	B-series	is.		Let	us	delve	into	this	issue	in	some	detail.	Consider	first	McTaggart’s	account	of	the	B-series;	to	constitute	such	a	series,	he	says,	there	is	required	a	transitive	asymmetrical	relation,	and	a	collection	of	terms	such	that,	of	any	two	of	them,	either	the	first	is	in	this	relation	to	the	second,	or	the	second	is	in	this	relation	to	the	first.		We	may	take	here	either	the	relation	of	“earlier	than”	or	the	relation	of	“later	than,”	both	of	which,	of	course,	are	transitive	and	asymmetrical.		If	we	take	the	first,	then	the	terms	have	to	be	such	that,	of	any	of	two	of	them,	either	the	first	is	earlier	than	the	second,	or	the	second	is	earlier	than	the	first	(NE,	§305).	It	turns	out	that	if	we	take	the	A-series	to	be	a	bona	fide	series,	this	account	of	the	B-series	is	not	unlike	an	account	of	the	A-series	because	by	taking	the	A-series	to	be	a	serially	ordered	set	of	temporal	points	we	take	it	to	be	subject	to	the	basic	laws	which	govern	all	serially	ordered	sets.		Now,	on	the	axiom	of	extensionality,	the	immutability	of	set-membership	is	a	sufficient	condition	for	the	identity	for	sets,	because	{a,b}	=	{b,a}.		Yet,	this	condition	is	not	adequate	to	give	us	a	criterion	of	identity	for	ordered	sets	because	<a,b>	≠	<b,a>.		An	additional	necessary	condition	is	required;	namely,	the	condition	of	immutability	of	order	because	a	series	whose	order	
6	
mutates,	whether	uniformly	or	otherwise,	cannot	remain	the	same	series,	since	at	times	it	is	<a,b>	and	at	some	other	times	it	is	<b,a>.		The	A-series,	therefore,	if	it	is	a	genuine	series,	must	be	as	internally	static	with	respect	to	both	its	composition	and	its	order,	as	its	counterpart,	the	B-series	certainly	is.	It	is	quite	certain	that	on	condition	that	the	A-series	is	a	bona	fide	series,	no	sense	can	be	given	to	the	notion	of	it	being	internally	fluid.		Suppose	we	say	that	the	A-series	flows	in	the	sense	that	events	come	from	the	future,	pause	for	a	moment	in	the	present,	and	then	inexorably	recede	further	and	further	into	the	past.		Under	this	scenario	and	on	condition	that	the	A-series	is	internally	static,	when	one	event	moves,	then	all	events	move	with	it	in	unison.		What	we	apparently	have	here	is	the	notion	of	a	static	time	that	moves	as	one	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	something	external.		In	contrast,	if	the	A-series	moves	internally,	then	this	entails	that	either	distances	between	its	temporal	points	vary	or	their	relative	positions	fluctuate	or	both	is	the	case.		Indeed,	there	are	three	possible	ways	in	which	a	temporal	series	can	be	said	to	flow	internally,	none	of	which,	it	seems	to	me,	is	satisfactory:	(a)	 Relative	positions	of	the	elements	of	a	fluid	temporal	series	are	continuously	rearranged,	(b)	 Temporal	distances	between	the	elements	of	a	fluid	temporal	series	continuously	change,	(c)	 Both,	relative	positions	of	the	elements	of	a	fluid	temporal	series	and	the	distances	between	them	are	in	the	state	of	flux.12	
																																																																				12	It	could	be	said	about	a	fluid	temporal	series	that	it	grows	in	volume,	such	that	new	elements	are	constantly	added	to	it.		I	shall	delve	into	this	issue	in	Chapter	II.	
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On	the	first	scenario,	we	have	something	like	this:	e1	is	past	in	relation	to	e2,	then	it	is	either	future	or	present	in	the	same	respect	and	so	forth.		On	the	second	scenario,	an	internally	fluid	temporal	series	would	be	like	a	rubber	cord,	continually	stretching	and	contracting.		On	the	third	scenario,	it	would	be	twice	over	a	chaotic	series.	But	surely,	neither	picture	of	internally	flowing	temporal	series	can	be	true	of	reality	since	they	are	all	incoherent	in	the	extreme.		If	an	event	e1	is	past	with	respect	to	an	event	e2,	it	is	always	past	in	that	respect	and	it	is	always	past	by	the	same	temporal	distance	from	e2.		The	outbreak	of	WWI,	for	example,	is	and	has	always	been	twenty-five	years	in	the	past	with	respect	to	the	outbreak	of	WWII.		Apparently,	no	sense	can	be	made	of	the	idea	of	an	internally	fluid	serially	ordered	set	in	general	and	of	internally	fluid	temporal	series	in	particular.		The	A-series,	therefore,	must	be	thought	of	as	internally	static.		Indeed,	McTaggart	makes	it	clear	that	he	takes	the	A-series	to	be	internally	static,	in	the	sense	that	temporal	distances	between	its	elements	and	their	relative	locations	do	not	change:	If,	then,	anything	is	to	be	rightly	called	past,	present,	or	future,	it	must	be	because	it	is	in	relation	to	something	else.		And	this	something	else	to	which	it	is	in	relation	must	be	something	outside	the	time-series.		For	the	relations	of	the	A	series	are	changing	relations,	and	no	relations	which	are	exclusively	between	members	of	the	temporal	series	can	ever	change.		Two	events	are	exactly	in	the	same	places	in	the	time-series,	relatively	to	one	another,	a	million	years	before	they	take	place,	while	each	of	them	is	taking	place,	and	when	they	are	a	million	years	in	the	past	(NE,	§327).	
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Of	course,	we	habitually	observe	‘fluidity’	of	temporal	ordering	as	in	cases	of	orders	of	succession,	e.g.,	an	order	of	appearance	of	actors	on	the	theater	stage.		But	in	what	sense	is	this	a	fluid	order?		It	is	so	strictly	in	an	existential	sense	–	first	one	actor	appears	(exists)	at	the	stage,	then	another	does,	and	the	rest.		Yet,	if	an	actor	x	appears	before	an	actor	y,	then	x	always	before	y,	otherwise	we	would	have	a	different	order	of	appearance,	i.e.,	a	different	ordered	series.	Since	a	fluid	serially	ordered	set	of	temporal	items	(whatever	they	might	be:	events,	moments,	temporal	points,	etc.)	is	not	possible,	what	exactly	does	McTaggart	mean	when	he	asserts	that	the	A-series	is	changeable?	To	answer	this	question	we	have	to	consult	the	text.		From	time	to	time	McTaggart	takes	A-characteristics,	viz.	past,	present,	future	to	be	monadic	properties,	since	he	often	says	that	such	and	such	event	e	is	past,	or	present,	or	future;	yet,	at	other	times	he	treats	them	as	relations	to	something	external	to	the	A-series,	as	in	the	beginning	of	the	passage	quoted	on	previous	page.		Indeed,	in	the	original	paper	he	says	that	it	seems	to	him	“a	more	reasonable	view”	that	the	A-characteristics	are	relations	(UT,	p.	467)	and	in	the	later	version,	it	is	“quite	clear”	to	him	that	they	are	bona	fide	relations	(NE,	§326).13		Yet,	it	seems	to	me	certain	that	McTaggart’s	master	argument	involves	A-monadic	properties,	not	A-relations	because	“…every	event	has	them	[A-characteristics]	all.		If	M	is	past,	it	has	been	present	and	future.		If	it	is	future,	it	will	be	present	and	past.		If	it	present,	it	has	been	future	and	will	be	past”	(NE,	§329).		Not	surprisingly,	we	find	in	McTaggart	two	radically	different	accounts	of	A-
																																																																				13	There	are	additional	textual	evidences	for	this	construal	of	temporal	fluidity	most	notably	in	NE,	§§	326-28	and	§§	331-32.			
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change,	one	which	is	articulated	in	terms	of	A-relations	and	the	other	in	terms	of	A-properties.		What	is	more,	it	is	not	always	clear	which	account	he	intends	at	different	phases	of	his	argument.		Still,	despite	this	substantial	ambiguity,	I	believe	we	are	justified	in	interpreting	McTaggart’s	A-series	as	a	serially	ordered	set	proper.	What	then	is	this	A-ordering?		I	already	mentioned	that	this	ordering	is	immutable,	that	the	A-series	is	internally	static	in	the	very	same	manner	as	the	B-series	is.		Take,	for	instance,	an	A-series	of	events;	an	event	e1	is	past,	an	event	e2	is	present,	and	an	event	e3	is	future.		In	what	way	is	this	A-ordered	set	different	from	a	B-ordered	set	of	the	same	events	such	that	an	event	e2	is	later	than	an	event	e1	and	earlier	than	an	event	e3?		The	difference	here	is	in	name	only;	in	all	other	respects,	the	two	series	are	identical,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	diagram	below.14			 	Fig.	1	A	and	B	temporal	series.	C.	D.	Broad,	in	his	painstaking	analysis	of	McTaggart’s	philosophy,	also	takes	the	A-series	to	be	a	bona	fide	ordered	set	of	temporal	items	because	it	is	…	formed	by	the	various	possible	degrees	of	pastness	in	decreasing	order	of	magnitude,	the	characteristic	of	strict	presentness,	and	the	various	possible	degrees	of	futurity		in	increasing	order	of	magnitude.		Except	for	the	fact	that	it	is	compact	it	might	be	represented	by	the	
																																																																				14	Although	present	is	not	a	part	of	the	B-series	and	simultaneity	is	not	a	part	of	the	A-series,	at	least	not	overtly,	the	point	here	is	that	the	A-and	B-series	have	the	same	topological	structure	and	the	same	elements.	
e1	 						e2	 	 e3	e1	 						e2	 	 e3	
past	 future	earlier	 	later	
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series	of	negative	integers,	the	singles	integer	0,	and	the	series	of	positive	integers.		Thus	…	-3,		-2,		-1;		0;	1,		2,		3,	…	
Pastness	 										Futurity	15	If	Broad	is	right	in	his	exegesis	of	McTaggart’s	theory	of	time,	then	topologically,	the	A-series	and	the	B-series	are	indistinguishable.		Given	that	the	elements	of	the	B-series	constitute	also	the	elements	of	the	A-series	and	that	the	order	in	question	is	one	and	the	same,	the	inescapable	conclusion	that	follows	is	that	the	two	series	are	alike	in	all	relevant	aspects.		J.	J.	Thomson	develops	a	similar	“indistinguishably”	thesis.16		She	points	out	that	on	condition	that	the	A-	and	B-series	are	comprised	of	the	same	elements	and	given	that	the	order	of	these	elements	is	exactly	the	same,	then	the	A-	and	B-series	are	identical	in	all	relevant	aspects:	…	the	order	of	the	events	in	the	A	series	is	the	same	as	the	order	of	the	events	in	the	B	series.		So	if	we	opt	for	the	familiar	account	of	the	identity	conditions	for	series	…	-	namely	that	series	S	is	identical	with	series	S¢	just	in	case	they	have	the	same	members,	and	their	order	in	S	is	the	same	as	their	order	in	S¢	-	then	we	are	committed	to	supposing	that	the	A	series	just	is	the	B	series.17	We	thus	must	conclude	that	if	we	take	the	A-series	to	be	a	bona	fide	series,	it	cannot	be	intrinsically	differentiated	from	the	B-series	because	the	two	series	are	
																																																																				15	C.	D.	Broad,	The	Examination	of	McTaggart’s	Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1938),	p.	289.	16	J.	J.	Thomson,	“McTaggart	on	Time,”	Philosophical	Perspectives	15	(2001),	pp.	229-52.	17	Ibid.	p	233.	
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alike	in	all	relevant	respects.		The	elements	of	the	two	temporal	series	and	their	ordering	are	the	same.		McTaggart’s	A-time/B-time	distinction,	therefore,	cannot	be	articulated	in	terms	of	internally	fluid/internally	static	time	dichotomy.		1.1.3 Recently,	Clifford	Williams	argued	against	the	A-time/B-time	distinction	from	an	opposite	stance.18		He	contends	that	the	distinction	must	be	abandoned	because	transience	is	an	essential	feature	of	both	A-	and	B-time.		This	thesis	Williams	calls	“The	Transition	Argument.”		He	also	maintains	that	the	two	types	of	temporal	passage	are	indistinguishable	in	principle:	The	real	difference	between	the	two	kinds	of	time	involves	two	kinds	of	flow	–	A-flow	and	B-flow.		A-time	is	not	the	only	kind	of	time	with	a	claim	to	transiency.		B-time,	too,	possesses	transition.		To	say	this,	however,	is	to	raise	the	question	of	how	B-time	flow	differs	from	A-time	flow….	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	any	way	to	differentiate	them,	and,	consequently,	that	there	doesn’t	appear	to	be	any	way	to	differentiate	the	two	kinds	of	time.19	Before	I	address	Williams’	argument,	let	me	briefly	fill	in	the	metaphysical	background	against	which	it	is	advanced.		The	B-theorist	employs,	among	other	theoretical	devices,	the	spatial	simile	–	the	thesis	that	time	and	space	both	have	breadth.		“There	is	a	common	topological	and	metrical	structure	between	any	given	
																																																																				18	Clifford	Williams,	“The	Metaphysics	of	A-	and	B-Time,”	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	46	(1996),	pp.	371-81;	“A	Bergsonian	Approach	to	A-	and	B-	Time,”	Philosophy	73	(1998),	pp.	379-93;	“Beyond	A-and	B-Time,”	Philosophia	31	(2003),	pp.	75-91.	19	C.	Williams	(2003),	p.	75.	
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spatial	dimension	and	the	temporal	dimension…	objects	are	spread	out	in	space…	objects	are	spread	out	in	time	as	well.”20		Quite	apart	from	the	question	whether	the	spatial	simile	is	a	legitimate	theoretical	device,	a	question	arises:		If	space	and	time	are	thought	of	as	extensions,	how	then	should	we	go	about	distinguishing	between	them?		A	conceptual	divide	between	“spatial	extension”	and	“temporal	extension”	must	be	drawn,	otherwise,	we	would	not	be	able	to	differentiate	between	the	two	types	of	extension.21	Taking	up	this	challenge,	Williams	argues	that	it	is	transience	that	constitutes	the	dissimilarity	between	spatial	and	temporal	extensions:	“if	there	were	no	transition	between	different	moments	or	events,	temporal	extension	would	not	differ	from	spatial	extension.		There	must	be	something	that	differentiates	the	two	kinds	of	extension,	and	this	can	only	be	transition.”22		On	the	face	of	it,	this	seems	to	be	an	odd	argument.		After	all,	it	is	a	prima	facie	fact	that	we	journey	between	spatial	localities.		So,	if	both	spatial	and	temporal	expanses	are	traversable,	then	the	transition	feature	cannot	assist	us	in	distinguishing	the	two	types	of	extension.	Yet,	there	is	more	to	Williams’	argument	than	meets	the	eye.		His	motivation	for	the	transition	argument	is	that	the	feature	of	B-time	that	Broad	aptly	labels	“The	Extensive	Aspect	of	Temporal	Facts”	is	not	sufficient	for	the	existence	of	time.23		Williams’	point,	if	I	understand	it	correctly,	is	that	since	on	a	pure	B	theory	,	the	B-
																																																																				20	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.	87.	21	The	B-theorist,	of	course,	would	claim	that	there	is	no	such	dissimilarity	at	all.		On	his	account,	there	are	simply	no	topological	differences	between	the	two	types	of	extension;	they	all	are	of	the	same	stock.		I	will	address	the	notion	of	the	spatial	simile	and	related	issues	in	section	3.3	of	Chapter	III.	22	C.	Williams	(2003),	p.	79.	23	C.	D.	Broad	(1938),	p.	267.		This	is	also	the	general	idea	of	McTaggart’s	essentiality	argument	which	I	will	discuss	in	detail	in	section	1.3.	
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extension	is	rigid,	it	is	hard	to	say	in	what	way,	if	any,	it	is	different	from	the	other	three	rigid	spatial	extensions.		In	other	words,	if	the	B-extension	is	not	transitory,	it	is	not	different	from	spatial	extensions;	to	all	intents	and	purposes,	it	is	the	fourth	spatial	extension.24		Thus,	the	first	issue	Williams	raises	is	whether	or	not	the	B-distances	are	transitory.		If	they	are,	then	there	is	a	B-passage	as	well	as	an	A-passage.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	B-passage,	then	the	B-extension	is	indistinguishable	from	spatial	extensions.	Having	argued	that	transience	is	as	much	part	of	B-time	as	it	is	of	A-time,	Williams	proceeds	with	a	list	of	arguments	for	the	view	that	the	two	types	of	transience	are	like	two	peas	in	a	pod.		Despite	the	somewhat	inconclusive	result	of	Williams’	project,	he	has	shown	(as	had	Broad	before	him)	that	all	is	not	well	and	good	with	McTaggart’s	A-series/B-series	distinction.		Given	the	fact	that	the	A-time/B-time	controversy	is	at	the	very	heart	of	modern	analytical	metaphysics	of	time,	the	question	arises	whether	the	century-long	debate	is	exceedingly	misguided.		
1.2 The	Two	Notions	of	Temporal	Flow	1.2.1 If	the	A/B	distinction	is	to	be	upheld,	we	must	find	a	way	to	differentiate	between	the	two	temporal	series.		Since	the	A-and	B-series	cannot	be	differentiated	internally,	the	only	option	is	to	differentiate	them	externally.		As	we	have	seen,	on	the	external	view	of	temporal	fluidity,	call	this	picture	of	temporal	flow	“the	external	
																																																																				24	It	might	be	argued	that	the	B-temporal	dimension	has	a	certain	feature	spatial	dimensions	totally	lack;	namely,	directionality.		Indeed,	it	is	often	argued	that	time’s	arrow	constitutes	a	difference	between	B-time	and	space.		But	this	objection	cannot	be	used	against	Williams	because	the	concept	of	one-directionality	of	time	is	dependent	on	the	concept	of	temporal	transition;	the	former	is	empty	without	the	latter.	
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doctrine	of	temporal	passage,”	temporal	flow	takes	place	outside	the	A-series	such	that	the	A-series	moves	as	one	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	something	external	to	it.		On	the	internal	conception	of	temporal	fluidity,	call	it	accordingly	“the	internal	doctrine	of	temporal	passage,”	temporal	flow	is	non-relational;	the	A-series	flows	within;	it	is	like	a	river,	only	that	it	is	a	river	without	banks	rolling	its	waters	uniformly	with	no	relation	to	anything	external.25		In	“fluid	temporal	series,”	therefore,	the	term	“fluid”	is	ambiguous;	it	could	be	read	either	as	“externally	fluid”	or	as	“internally	fluid.”	26		On	the	external	reading,	“fluid	temporal	series”	stands	as	follows:	
Def.	I:	S	is	a	fluid	temporal	series	ºdef.	S	is	a	series	of	temporal	items	that	flows	as	one	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	something	external	to	it.	When	“fluid	temporal	series”	is	read	internally,	it	has	the	following	sense:			
Def.	II:	S	is	a	fluid	temporal	series	ºdef.	S	is	a	series	of	temporal	items	that	flows	within	irrespective	of	an	external	point	of	reference.	Now,	in	“fluid	temporal	series”	and	its	proxies,	e.g.,	“the	A-series,”	the	term	“series”	is	short	for	“serially	ordered	set.”		Thus,	properly	analyzed,	“fluid	temporal	series”	stands	as	follows:	
Def.	III:	S	is	a	fluid	temporal	series	ºdef.	(i)	S	is	a	serially	ordered	set	of	temporal	items;	(ii)	S	is	fluid.	
																																																																				25	Compare	this	account	of	temporal	passage	with	Newton’s	account	of	absolute	time,	“Absolute,	true,	and	mathematical	time,	of	itself,	and	from	its	own	nature,	flows	equably	without	relation	to	anything	external,	and	by	another	name	is	called	duration.”		Isaac	Newton,	Principa		F.	Cajori	(ed.)	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1947),	p.6.	26	G.	Schlesinger	offers	a	word	of	caution	in	this	regard.		He	says	that	talk	about	temporal	passage	“may	be	attempted	in	two	totally	different	senses.		These	two	senses	must,	under	no	circumstances,	be	conflated.”	The	two	senses	(roughly)	are	what	I	call	the	external	and	eternal	doctrines	of	temporal	passage.	George	Schlesinger,	“The	Two	Notions	of	the	Passage	of	Time”	Noûs	3	(1969),	pp.	1-16.	
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If	in	Definition	III	we	read	“fluid”	internally,	its	two	clauses,	as	I	have	argued	in	subsection	1.1.2,	are	mutually	exclusive	because	in	the	first	clause,	the	A-series	is	conceived	as	a	static	row	whereas	in	the	second	clause,	it	is	in	the	perpetual	state	of	flux.		Apparently,	on	(i),	the	A-series	is	modeled	on	a	Dedekind-complete	ordered	field,	whereas	on	(ii),	it	is	nothing	like	a	continuum.		On	the	internal	reading,	therefore,	Definition	III	is	an	amalgamation	of	two	competing	conceptions	of	fluid	temporal	series:	
Def.	IV:		S	is	a	fluid	temporal	series	ºdef.	S	is	an	immutable	series	of	temporal	items.	
Def.	V:	S	is	a	fluid	temporal	series	ºdef.	S	is	a	mutable	series	of	temporal	items.	On	Definition	IV,	the	A-series/B-series	distinction	is	a	nonstarter.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	we	adapt	Definition	V,	then	we	have	a	logically	imprecise	doctrine	of	A-time,	since,	it	is	an	a	priori	truth	that	fluctuations	within	a	set,	temporal	or	not,	preclude	it	from	being	an	ordered	series.		Strictly	speaking,	“an	internally	fluid	temporal	series”	is	a	contradiction	in	terms,	for	it	basically	amounts	to	“a	fluctuating	ordered	set	of	temporal	items,”	that	is,	to	“an	unordered	ordered	set	of	temporal	items.”		As	such,	the	notion	of	internally	fluid	temporal	series	is	without	any	ontological	import	whatsoever;	there	is	simply	no	such	thing	as	an	unordered	ordered	set	of	temporal	items.		1.2.2 It	appears	that	the	only	sensible	reading	of	‘fluid	temporal	series’	is	that	which	is	given	by	Definitions	I.		However,	by	accepting	these	definitions,	we	are	compelled	to	state	that	the	A-series	is	different	from	the	B-series	only	in	that	it	moves	as	a	rigid	
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whole	with	respect	to	something	external,	whereas	the	B-series	is	static	both	internally	and	externally.		In	the	footnote	on	pages	10-11	of	Vol.	II	of	NE,	McTaggart	offers	such	an	account	of	temporal	passage.		He	says	there	that	if	the	A-series	flows,	it	must	flow	as	a	rigid	whole,	in	relation	to	the	B-series,	which	itself	must	be	stationary.		He	also	considers	the	converse	picture	of	temporal	passage:	The	movement	of	time	consists	in	the	fact	that	later	and	later	terms	pass	into	the	present,	or	–	which	is	the	same	fact	expressed	in	another	way	–	that	presentness	passes	to	later	and	later	terms.		If	we	take	it	the	first	way,	we	are	taking	the	B	series	as	sliding	along	a	fixed	A	series.		If	we	take	it	the	second	way,	we	are	taking	the	A	series	as	sliding	along	a	fixed	B	series.		In	the	first	case	time	presents	itself	as	a	movement	from	future	to	past.		In	the	second	case	it	presents	itself	as	movement	from	earlier	to	later	(NE,	§306,	footnote	2).	Figure	2,	I	believe,	faithfully	renders	the	metaphysics	of	temporal	passage	based	on	the	external	doctrine	of	temporal	flow.		On	the	(a)	scenario	the	B-series	moves	as	a	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	the	A-series	from	future	to	past;	on	the	(b)	scenario	the	A-series	moves	as	a	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	the	B-series	from	earlier	to	later	times.		A	third	scenario	such	that	both	series	move	in	opposite	directions	is	logically	feasible.		On	this	scenario,	however,	we	cannot	differentiate	between	the	two	temporal	series,	since	both	externally	fluid	and	internally	static	and	both	are	composed	of	the	same	elements	and	have	the	same	order.		Since	on	this	scenario	the	two	time	series	move	in	opposite	directions,	it	could	be	held	that	they	distinguishable	in	this	respect.		But	this	does	not	give	us	the	A-series/B-series	distinction.	
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				 			Fig.	2	Directions	in	A	and	B	temporal	series.		It	seems	that	McTaggart’s	external	doctrine	of	temporal	passage	stems	from	his	realization	of	the	fact	that	if	the	A-series	is	a	bona	fide	ordered	series,	it	must	be	internally	static,	as	all	ordered	series	are.		This	leads	him	to	find	the	external	doctrine	of	temporal	passage	to	be	the	only	conceptually	viable	alternative.		Yet,	as	we	shall	see,	the	external	doctrine	of	temporal	passage	plays	no	role	in	his	principle	argument	for	the	unreality	of	the	A-series.27		Indeed,	the	very	design	of	this	master	argument	turns	on	the	idea	of	events/moments	exemplifying	mutually	exclusive	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	which	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	external	doctrine	of	temporal	passage.		McTaggart	talks	more	often	about	the	A-series	in	terms	of	monadic	properties	than	in	terms	of	relations	and	switches	between	these	two	diametrically	different	concepts	of	the	A-series	with	an	astonishing	ease.		And	although	he	is	insistent	that	A-characteristics	are	relations,	he	casts	the	contrast	between	the	A-	and	B-series	in	terms	of	the	contrast	between	monadic	properties	of	
																																																																				27	That	is	why,	I	think,	in	the	literature	on	the	topic,	the	external	doctrine	of	temporal	passage	is	generally	overlooked.		Nathan	Oaklander’s	“McTaggart’s	Paradox	Defended”	is	one	of	few	exceptions,	in	The	Ontology	of	Time	(Amherst,	New	York:	Prometheus	Books,	2004),	pp.51-62.	
(a)	
(b)	
the	B-series	the	A-series	
earlier	 later	past	 future	
the	B-series	the	A-series	earlier	 later	
past	 future	
18	
pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	and	relations	of	earlier	than/later	than.		We	thus	have	an	apparent	inconsistency	here:	on	the	one	hand,	events	and	moments	exemplify	A-monadic	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	and	on	the	other,	they	stand	in	two-place	relations	to	something	external	to	the	A-series.	How	then	should	we	reconcile	this	inconsistency?		McTaggart	appears	to	be	of	two	minds	on	this	issue.		The	contradictory	nature	of	the	A-series,	McTaggart	says,	“would	arise	in	the	same	way	supposing	that	pastness,	presentness	and	futurity	were	original	qualities,	and	not,	as	we	have	decided	that	they	are	relations”	(NE,	§332).		Yet,	McTaggart	does	not	offer	us	an	argument	for	the	contradictory	nature	of	the	A-series	based	on	the	supposition	that	A-characteristics	are	relations.		Besides,	McTaggart	says	that	he	sees	“a	more	positive	difficulty	in	the	way	of	the	reality	of	the	A	series”	(NE,	§328).		This	“positive	difficulty”	is	his	celebrated	temporal	transience	paradox.		Indeed,	the	paradoxical	nature	of	the	A-series	becomes	apparent	only	when	we	consider	events/moments	instantiating	monadic	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity.		And	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	it	is	that	the	same	contradiction	arises	upon	taking	A-characteristics	to	be	relations.		And	even	if	there	is	some	contradiction	that	arises	when	we	take	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	to	be	relations,	it	surely	cannot	be	the	same	contradiction	that	arises	from	taking	them	as	being	monadic	properties.	Before	turning	to	the	contradiction	in	question,	viz.	to	McTaggart’s	celebrated	temporal	transience	paradox,	let	us	first	consider	what	I	shall	call	henceforth	McTaggart’s	essentiality	conjecture.		This	conjecture,	together	with	the	temporal	transience	paradox,	is	at	the	center	of	McTaggart’s	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time.	
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1.3 The	Essentiality	Conjecture	1.3.1 McTaggart’s	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time	is	two-pronged.		Its	initial	stage	aims	at	showing	that	“the	distinctions	of	past,	present,	and	future	are	essential	to	time”	(NE,	§324).		This	is	McTaggart’s	essentiality	conjecture.		As	one	would	expect,	at	the	second	stage,	McTaggart	seeks	to	establish	the	unreality	of	the	A-series.		This	is	attained	via	his	famous	temporal	transience	paradox.		This	two-pronged	line	of	attack,	therefore,	enables	McTaggart	to	promote	his	argument	against	the	reality	of	A-time	as	his	more	general	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	as	such.		In	the	literature	on	the	topic,	the	essentiality	conjecture	and	the	temporal	transience	paradox	are	often	called	McTaggart’s	‘positive’	and	‘negative’	theses	respectively.28		I	shall	address	these	two	arguments	separately.		In	this	section,	I	will	take	up	the	essentiality	conjecture.		The	temporal	transience	paradox	shall	be	the	subject	matter	of	the	next	section.	McTaggart’s	claim	that	the	A-series	is	essential	to	the	nature	of	time	is	somewhat	ambiguous	because	he	also	asserts	that	both	the	A-	and	B-series	are	essential	to	time,	“the	distinction	of	past,	present,	and	future	is	as	essential	to	time	as	the	distinction	of	earlier	and	later”	(NE,	§306).		The	qualification	that	immediately	follows	this	assertion	that	the	A-distinction	is	“more	fundamental	than	the	distinction	of	earlier	and	later”	only	adds	to	the	ambiguity.		This	is	the	passage	in	its	entirety:	Since	distinctions	of	the	first	class	[B-distinctions]	are	permanent,	it	might	be	thought	that	they	were	more	objective,	and	more	essential	to	
																																																																				28	See,	for	instance,	Heather	Dyke,	“McTaggart	and	the	Truth	about	Time”	in	Time,	Reality	&	Experience,	Craig	Callender	(ed.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002)	and	Nathan	Oaklander	(2004).	
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the	nature	of	time,	than	those	of	the	second	class	[A-distinctions].		I	believe,	however,	that	this	would	be	a	mistake,	and	that	the	distinction	of	past,	present,	and	future	is	as	essential	to	time	as	the	distinction	of	earlier	and	later,	while	in	a	certain	sense	it	may,	as	we	shall	see,	be	regarded	as	more	fundamental	than	the	distinction	of	earlier	and	later	(NE,	§306).	If	in	the	above	passage	we	read	“more	fundamental,”	as	“more	essential,”	as,	it	seems	to	me,	is	McTaggart’s	intention,	then	we	have	a	notion	of	degrees	of	essentiality,	i.e.,	the	B-series	is	essential	to	time,	but	the	A-series	is	more	essential	to	it.		This	Orwellian	treatment	of	the	notion	of	essentiality	is	exceedingly	dubious,	if	not,	in	fact,	altogether	unintelligible.		For	if	we	take,	as	I	think	we	should,	“x	is	essential	to	
y”	to	bear	the	meaning	“it	is	necessary	y	iff	x,”	or	more	plainly,	“under	no	condition	there	exists	y	without	x,”	then	given	that	logical	necessity	does	not	come	in	degrees	and	that	“x	is	essential	to	y”	is,	in	effect,	a	modal	statement,	it	follows	that	essentiality	too	does	not	come	in	degrees.		Hence,	either	the	A-and	B-series	are	both	equally	essential	to	the	nature	of	time,	or	only	one	is.	This	ambiguity,	however,	can	be	easily	avoided.		As	we	have	seen	in	the	previous	section,	on	McTaggart’s	picture	of	temporal	passage,	both	series	are	required	for	temporal	passage	to	take	place.		So,	perhaps,	the	following	sense	could	be	made	of	the	idea	that	the	A-and	B-series	are	both	essential	to	time:	(1) Time	iff	temporal	passage	(2) Temporal	passage	iff	(the	A-series	&	the	B-series)	(3) \	Time	iff		(the	A-series	&	the	B-series)	
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How	then	should	the	superlative	in	“is	more	fundamental	than”	be	interpreted	in	this	case?		§610	of	NE	sheds	some	light	on	this	question.		In	it,	McTaggart	asserts	the	A-series	is	more	fundamental	than	the	B-series	because	the	earlier	than/later	than	relations	are	defined	in	terms	of	pastness,	presentness	and	futurity,	“The	term	P	is	earlier	than	the	term	Q	if	it	is	ever	past	while	Q	is	present,	or	present	while	Q	is	future”	(NE,	§610).		Yet,	the	main	reason,	as	I	see	it,	for	holding	the	A-series	to	be	more	fundamental	than	its	counterpart	is	that	in	McTaggart’s	view	time	requires	change,	“there	could	be	no	time	if	nothing	changed”	(NE,	§309).		It	is	within	the	framework	of	this	thesis	that	a	sense	can	be	given	to	McTaggart’s	notion	of	degrees	of	essentiality.		The	A-series	is	more	fundamental	than	the	B-series	because	it	is	the	A-series	that	brings	about	change.		1.3.2 McTaggart	begins	his	exposition	of	the	essentiality	conjecture	by	stating	that	time	necessarily	involves	change,	and	that	for	there	to	be	change,	there	must	exist	the	A-series.		“Let	us	suppose	that	the	distinctions	of	past,	present,	and	future	do	not	apply	to	reality.		In	that	case,	can	change	apply	to	reality?”		(NE,	§309)		He	answers	this	question	in	the	negative.29		Yet,	it	is	not	exactly	clear	what	type	of	change	McTaggart	has	in	mind.		On	some	occasions,	it	seems,	he	means	ordinary	changes	in	things,	such	as	a	leaf	changing	its	color	from	green	to	yellow.		In	other	places	it	seems	that	he	has	in	his	crosshairs	changes	in	the	A-properties	of	events.		Additionally,	there	is	no	clear	demarcation	line	enabling	the	reader	to	follow	the	frequent	shifts	in	
																																																																				29	In	the	course	of	arguing	against	the	reality	of	the	A-series,	McTaggart	comes	to	an	implausible	Parmenidean	conclusion	that	changes	in	things	are	illusory.		At	the	end,	however,	he	did	not	prove	the	unreality	of	change,	this	quintessentially	Mooreian	fact	of	our	everyday	experience.	
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meaning.		One	thing,	however,	is	clear;	McTaggart	thinks	that	the	ordinary	changes	in	things	require	the	reality	of	the	A-series,	“…	if	there	is	any	change,	it	must	be	looked	for	in	the	A	series	alone.		If	there	is	no	real	A	series,	there	is	no	real	change”	(NE,	§311).	What	is	then	this	connection	between	changes	in	the	ordinary	properties	of	things	and	changes	in	the	A-properties	of	events?		The	leaf	cannot	change	its	color	unless	the	property	“being	yellow”	first	is	in	the	future	then	it	is	in	the	present	and	the	property	“being	green”	first	in	the	present	and	then	in	the	past.		But	the	B-series	does	not	allow	such,	or	for	that	matter	any	other	form	of	temporal	dynamism.	The	conclusion,	therefore,	is	that	there	can	be	no	changing	of	the	leaf’s	color	unless	the	A-series	is	real.		This	is	how	McTaggart	lays	out	this	contention:	Can	we	say	that,	in	time	which	formed	a	B	series	but	not	an	A	series,	the	change	consisted	in	the	fact	that	the	event	ceased	to	be	an	event,	while	another	event	began	to	be	an	event?		If	this	were	the	case,	we	should	certainly	have	got	a	change.		But	this	is	not	possible.		If	N	is	ever	earlier	than	O	and	later	than	M,	it	will	always	be,	and	has	always	been,	earlier	than	O	and	later	than	M,	since	the	relations	of	earlier	and	later	are	permanent.		N	will	thus	always	be	in	a	B	series.		And	as,	by	our	present	hypothesis,	a	B	series	by	itself	constitutes	time,	N	will	always	have	a	position	in	a	time-series,	and	always	has	had	one.		That	is,	it	always	has	been	an	event,	and	always	will	be	one,	and	cannot	begin	or	cease	to	be	an	event	(NE,	§310).	
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McTaggart	argues	that	on	the	B-picture	of	reality	events	are	forever	stacked,	as	it	were,	in	B-locations.		Apparently,	in	this	reality,	no	change	is	possible;	nothing	could	change	in	this	frozen	river	of	time;	the	leaf	is	and	has	always	been	green	in	the	relative	B-location	and	it	can	never	become	yellow.30		McTaggart	further	argues	that	B-ordered	events	do	not	change	qualitatively	–	once	a	certain	event	always	a	certain	event.		Indeed,	what	is	changeable	in	an	event?		Well,	nothing,	nothing	at	all.		For	if	something	were	changeable	in	an	event,	then	it	would	not	be	the	same	event.		If	
Leibnitz’s	Law	of	Identity	holds	at	all,	it	undoubtedly	holds	in	the	case	of	events.		Here	is	how	McTaggart	puts	this	contention:	Take	any	event	–	the	death	of	Queen	Anne,	for	example	–	and	consider	what	change	can	take	place	in	its	characteristics.		That	it	is	death,	that	it	is	the	death	of	Anne	Stuart,	that	it	has	such	causes,	that	it	has	such	effects	–	every	characteristic	of	this	sort	never	changes.		“Before	the	stars	saw	one	another	plain”	the	event	in	question	was	a	death	of	an	English	Queen.		At	the	last	moment	of	time	–	if	time	has	a	last	moment	–	the	event	in	question	will	still	be	a	death	of	an	English	Queen	(NE,	§311).	Yet,	as	McTaggart	points	out,	in	one	respect	A-ordered	events	do	change.		A	future	event	e	will	inevitably	become	present	and	then,	in	an	instant,	it	will	become	past.		It	is	this	type	of	change	that	McTaggart	takes	to	be	the	basis	of	all	change	and	it	
																																																																				30	The	B-theorist	would	be	quick	to	point	out	that	the	B-order	of	events	gives	rise	to	variation	over	the	B-distances;	on	his	view,	this	is	all	that	there	is	to	change.		I	will	delve	extensively	into	this	issue	in	Chapter	III.	
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is	this	type	of	change	that	he	deems	to	be	paradoxical.		And	this	brings	us	to	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox.		
1.4 The	Temporal	Transience	Paradox	1.4.1 The	initial	phase	of	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox	is	basically	this:		(1) Pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	prima	facie	incompatible	properties;	no	event	instantiates	more	than	one	at	once.	(2) However,	the	reality	of	the	A-series	entails	that	any	event	instantiates	all	three	temporal	properties	at	once.	Apparently,	(1)	and	(2)	are	incompatible.		This	is	how	McTaggart	articulates	this	initial	phase:	Past,	present,	and	future	are	incompatible	determinations.		Every	event	must	be	one	or	the	other,	but	no	event	can	be	more	than	one.		If	I	say	that	any	event	is	past,	that	implies	that	it	is	neither	present	nor	future,	and	so	with	others....		The	characteristics,	therefore,	are	incompatible.		But	every	event	has	them	all	(NE,	§329).	On	its	face,	this	reasoning	is	rather	an	oddball.		Many	B-theorists,	however,	defend	its	theoretical	legitimacy.		N.	Oaklander,	for	instance,	argues	that		McTaggart	does	not	begin	by	assuming	that	every	event	is	(timelessly	or	simultaneously)	past,	present,	and	future,	but	rather	he	denies	it.		Thus,	the	common	critique	of	McTaggart	that	he	errs	at	the	first	step	by	
assuming	every	event	is	past,	present	and	future	is	a	non	sequitur.31																																																																							31	N.		Oaklander	(2004),	p.53.	
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Oaklander’s	charitable	reading,	however,	is	not	supported	by	the	text	(although,	as	we	shall	see	in	section	1.5,	it	is	not	entirely	off	the	mark).		McTaggart	explicitly	states	that	“every	event	has	them	all.”		Worse,	he	does	not	give	an	argument	for	this	crucial	conjecture;	not	even	a	hint	as	to	how	it	might	go.		Unless,	of	course,	we	are	willing	to	accept	the	three	sentence	which	immediately	follows	the	opening	claim	to	be	such	an	argument:	If	M	is	past,	it	has	been	present	and	future.		If	it	is	future,	it	will	be	present	and	past.		If	it	is	present,	it	has	been	future	and	will	be	past.		Thus	all	the	three	characteristics	belong	to	each	event.		How	is	this	consistent	with	their	being	incompatible	(NE,	§329)?	The	initial	reaction	people	usually	have	when	they	first	encounter	this	reasoning	is	utter	incredulity.32		It	appears	that	McTaggart	is	totally	oblivious	to	the	profound	distinction	between	simple	and	compound	temporal	attributes.		Surely,	just	because	(i),	(ii),	and	(iii)	are	true,	it	does	not	follow	that	(i)*,	(ii)*,	and	(iii)*	must	also	be	true.	(i) Any	past	event	instantiates	the	simple	property	_is	past	and	compound	properties	_has	been	present	and	_has	been	future,	
																																																																				32	D.	M.	Zimmerman	(2005),	for	instance,	deems	it	to	be	McTaggart’s	“worst	argument”	and	agrees	with	C.	D.	Broad’s	characterization	of	it	as	a	“philosophical	howler.”		In	the	hundred	years	since	the	inception	of	the	paradox,	a	number	of	interpretations	of	its	initial	phase	have	been	advanced.		As	a	rule,	A-theorists	are	critical	of	its	underlying	logical	structure;	they,	therefore,	reject	its	metaphysical	import.		In	contrast,	B-theorists	tend	to	overlook	its	logical	blemishes	and	prefer	to	accentuate	its	far-reaching	metaphysical	consequences.		To	date,	no	consensus	has	been	reached	about	the	logical	validity	of	the	initial	phase	and	soundness	of	its	metaphysics.		For	positive	assessments	of	the	initial	phase	of	the	paradox,	and	the	paradox	in	general,	see,	for	instance,	M.	Dummett,	“A	defense	of	McTaggart’s	Proof	of	the	Unreality	of	Time,”	The	Philosophical	Review	69	(1960),	pp.	497-504;	chapter	7	of	D.	H	Mellor	(1998);	and	N.	Oaklander	(2004).		For	negative	assessments,	see,	for	instance,	C.	D.	Broad	(1938);	G.	N.	Schlesinger	(1980);	and	S.	Savitt	(2001).	
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(i)*	 Any	past	event	instantiates	the	simple	properties	_is	past,	_is	present,	and	_is	future,	(ii)	 Any	present	event	instantiates	the	simple	property	_is	present	and	compound	properties	_has	been	future	and	_will	be	past,	(ii)*	 Any	present	event	instantiates	the	simple	properties	_is	present,	_is,	past	and	_is	future,	(iii)	 Any	future	event	instantiates	the	simple	property	_is	future	and	compound	properties	_will	be	present	and	_will	be	past.		(iii)*	 Any	future	event	instantiates	the	simple	properties	_is	future,	_is	present,	and	_is	past.	Broad	was	quick	to	point	out	that	there	is	no	contradiction	to	be	avoided	in	the	first	place;	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	incompatible	only	if	they	are	instantiated	by	events	at	the	same	time.		But	they	are	never	instantiated	in	this	way:	When	it	is	said	that	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	incompatible	predicates,	this	is	true	only	in	the	sense	that	no	one	term	could	have	two	of	them	simultaneously	or	timelessly.		Now	no	term	ever	appears	to	have	any	of	them	timelessly,	and	no	term	ever	appears	to	have	them	simultaneously.		What	appears	to	be	the	case	is	that	certain	terms	have	them	successively.		Thus	there	is	nothing	in	the	temporal	appearances	to	suggest	that	there	is	a	contradiction	to	be	avoided.33	Yet,	there	is	more	to	McTaggart’s	reasoning	than	meets	the	eye.		It	is	more	than	just	an	artless	equation	of	simple	and	compound	temporal	attributes.		The	air	of	
																																																																				33	C.	D.	Broad	(1938),	p.	313.	
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fallaciousness	that	surrounds	the	initial	pace	of	the	argument	is	due	solely	to	the	haphazardness	of	McTaggart’s	way	of	reasoning.		What	is	more,	McTaggart	is	fully	aware	of	the	apparent	strangeness	of	his	claim	and	acknowledges,	in	the	passage	that	immediately	follows	its	articulation,	that	a	natural	way	to	counter	it	would	be	to	say	that	events	do	not	exemplify	all	three	simple	temporal	properties	simultaneously:	It	may	seem	that	this	can	easily	be	explained.		Indeed,	it	has	been	impossible	to	state	the	difficulty	without	almost	giving	the	explanation….		It	is	never	true,	the	answer	will	run,	that	M	is	present,	past,	and	future.		It	is	present,	will	be	past,	and	has	been	future.		Or	it	is	past,	and	has	been	future	and	present,	or	again	is	future,	and	will	be	present	and	past.		The	characteristics	are	only	incompatible	when	they	are	simultaneous,	and	there	is	no	contradiction	to	this	in	the	fact	that	each	term	has	all	of	them	successively	(NE,	§330).	Indeed,	when	we	have	successive	instantiation	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity,	we	have	perfectly	compatible	facts,	which	are	expressible	by	perfectly	consistent	tense	elocutions.		But,	McTaggart	argues,	this	is	not	the	whole	picture.			There	are	further	concerns	which	arise	upon	contemplating	the	idea	that	events	instantiate	different	temporal	properties	at	different	times.		Namely,	iterated	tenses,	e.g.,	e	is	future	in	the	past,	e	is	present	in	the	present,	e	is	past	in	the	future,	are	suspect	because	they	imply	an	infinite	hierarchy	of	the	A-series.34		McTaggart	then	argues	that	at	any	level	of	this	hierarchy	we	have	a	dilemma:	either	events	instantiate	
																																																																				34	A.	Prior	(1967)	considers	McTaggart’s	uneasiness	with	iterated	tenses	to	herald	the	advance	of	temporal	logic,	“one	could	say	that	there	is	tense-logic	itself	in	McTaggart,	though	Findlay	was	first	to	see	it	as	such,”	p.1.	
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pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	at	once	or	they	instantiate	them	successfully.		It	is	this	dilemma,	neither	horn	of	which	is	metaphysically	viable,	that	is	at	the	heart	of	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox.		1.4.2 Having	acknowledged	the	obvious	fact	that	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	incompatible	properties	only	when	they	are	instantiated	simultaneously,	McTaggart	then	invites	us	to	consider	an	alternative	possibility,	namely,	that	they	are	instantiated	successively,	as,	for	instance,	when	an	event	e	is	present,	will	be	past,	and	
has	been	future,	and	then	he	asks,	“But	what	is	meant	by	“has	been”	and	“will	be”?		And	what	is	meant	by	“is,”	when,	as	here,	it	is	used	with	a	temporal	meaning,	and	not	simply	for	predication”	(NE,	§331)?		In	answering	this	question,	McTaggart	invokes	the	notion	of	ordinary	property	instantiation	over	time:	When	we	say	that	X	has	been	Y,	we	are	asserting	X	to	be	Y	at	a	moment	of	past	time.		When	we	say	X	will	be	Y,	we	are	asserting	X	to	be	Y	at	a	moment	of	future	time.		When	we	say	that	X	is	Y	(in	the	temporal	sense	of	“is”),	we	are	asserting	X	to	be	Y	at	a	moment	of	present	time	(NE,	§331).	This	notion	of	ordinary	property	instantiation	over	time	is	depicted	in	Figure	3	below:			 	Fig.	3	Ordinary	property	instantiation	over	time.	
x	is	Y	 x	is	Y	 x	is	Y	past	moment	 present	moment	 future	moment	
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	McTaggart	then	assumes	without	additional	argument	that	the	same	mechanics	are	in	play	in	the	case	of	instantiation	of	temporal	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity,	thus,	in	effect,	positing	a	second-order	A-time,	Thus	our	first	statement	about	M	–	that	it	is	present,	will	be	past,	and	has	been	future	–	means	that	M	is	present	at	a	moment	of	present	time,	past	at	some	moment	of	future	time,	and	future	at	some	moment	of	past	time	(NE,	§331).	This	unargued	assumption	can	be	represented	analogously	to	that	in	Figure	3	as	follows:			 Fig.	4	Temporal	property	instantiation	over	time.		It	appears	that	McTaggart	is	taken	in	here	by	the	grammatical	similarity	between	statements	expressing	ordinary	and	temporal	property	instantiation.		For	him,	for	instance,	“x	is	red”	is	on	a	par	with	“x	is	past.”		And	since	being	red	is	always	being	red	at	some	moment	of	time,	McTaggart	surmises	that	being	past,	present,	and	future	is	too	always	being	past,	present,	and	future	at	some	moment	of	time.		This	reasoning	leads	McTaggart	to	the	conjecture	that	the	instantiation	of	A-properties	always	involves	a	higher-order	A-time,	because	being	a	process,	it,	as	all	processes,	must	unfold	over	time.		And	since	past,	present,	and	future	cannot	unfold	over	
e	is	F	 e	is	N	 e	is	P	past	moment	 present	moment	 future	moment	
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themselves,	it	follows	that	they	unfold	over	a	higher-order	time.		This	is	McTaggart’s	initial	step	toward	infinite	regress	of	A-attributions.	McTaggart	then	proceeds	to	argue	that	“every	moment,	like	every	event	is	both	past,	present,	and	future”	(NE,	§331).		Unfortunately,	this	shift	from	event-talk	to	moment-talk	is	largely	overlooked	in	the	literature;	yet,	it	is	an	integral	part	of	McTaggart’s	argument.		At	the	outset	McTaggart	claims	that	any	event	e	is	past,	present,	and	future.		Then	he	points	to	the	obvious	fact	that	this	is	a	contradictory	claim.		Apparently,	this	contradiction	is	avoidable	by	positing	a	second-order	A-series:	event	e	is	past	at	a	future	moment,	present	at	present	moment,	and	future	at	a	past	moment.		Then	McTaggart	states	that	a	second-order	A-series	is	too	comprised	of	moments.		These	second-order	moments,	McTaggart	then	claims,	instantiate	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity.		We,	thus	again,	as	in	the	case	of	events,	have	only	two	available	options;	either	second-order	moments	instantiate	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	simultaneously	or	they	instantiate	them	successively	and	thus	over	a	third-order	A-time	and	so	on.	It	is	this	switch	from	the	event-talk	to	the	moment-talk	and	not,	as	is	commonly	held,	McTaggart’s	initial	claim	that	any	event	instantiate	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	at	once,	that	is	the	weakest	link	in	his	argument,	because	it	is	not	at	all	clear	why	second-order	moments,	or	for	that	matter	first-order	moments,	should	instantiate	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity.		It	is	at	moments,	not	by	moments,	that	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	instantiated	by	events.		It	is	sensible	to	state	that	event	e	is	future	and	then	it	is	past,	but	it	is	not	sensible	to	state	that	a	moment	was	in	the	future	and	then	it	moved	into	the	past.		Indeed,	as	I	
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have	argued	in	section	1.2,	McTaggart	is	well-aware	of	the	fact	that	moments	of	time,	if	there	to	be	such	entities,	are	permanently	ordered,	they	do	not	migrate	in	relation	to	each	other,	though	it	is	conceivable	that	they	can	move	as	one	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	something	external.	McTaggart	seems	to	be	saying	that	a	second-order	A-series	moves	as	a	rigid	whole	in	relation	to	the	first-order	A-series	and	a	third-order	A-series	moves	in	the	same	fashion	in	relation	to	a	second-order	A-series	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.		This	picture	of	temporal	reality	stems	from	McTaggart’s	shift	from	the	event-talk	to	the	moment-talk,	but	it	is	not	at	all	clear	what	justifies	this	rather	sudden	shift.		Yet,	we	can	discern	the	motivation	for	the	shift.		McTaggart	does	not	intend	to	introduce	higher-order	events.		Indeed,	what	such	entities	could	possibly	be?		But	a	talk	of	higher-order	times,	it	seems,	is	plausible.		That	is	why	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox	is	formulated	in	terms	of	higher-order	terms	of	times	and	not	in	terms	of	higher-order	events.	Now,	McTaggart’s	treatment	of	the	phenomenon	of	temporal	properties	instantiation	as	an	analog	of	the	phenomenon	of	regular	property	instantiation	(see	Figure	4)	cannot	be	true	of	reality.		Any	past	event	e	is	not	future	in	the	past,	that	is,	it	does	not	instantiate	the	property	of	futurity	at	a	past	moment,	it	is	at	a	past	moment	
simpliciter;	it	is	this	temporal	fact	of	being-at-a-past-moment	that	makes	this	event	being	past,	viz.	makes	it	instantiate	the	property	of	pastness;	and	this	is	true	for	presentness	and	futurity:	e	is	present	means	e	is-at-a-present-moment	and	e	is	future	means	e	is-at-a-future-moment.		A	consistent	picture	of	A-temporal	reality	is	depicted	
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in	Figure	5.35		In	this	diagram	it	can	be	clearly	seen	that	it	is	not	A-times	(as	in	Figure	4)	which	are	at	A-times,	but	that	it	is	only	events	which	are	at	A-times.		First	an	event	
e	is	in	the	future,	then	it	moves	to	the	present,	and	eventually	it	recedes	into	that	past.		On	this	picture	no	infinite	hierarchy	of	A-series,	therefore,	arises.			 	Fig.	5	No	infinite	hierarchy	of	A-series.	It	is	hard	to	say	what	exactly	compelled	McTaggart	to	hold	that	moments,	in	addition	to	events,	also	instantiate	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity.		Be	it	as	it	may,	once	it	is	held	that	moments	do	themselves	instantiate	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	at	other	moments,	the	original	dilemma	articulated	with	respect	to	events	reappears	in	the	case	of	moments;	either	moments	of	time	instantiate	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	at	once	or	they	instantiate	them	successively.		The	former	horn	of	the	dilemma	is	patently	contradictory	and	the	latter	one	inevitably	leads	to	the	infinite	regress	of	A-series.		Indeed,	if	we	accept	McTaggart’s	dilemma	a	propos	moments,	then	we	have	no	choice	but	to	admit	the	reality	of	an	infinite	hierarchy	of	A-series.		The	gist	of	McTaggart’s	claim,	therefore,	is	that	an	A-series	of	any	order	is	either	essentially	self-contradictory	or	this	contradiction	can	only	be	resolved	by	positing	a	higher-order	A-time.		But	since	the	contradiction	cannot	be	resolved	
																																																																				35	It	is	consistent	in	so	far	its	theoretical	structure	is	concerned.		Whether	it	is	true	of	reality	is	altogether	a	different	question.		
e	is	at	past	moment	 present	moment	 future	moment	e	is	at	 e	is	at	
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conclusively	at	any	level,	we	have	an	infinite	regress	of	A-series.		McTaggart	then	concludes	that:	Such	an	infinity	is	vicious.		The	attribution	of	the	characteristics	past,	present,	and	future	to	the	terms	of	any	series	leads	to	a	contradiction,	unless	it	is	specified	that	they	have	them	successively.		This	means,	as	we	have	seen,	that	they	have	them	in	relation	to	terms	specified	as	past,	present,	and	future.		These	again,	to	avoid	a	like	contradiction,	must	in	turn	be	specified	as	past,	present,	and	future.		And,	since	this	continues	infinitely,	the	first	set	of	terms	never	escapes	from	contradiction	at	all	(NE,	§332).		1.4.3 Still,	the	question	persists	whether	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress	of	A-series	is	vicious.		Consult,	for	instance,	the	exchange	between	Q.	Smith	and	N.	Oaklander	(1984)	which,	incidentally,	they	frame	not	in	terms	of	the	regress	of	A-series,	but	in	terms	of	the	regress	of	temporal	attributions.36		Smith	admits	the	regress,	but	holds	it	to	be	benign.		Oaklander,	on	the	other	hand,	holds	it	to	be	outright	vicious.		As	a	rule,	A-theorists	take	the	regress	to	be	benign	and	their	opponents	take	it	to	be	vicious	because,	as	Mellor	puts	it,	“at	no	stage	in	it	can	all	the	A-facts	it	entails	be	consistently	stated.”37		G.	Priest,	although	he	adapts	Mellor’s	treatment	of	the	regress,	nonetheless	
																																																																				36	Q.	Smith,	“The	Infinite	Regress	of	Temporal	Attributions”	in	The	New	Theory	of	Time,		N.	Oaklander	and	Q.	Smith	(eds.),	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	1984)	pp.	180–94.			N.	Oaklander,	“McTaggart’s	Paradox	and	the	Infinite	Regress	of	Temporal	Attributions:	A	Reply	to	Smith,”	the	same	volume,	pp.195–201.	37	D.H.	Mellor	(1998),	p.74.	
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sharply	disagrees	with	him	on	this	point.		Priest	takes	the	regress	to	be	benign	and	concludes	that	“McTaggart’s	argument,	therefore,	fails.”38	Priest’s	position	is	of	particular	relevance	to	the	issue	in	hand.		Before	discussing	Priest’s	interpretation	of	McTaggart’s	infinite	temporal	regress,	which	I	think	is	wrong,	let	me	first	say	something	about	how	I	understand	the	difference	between	vicious	and	benign	regresses	in	general.		It	is	not	easy	to	come	up	with	a	clear	criterion	of	the	vicious	and	the	benign	with	respect	to	the	notion	of	infinite	regress,	but	perhaps	definition	by	example	will	do.		Let	us	start	with	benign	infinite	regresses.		The	following	is	Priest’s	example	of	it:	P	is	true,	(P	is	true)	is	true,	((P	is	true)	is	true)	is	true…39	Here,	it	would	appear,	we	are	dealing	with	an	infinite	series	of	propositions;	in	no	stage	of	this	infinite	reiteration	of	the	first	proposition	there	crops	up	a	contradiction	or	any	other	sort	of	logical	trouble.		John	Passmore	too	identifies	a	benign	infinite	regress	with	an	infinite	series,	and	distinguishes	this	from	an	infinite	regress	proper	which	he	takes	to	be	vicious	in	all	cases.40		Here	are	Passmore’s	examples	of	benign	and	vicious	infinite	regresses	in	that	order:	(i)	Every	line	is	infinitely	divisible,	(ii)	To	move	along	a	line	one	must	move	through	all	its	parts.	Now,	I	distinguish	between	three	types	of	infinite	regress:	(i)	logical	infinite	regress,	(ii)	epistemological	infinite	regress,	and	(iii)	ontological	infinite	regress.		I	take	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress	to	be	an	instance	of	ontological	infinite	regresses,	
																																																																				38	G.	Priest,	Logic:	a	very	Short	Introduction	(Oxford,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	p.	60.	39	Private	correspondence.	40	J.	Passmore,	Philosophical	Reasoning,	(New	York:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1961),	Chapter	2.	
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for	it	involves	the	question	concerning	the	roster	of	existence;	it	is,	in	other	words,	about	what	exists,	or	rather	in	McTaggart’s	case,	about	what	does	not	exist.		Priest’s	example	and	Passmore’s	first	example	are	instances	of	logical	infinite	regress.		Here	is	an	example	of	epistemological	infinite	regress.		If	to	know	x	is	to	know	its	cause,	then	in	order	for	this	cause	to	be	known,	the	cause	of	this	cause	must	be	known	and	so	ad	
infinitum	(unless,	of	course,	one	assumes	that	there	exists	the	primal	uncaused	cause	of	everything).		It	has	the	form	of	‘why	x?	--	because	y;	why	y?	--	because	z;	‘why	z	--because…’		Epistemological	infinite	regress,	it	seems	to	me,	is	always	vicious	because	it	defers	explanation	indefinitely.	Here	is	another	example	of	ontological	infinite	regress.		Take	two	objects	A	and	B.		Count	them;	this	is	the	one	and	this	is	the	other.		But	look,	in	fact	we	have	three	objects	A,	B,	and	the	compound	object	A+B.		But	by	having	three	objects	we	have	four,	i.e.,	A,	B,	A+B	and	the	compound	object	A+B+(A+B)	and	so	ad	infinitum.41		Yet,	the	intuition	we	have	is	that	the	regress	stops	at	the	third	object,	or	may	be	even	at	the	second.		This	instance	of	ontological	infinite	regress	is	vicious	in	the	sense	that	it	cannot	be	true	of	reality;	two	objects	simply	do	not	generate	an	infinite	number	of	objects,	there	are	at	most	three	objects.			Now,	back	to	Priest’s	reading	of	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress	of	A-series.		Priest	offers	an	ingenious	interpretation	of	this	infinite	regress	as	an	instance	of	logical	infinite	regress.		As	one	would	expect,	he	maintains	that	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress	
																																																																				41	This	is,	of	course,	resembles	of	the	famous	‘Third	Man	Argument’.	
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is	perfectly	benign.		In	arguing	his	case,	Priest	employs	Arthur	Prior’s	logical	machinery	in	conjunction	with	the	notion	of	a	static	time	series	as	follows:42	Suppose	that	h	is	true	in	just	s0.		Then	any	statement	with	a	compound	tense	concerning	h	is	true	somewhere.		For	example,	consider	FPPFh.		This	is	true	in	s-2,	as	the	following	diagram	shows:				Priest	then	concludes	that	“...	we	can	do	the	same	for	every	compound	tense	composed	of	F	and	P,	zigzagging	left	and	right,	as	required.		And	all	this	is	perfectly	consistent.”43	In	understanding	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress,	however,	the	crucial	question	which	ought	to	be	asked	is	whether	McTaggart’s	iterated	tenses,	such	as	future	in	the	past,	past	in	the	future,	etc.,	denote	distinct	A-series.		As	I	have	argued	in	the	previous	subsection,	they	indeed	do.		On	McTaggart’s	view	such	expressions	as	‘e	will	be	past	in	future’	imply	that	there	actually	exist	two	A-series;	the	same	would	follow	were	we	to	use	more	complex	iterated	tenses,	such	as	FPPFh, PFh, PPFh,	etc.		Indeed,	the	very	
notion	of	an	event	e	being	past	or	future	at	a	time	implies	a	second-order	A-series	because	it	amounts	to	the	notion	a	moment	being	at	another	moment.		It	is	this	infinite	hierarchy	of	A-series	which	McTaggart	holds	to	be	vicious.		It	is	vicious	
																																																																				42	Incidentally,	Prior	most	likely	would	not	approve	of	such	a	hybrid	theory	of	time,	for	he	held	the	concept	of	static	temporal	series	all	elements	of	which	are	equally	in	existence,	to	be	without	any	ontological	import.	43	G.	Priest	(2000),	p.60.	
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ontologically	because	each	A-series	requires	the	existence	of	a	higher	order	A-series	since	at	any	level	of	the	hierarchy	the	dilemma	in	question	is	present.44		It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	deem	McTaggart’s	infinite	regress	of	A-series	to	be	vicious. One,	however,	might	ask	"What	precisely	is	wrong	with	the	benign	infinite	regress	of	temporal	attributes	Priest	offers	in	Logic?"		I	think	nothing	is	wrong	with	it	as	long	as	we	do	not	take	the	compound	tenses	to	denote	distinct	A-series	in	the	hierarchy	of	A-series.		However,	if	we	take	the	compound	tenses	to	denote	distinct	A-series,	then	either	we	have	a	patent	contradiction	or	if	not	then	a	higher-order	A-series,	and	all	this	goes	indefinitely;	at	any	level	we	have	the	unresolvable	dilemma.		And	since	the	dilemma	cannot	be	resolved	conclusively	at	any	level	we	have	vicious	infinite	regress.	If	we	treat	McTaggart’s	temporal	regress	as	a	logical	regress,	as	it	seems	to	me	Priest	does,	then,	of	course,	the	regress	is	benign.		This	latter	interpretation,	however,	is	unwarranted.		McTaggart’s	argument	is	through-and-through	metaphysical,	since	it	deals	with	the	issue	of	what	is	out	there,	or	rather	with	the	issue	of	what	is	not	out	there.		In	McTaggart’s	case,	we	are,	using	Quine’s	phraseology,	dealing	with	the	problem	on	what	there	is,	and	not	with	the	problem	of	how	we	logically	regiment	the	language	of	temporal	discourse.		To	be	sure	the	latter	problem	is	integral	to	metaphysical	inquiry	concerning	the	nature	of	time,	yet,	it	is	also	distinct	from	this	inquiry	as	was	demonstrated	by	Prior,	who	has	shown	us	that	we	can	have	a	logically	regimented	tensed	language	in	the	world	of	ours	that	has	neither	past	nor	future.		
																																																																				44	Another	reason	for	holding	ontological	infinite	regress	of	A-series	to	be	unacceptable	is	that	an	infinite	number	of	A-series	violates	Ockham’s	razor.	
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McTaggart	skillfully	uses	ontological	infinite	regress	of	A-series	as	an	argument	against	the	reality	of	fluid	time.		Priest’s	interpretation	of	it	as	a	logical	infinite	regress,	therefore,	is	unwarranted.		
1.5 The	General	Structure	of	McTaggart’s	Argument	1.5.1 Let	us	now	go	back	to	the	beginning	of	section	1.4.		It	appears	that	it	is	(2)	that	is	the	crux	of	the	temporal	transience	paradox;	it,	therefore,	must	be	shown	to	be	true;	and	since	the	truth	of	(1)	is	self-evident	that	would	show	the	conjunction	of	(1)	and	(2)	to	be	genuinely	paradoxical	because	(1)	and	(2)	cannot	both	be	true.		Naturally,	a	question	arises:	How	does	McTaggart	prove	the	truth	of	that	the	reality	of	the	A-series	entails	that	any	event	instantiates	all	three	temporal	properties	at	once?		Yet,	in	the	end	the	soundness	of	the	paradox	does	not	hinge	on	such	a	proof.		McTaggart	does	not	argue,	as	Mellor	thinks	he	does,	that	“because	each	event	is	always	changing	its	A-times,	it	has	to	have	them	all.”45		It	is	patently	clear	that	the	assertion	that	any	event	is	past,	present	and	future	at	once	is	simply	false,	or	rather,	as	E.	Lowe	points	out,	it	is	incoherent.46	The	significance	of	the	temporal	transience	paradox,	as	I	have	argued	in	the	previous	section,	is	that	it	has	the	form	of	a	certain	dilemma,	namely,	either	events	instantiate	pastness,	presentness	and	futurity	at	once	or	they	instantiate	these	properties	successively.		The	former	horn	of	the	dilemma	is	patently	contradictory,	whereas	the	latter	one	generates	a	vicious	infinite	regress	of	the	A-series.		It	is	
																																																																				45	D.	H.	Mellor	(1998),	p.	73.	46	E.	J.	Lowe,	“The	Indexical	Fallacy	in	McTaggart’s	Proof	of	the	Unreality	of	Time,	Mind	96	(1987),	pp.	62-70.	
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McTaggart’s	analysis	of	simple-tense	predications	that	is	of	crucial	importance	to	understanding	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox.		The	following,	I	believe,	is	the	essence	of	McTaggart’s	analysis	of	simple-tense	predications:	(i) “e	is	past	in	the	future,”	=	“there	is	a	future	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	pastness	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series,”	(ii) “e	is	present	in	the	present,”	=	“there	is	a	present	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	presentness	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series,”	(iii) “e	is	future	in	the	past”	=	“there	is	a	past	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	futurity	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series.”	It	is	these	P-at-t,	N-at-t,	and	F-a-t	relations	which	bring	about	the	vicious	infinite	regress	of	temporal	attributions.		Apparently,	instantiations	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	over	time	commits	us	to	a	second-order	time	because	the	process	of	exemplification	of	temporal	properties	is	prima	facie	a	process	over	a	second-order	time	since	relations	the	P-at-t,	N-at-t,	and	F-at-t	are	essentially	t	¢-at-t	¢¢	relations.		And	since	McTaggart	explicitly	states	that	this	second-order	time	is	A-time,	“But	every	moment,	like	every	event,	is	both	past,	present,	and	future”	(NE,	§331),	we	are	dealing	here	with	the	exemplification	of	first-order	A-properties	over	a	second-order	A-time.		The	same	goes	for	second-order	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity;	they	too	are	exemplified	successively	because	they	are	no	less	incompatible	with	one	another	than	the	first-order	temporal	properties,	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.	
40	
The	crux	of	McTaggart’s	paradox	is	not	that	events	instantiate	all	three	temporal	properties	at	once,	they	in	fact	never	do,	but	that	the	instantiation	of	A-properties	entails	infinite	regress,	or	if	not	then	we	have	a	contradiction.		What	McTaggart	should	have	said,	therefore,	is	that	we	have	only	two	alternative	scenarios:	either	A-properties	are	instantiated	simultaneously	or	successively.		And	then	he	should	have	shown	that	neither	alternative	is	viable.		This	would	have	been	decisive.		Instead,	he	has	chosen	to	posit	an	unargued	assumption	that	the	contradiction	arises	at	the	first	level	of	instantiation	only	to	disclaim	it	immediately	thereafter	as	patently	nonsensical;	he	then	again	reintroduces	it	at	the	second	level	and	so	forth.		This	unwieldy	strategy	can	be	completely	avoided	if	we	take	the	temporal	transience	paradox	to	be	not	the	conjunction	of	(1)	and	(2),	but	as	a	dilemma.		So	construed,	the	paradox	has	the	form	of	a	catch-22:	either	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	instantiated	simultaneously,	which	is	a	blatant	contradiction	or	if	not,	they	are	then	instantiated	successively,	and	thus	over	a	second-order	A-time	and	so	ad	infinitum.		Whichever	horn	of	the	dilemma	one	chooses,	the	outcome	is	the	same	–	the	reality	of	A-time	must	be	rejected.		Despite	the	numerous	deficiencies	of	McTaggart’s	exposition	of	the	temporal	transience	paradox,	when	critically	and	charitably	construed,	it	conveys	a	singularly	potent	metaphysical	result	–	the	notion	of	temporal	transience	is	essentially	incongruous;	and	as	such,	it	is	without	any	ontological	import	whatsoever.	1.5.2 I	take	the	intended	general	structure	of	McTaggart	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	to	have	the	following	form:	(1) time	º	A-series	 (the	essentiality	conjecture),	
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(2) ¬	A-series	exists	 (the	temporal	transience	paradox),	(3) \¬time	exists	 (conclusion).	Yet,	on	McTaggart’s	own	admission,	time	involves	both	the	A-	and	B-series.		As	it	stands,	McTaggart’s	argument	amounts	to	the	rejection	of	the	reality	of	A-time	and	not,	as	he	claims,	to	the	rejection	of	the	reality	of	time	per	se.		McTaggart,	in	effect,	makes	two	metaphysical	claims,	one	of	which	has	larger	ontological	implications	than	the	other.		The	larger	claim	is	that	time	per	se	is	nonexistent	and	the	more	modest	claim	is	that	A-time	is	unreal.		The	lesser	claim	is	argued	for	via	the	temporal	transience	paradox,	whereas	the	larger	claim,	to	all	intents	and	purposes,	is	left	unargued.		McTaggart	simply	grounds	the	larger	claim	that	time	as	such	is	unreal	on	the	lesser	claim	that	the	A-series	is	unreal	via	the	essentiality	conjecture.		This	move	amounts	to	an	unwarranted	inflation	of	the	ontological	scope	of	the	temporal	transience	paradox.		This	inflation	has	rightly	been	criticized	by	Schlesinger:	
the	claim	that	time	is	unreal	is	not	an	intrinsic	part	of	McTaggart’s	argument.		His	argument	is	designed	principally	to	show	that	the	notion	of	an	A-series	gives	rise	to	a	contradiction.		If	his	argument	is	correct,	it	implies	only	that	the	A-series	is	unreal.		The	most	natural	conclusion	to	draw	from	this	would	be	that	time	should	be	thought	of	as	consisting	of	the	B-series	alone.”47	Apparently,	to	yield	(3),	(1)	should	state	that	time	as	such	is	A-time	and	nothing	else.		So	modified,	the	argument	has	the	following	form:	
																																																																				47	George	N.	Schlesinger	(1980),	p.	41.	
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(4) time	=	the	A-series	(5) ¬	A-series	exists	(6) \	¬time	exists	Yet,	it	is	not	how	McTaggart	argues	his	case.		The	A-series,	he	says,	is	as	essential	to	time	as	the	B-series	is.		Because	McTaggart’s	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	per	se	cannot	be	underwritten	by	his	argument	against	the	reality	of	A-time,	he	has	failed	to	prove	what	he	set	out	to	prove	–	the	unreality	of	time	as	such.		In	the	absence	of	an	argument	against	the	reality	of	B-time,	or	a	direct	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	as	such,	McTaggart’s	argument	for	the	delusiveness	of	time	is	inconclusive.		However,	an	argument	against	the	reality	of	B-time	would,	in	conjunction	with	the	argument	against	the	reality	of	A-time,	be	sufficient	to	complete	McTaggart’s	project.		I	will	offer	a	number	of	such	arguments	in	Chapter	III.	
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Chapter	II:	A	and	A/B	Theories	of	Time	
	
2.1 Varieties	of	A	and	A/B	theories	2.1.1 It	is	generally	agreed	that	the	foremost	difficulty	for	A	and	A/B	theorists	is	to	give	a	non-metaphorical	account	of	the	notion	of	temporal	passage.		McTaggart	argued	that	no	such	account	is	possible	in	principle	because	the	concept	of	temporal	passage	is	inherently	inconsistent.		Yet,	denial	of	the	reality	of	temporal	flow	is	patently	counterintuitive,	for	“there	is	hardly	any	experience	that	seems	more	persistently,	or	immediately	given	to	us	than	the	relentless	flow	of	time.”48		Surely,	says	the	voice	of	commonsense,	there	must	be	something	in	reality	that	corresponds	to	our	notion	of	temporal	passage.		Events	come	and	go,	things	take	shape	and	perish,	and	everything	succumbs	to	the	gnawing	tooth	of	time.		The	voice	of	commonsense	notwithstanding,	McTaggart	is	right	–	the	notion	of	temporal	flow,	in	any	shape	or	form,	is	ontologically	empty;	there	is	simply	nothing	in	reality	that	corresponds	to	our	deep-seated	belief	in	the	reality	of	temporal	passage.	McTaggart	presented	one	argument	to	that	conclusion,	but	there	are	many	more.		In	fact,	there	are	as	many	arguments	to	that	effect	as	there	are	versions	of	A	and	A/B	theories,	for	each	version	is	rooted	in	its	own,	inevitably	erroneous,	concept	of	temporal	flow.		In	this	chapter,	I	will	give	an	account	of	the	major	brands	of	A	and	A/B	theories.		The	exposition	seeks	to	bring	to	the	fore	the	principal	difficulties	which	besiege	the	concept	of	temporal	passage.	
																																																																				48	George	N.	Schlesinger,	“E	Pur	Si	Mouve,”	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	41	(1991),	pp.	427-41.	
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Let	us	begin	with	the	three	basic	theories	of	time.		The	variety	of	temporal	theories	is	constrained	by	three	basic	temporal	ontologies;	namely,	Presentism	(the	Pure	A-universe),	Possibilism	(the	Burgeoning-Universe),	and	Eternalism	(the	Block-Universe).		The	differences	between	the	three	temporal	ontologies	are	expressed	schematically	in	Figure	6	below.				 	Fig.	6	The	Pure	A-universe,	the	Burgeoning-Universe,	and	Block-Universe.	Unlike	the	Pure	A-universe	which	is	devoid	of	the	past	and	future	regions	(it	is	as	ephemeral	as	the	present	itself,	to	which	its	existence	is	reduced;	it,	as	one	might	say,	is	present-thin),	the	Block-universe	is	a	full-blown	entity;	it	is	also,	in	contrast	to	its	two	alternatives,	static	in	every	imaginable	respect.		In	the	Block-Universe,	nothing	changes	and	nothing	can	be	added	to	or	subtracted	from	its	existential	roster;	it	is	a	very	solid	block	universe,	indeed.49		The	Burgeoning	Universe,	on	the	other	hand,	has	both	dynamic	and	static	features.		Like	a	coral	reef,	it	continuously	grows	in	bulk	and	complexity,	building	on	what	is,	striving	toward	what	is	not	yet	in	existence.	
																																																																				49		I	will	delve	into	the	Block-Universe	hypothesis	in	Chapter	III.	
the	Pure	A-Universe											the	Burgeoning	Universe																								the	Block-Universe		 	
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	The	interjectory	of	the	three	basic	temporal	ontologies	depicted	in	Figure	6	and	the	three	basic	metaphysics	of	time,	viz.	the	A	theory,	the	B	theory,	and	the	A/B	theory,	gives	us	the	set	of	nine	possible	metaphysical	theories	of	time,	as	shown	in	Figure	7.		Some	pairings	in	Figure	7	are	counterintuitive.		For	instance,	the	marriage	between	an	A	theory	and	Eternalism	is,	on	its	face,	a	nonstarter,	since	it	gives	rise	to	a	self-contradictory	hypothesis	of	static/flowing	time.		Yet,	recently,	Dean	Zimmerman	took	it	upon	himself	to	“search	for	a	stable	eternalist	A	theory.”50		On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	nothing	can	be	more	discordant	than	a	B	theory	and	Presentism;	yet,	as	I	shall	show	in	Chapter	III,	the	Block-Universe	hypothesis	does	inevitably	lead	to	the	notion	that	all	temporally	ordered	segments	of	the	Block-Universe	exist	at	one	and	the	same	durationless	moment;	which	is	another	way	to	say	that	all	temporally	ordered	slices	of	the	Block-Universe	are	simultaneous	and,	therefore,	are	co-present.		
	Fig.	7		The	set	of	nine	possible	metaphysical	theories	of	time.	
																																																																				50	D.	W.	Zimmerman,	“The	A	theory	of	Time,	the	B	theory	of	Time,	and	‘Taking	Tense	Seriously’,”	
Dialectica	59	(2005),	pp.	401–57.		I	take	Zimmerman’s	A	Eternalism	to	amount	to	A/B	Eternalism,	for	what	he	argues	for	is,	in	fact,	the	Block-Universe	plus	the	dynamic	Now.	
	 	 A	theory		 	 B	theory		 	 A/B	theory			
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Presentism	 	 A	Presentism	 	 B	Presentism	 	 A/B	Presentism	
Possibilism	 	 A	Possibilism	 	 B	Possibilism	 	 A/B	Possibilism	
Eternalism	 	 A	Eternalism	 	 B	Eternalism	 	 A/B	Eternalism	
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2.2 The	Moving-Now	Model	of	Temporal	Passage	2.2.1 Let	us	first	consider	the	question	whether	the	moving-now	is	an	element	of	the	A-series.		In	the	first	chapter,	I	argued	that	if	we	take	the	A-series	to	be	a	genuine	series,	its	elements	must	be	permanently	ordered.		Suppose	then	that	the	A-series	is	a	genuine	series	and	that	the	moving-now	is	one	of	its	elements.		From	these	two	suppositions	it	follows	that	all	elements	of	the	A-series	move	in	unison	with	the	moving-now	in	relation	to	something	external.		How	then,	on	this	hypothesis,	should	we	go	about	distinguishing	the	moving-now	from	the	other	elements	of	the	A-series?		We	surely	should	not	say	that	all	the	elements	of	the	A-series	are	nows,	for	in	such	case	everything	would	be	now.		There	must	be	something	unique	about	the	moving-now.		What	is	then	that	particular	feature	of	the	moving-now	that	other	elements	of	the	A-series	lack?		As	far	as	I	can	tell,	on	a	pure	A	theory,	the	moving-now	is	indistinguishable	from	any	other	temporal	point	in	the	A-series.		If,	however,	we	assume	an	A/B	picture	of	time,	then	it	could	be	said	that	the	moving-now	moves	along	the	B-series,	one	B-segment	at	a	time;	and	while	it	‘hovers	over’	a	given	segment	of	the	B-series	it	brings	into	existence	whatever	is	situated	at	that	segment	so	that	what	is	no	longer	and	not	yet	in	the	spotlight	of	the	moving-now	does	not	exist.51		It	is	this	feature	of	the	moving-now	about	which	it	then	can	be	said	that	it	sets	it	apart	from	the	other	elements	of	the	A-series.			
																																																																				51	Compare	this	picture	with	Broad’s	description	of	the	moving-now	as	“policeman’s	bull’s-eye	traversing	the	fronts	of	the	houses	in	a	street”	quoted	in	full	on	page	47.	
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Apparently,	on	this	picture,	all	other	members	of	the	A-series	are	existentially	inert;	that	is,	they	play	no	role	in	bringing	things	into	existence.		In	fact,	postulating	these	members	is	of	no	theoretical	consequence	whatsoever,	for	they	neither	add	to	nor	take	away	from	a	theory	of	the	moving-now.		In	the	light	of	this	understanding	and	for	the	sake	of	economy,	it	would	be	prudent	to	dispose	of	the	notion	of	the	A-series	altogether	and	hold	that	it	is	just	the	moving-now	that	moves	in	relation	to	the	static	B-series,	as	shown	in	Figure	8.				 Fig.	8	The	now	moves	in	relation	to	the	static	B-series.		The	B-series	+	the	moving-now	hypothesis	is	sometimes	called	in	the	literature	the	cinematographic	conception	of	temporal	passage.52		The	aim	of	the	analogy	is	to	communicate	the	idea	that	even	though	the	relations	of	the	elements	of	the	B-series	are	static,	the	movement	of	the	moving-now	along	the	B-series	(alternatively,	the	movement	of	the	B-series	in	relation	to	the	stationary	now)	animates	the	‘world-film’,	as	it	were.		This	analogy,	of	course,	does	not	help	a	bit	to	clarify	the	nature	of	the	moving-now.		Despite	the	fact	that	we	are	told	an	ostensibly	sound	story	of	the	‘world-film’,	all	frames	of	which	are	in	place	but	only	one	frame	being	existentially	active	at	a	time,	the	story,	though	internally	coherent,	is	without	
																																																																				52	See,	for	instance,	H.	Bergson,	An	Introduction	to	Metaphysics,	T.E.	Hulme	(trans.),	(New	York:	The	Liberal	Arts	Press,	1949).	
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any	ontological	import	whatsoever,	for	it	says	nothing	about	the	nature	of	the	moving-now.		Indeed,	in	what	sense	the	‘lens’	of	the	moving-now	moves	in	relation	to	the	‘world-film’	spread	over	the	B-series	thus	animating	its	characters	or,	conversely,	what	sense	can	be	given	to	the	idea	that	the	‘world-film’	itself	moves	in	relation	to	the	lens	of	the	static-now?		Such	pictures	are	too	metaphorical	to	have	a	theoretical	worth.		The	cinematographic	analogy,	therefore,	must	be	rejected	as	being	nothing	but	a	figure	of	speech;	by	itself,	it	cannot	give	us	a	coherent	theoretical	account	of	the	notion	of	the	moving-now,	and	more	generally,	about	the	nature	of	temporal	passage.		2.2.2 Apparently,	the	moving-now	model	of	temporal	passage,	properly	classified,	is	a	hybrid	A/B	theory,	for	it	involves	the	static	B-series	and	the	dynamic	now	moving	in	the	direction	from	past/earlier	to	future/later,	as	shown	in	Figure	9.		I	doubt	that	a	pure	A-model	of	the	moving-now,	that	is,	a	model	that	does	not	involve	the	B-series,	or	some	point	of	reference	external	to	the	moving-now,	is	theoretically	feasible,	for	it	would	hinge	on	an	inherently	contradictory	notion	of	a	non-relational	movement	of	the	moving-now.						 Fig.	9	The	non-relational	movement	of	the	moving-now.	
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This	twofold	time	hypothesis	is	implicit	in	McTaggart.		But	it	is	in	C.	D.	Broad	that	the	hypothesis	is	explicitly	articulated	(although	he	does	not	endorse	it):	We	are	naturally	tempted	to	regard	the	history	of	the	world	as	existing	eternally	in	a	certain	order	of	events.		Along	this,	and	in	a	fixed	direction,	we	imagine	the	characteristic	of	presentness	as	moving,	somewhat	like	the	spot	of	light	from	policeman’s	bull’s-eye	traversing	the	fronts	of	the	houses	in	a	street.		What	is	illuminated	is	the	present,	what	has	been	illuminated	is	the	past,	and	what	has	not	yet	been	illuminated	is	the	future.53	Upon	considering	the	moving-now	model	of	temporal	passage,	numerous	questions	present	themselves:	For	instance,	it	reasonable	to	ask,	How	fast	does	the	moving-now	move?		Alternatively,	we	could	ask	how	fast	the	‘world-film’	moves	in	relation	to	the	static-now?		Is	it	a	member	of	the	A-series?		If	it	is,	what	then	is	its	relation	to	the	other	members?		What	are	these	other	members?		Are	they	moving-	nows	all	sliding	in	unison	along	the	B-series?		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	moving-now	is	not	a	part	of	the	A-series,	do	we	not,	in	effect,	have	a	three-layer	time	hypothesis,	viz.	the	A-series	plus	the	B-series	plus	the	moving-now?		Is	this	an	ontologically	cost-effective	picture	of	reality?		These,	and	the	like,	questions	are	unavoidable	in	considering	the	moving-now	model	of	temporal	passage.	
																																																																				53	C.	D.	Broad,	Scientific	Thought	in	Metaphysics:	the	Big	Questions,	P.	Van	Inwagen	&	D.	Zimmerman	(eds.)	(Malden	Massachusetts	and	Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishes,	1998),	p	84.	
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Despite	its	being	theoretically	cumbrous	and	exceedingly	metaphorical,	the	moving-now	model	finds	its	ardent	proponents.		G.	Schlesinger	is	one	of	them.54		Having	found	himself	in	agreement	with	Broad	that	the	standard	moving-now	model	(i.e.,	the	one	depicted	in	Figure	8)	lacks	theoretical	coherency,	Schlesinger	devised	his	own	model.		The	gist	of	his	theory	is	that	a	sense	can	be	made	of	the	idea	of	the	moving-now	by	relativizing	its	movement	to	a	higher-order	time:	The	movement	of	the	NOW	in	the	standard	series	of	time	may	be	explicated	by	explaining	that	the	NOW	is	at	t1	in	the	ordinary	series	when	it	is	at	T1	in	the	super-series	and	at	t2	in	the	ordinary	series	when	it	is	at	T2	in	the	super	series.55	Responding	to	N.	Oaklander’s	devastating	critique	of	this	picture	of	temporal	reality,56	Schlesinger	later	abandoned	his	two-dimensional	picture	of	temporal	flow	in	favor	of	relativizing	the	movement	of	the	moving-now	to	possible	worlds.57		I	am	not	sure	what	to	make	of	this	latter,	exceedingly	complex,	edition	of	his	theory,	but	I	believe	that	by	addressing	the	questions	I	have	raised	above,	we	should	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	moving-now	model,	in	any	shape	or	form,	is	unattainable.		Let	me	address	one	problem	in	particular;	namely,	the	problem	of	the	speed	of	the	moving-now	or,	more	broadly,	the	problem	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage.58		
																																																																				54	George	N.	Schlesinger,	“Temporal	Becoming”	and	“How	to	Navigate	the	River	of	Time,”	in	The	New	
Theory	of	Time	N.	Oaklander	&	Q.	Smith	(eds.)	(New	Haven	and	London:	Yale	University	Press,	1994).	55	Ibid,	p.218.	56	Nathan	Oaklander,	“McTaggart,	Schlesinger,	and	the	Two-Dimensional	Time	Hypothesis”	in	The	New	
Theory	of	Time.	57	George	N.	Schlesinger	(1991),	pp.	427-41	and	“The	Stream	of	Time,”	in	The	New	Theory	of	Time.	58	The	two	problems	are	essentially	the	same	because	as	in	the	case	of	the	flowing	river	of	time,	so	in	the	case	of	the	moving-now,	the	same	conundrum	of	the	rate	of	temporal	flow	arises.	
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2.2.3 In	his	influential	“The	River	of	Time,”	J.	J.	C.	Smart	lays	out	the	problem	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	as	follows:		…with	respect	to	motion	in	space	it	is	always	possible	to	ask	“how	fast	is	it?”		An	express	train,	for	example,	may	be	moving	at	88	feet	per	second.		The	question	how	fast	is	it	moving?”	is	a	sensible	question	with	a	definite	answer:	“88	feet	per	second.”…	Contrast	the	pseudo-question	“how	fast	am	I	advancing	through	time?”	or	“How	fast	did	time	flow	yesterday?”		We	do	not	know	how	we	ought	to	set	about	answering	it.		What	sort	of	measurements	ought	we	to	make?		We	do	not	even	know	what	the	sort	of	units	in	which	our	answer	should	be	expressed.		“I	am	advancing	through	time	at	how	many	seconds	per	–	?”	we	might	begin,	and	then	we	should	have	to	stop.		What	could	possibly	fill	the	blank?		Not	“seconds”	surely.		In	that	case	the	most	we	could	hope	for	would	be	the	not	very	illuminating	remark	that	there	is	just	one	second	in	every	second.59	Smart’s	contention	is	that	second	per	second	rate	cannot	possibly	be	a	rate	of	temporal	passage,	because	it	cannot	be	a	rate	at	all,	and	since	there	are	no	other	ways	to	express	the	rate	of	temporal	passage,	the	very	notion	of	temporal	flow	must	be	abandoned	as	having	no	analogue	in	physical	reality.		Indeed,	any	type	of	physical	flow,	be	it	the	flow	of	a	river,	of	an	atmospheric	mass,	of	an	electric	current,	and	the	like	must	occur	at	a	certain	rate.		It	is	a	distinct	fact	of	physical	reality	that	rateless	flow	of	a	material	substance	is	not	possible.		Therefore,	on	conditions	that	(a)	time	is	
																																																																				59	J.J.C.	Smart	(1949),	p.485.	
52	
a	physical	phenomenon	and	(b)	it	flows,	time	necessarily	must	flow	at	a	rate.		Besides,	if	time	flowed,	we	would	have	used	the	expression	sec/sec	or	such	to	describe	its	rate,	which	would	reduce	it	to	what	physicists	call	“dimensionless	constant.”		However,	it	is	the	physical	fact	that	rates	are	not	dimensionless.		Hence,	the	notion	of	temporal	flow	is	ill-formed.60		Broad	too	rightly	held	the	notion	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	to	be	wholly	incongruous:	If	anything	moves,	it	must	move	with	some	determinate	velocity.		It	will	always	be	sensible	to	ask	“How	fast	does	it	move?”	even	if	we	have	no	means	of	answering	this	question.		Now	this	is	equivalent	to	asking	“How	great	a	distance	will	it	have	traversed	in	unit	time-lapse?”		But	here	the	series	along	which	presentness	is	supposed	to	move	is	temporal	and	not	spatial.		In	it	“distance”	is	time-lapse.		So	the	question	becomes	“How	great	a	time-lapse	will	presentness	have	traversed	in	unit	time-lapse?”		And	this	question	seems	to	be	meaningless.61	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	the	only	plausible	answer	to	the	question,	“At	what	rate	does	time	flow	and	in	relation	to	what	does	it	flow?”		at	least	provisionally,	is	that	since	time	cannot	flow	in	relation	to	anything	non-temporal,	or	in	relation	to	itself,	and	since	it	must	flow	at	a	rate	and	not	in	relation	to	another	flowing	time,	it	must	flow	at	the	rate	of	a	certain	number	of	static	temporal	intervals	per	temporal	unit.		What	we	in	effect	have	here	is	a	three-tier	model	of	temporal	flow	because	the	first-
																																																																				60	I	owe	this	observation	to	Michael	Levin.	61	C.D.	Broad	(1938),	p.	277.	
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order	fluid	time	flows	in	relation	to	second-order	static	time	at	the	rate	of	a	third-order	time	unit.		Pictorially,				 Fig.	10	The	first-order	fluid	time	flows	in	relation	to	second-order	static	time.	As	before,	a	question	arises	at	what	rate	a	third-order	time	flows.		The	only	answer,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	is	that	it	flows	at	the	rate	of	fourth-order	temporal	intervals	per	fifth-order	temporal	unit	and	so	ad	infinitum.		There	arises	an	additional	difficulty.		Suppose	fluid	time	flows	over	second-order	static	temporal	distances.		If	so,	it	must	flow	at	the	rate	given	by	a	number	of	second-order	static	time	units	per	third-order	(either	fluid	or	static)	time	unit.		Over	what	static	distances	then	does	the	third-order	fluid	time	flow?		If	it	flows	over	first-order	static	distances,	then	both	first-order	and	second-order	fluid	times	flow	over	the	same	static	temporal	spans,	which	is	a	utterly	nonsensical	proposition.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	a	third-order	fluid	time	flows	over	forth-order	static	spans,	then	in	addition	to	the	infinite	number	of	fluid	temporal	series	we	have	are	an	infinite	number	of	static	temporal	series.		Thus,	we	have	the	same	vicious	infinite	regress	whether	we	take	the	second-order	time	to	be	fluid	or	static.			Such	pictures	of	temporal	passage	are	too	cumbersome	to	be	plausible.		Furthermore,	any	notion	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	is	too	metaphorical	to	have	any	analytical	value,	for	either	A-time	is	conceived	as	a	fluid	object,	of	a	sort,	and	B-time	is	conceived	as	a	static	space-like	expanse	over	which	A-time	flows	at	the	rate	of	
static	time	
t1	 t2	 t3	 t4	 t5	 t6	 t7	 t8……………tn	earlier	 later	2t/1sec	
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a	certain	number	of	B-points	per	second-order	A-time	unit,	or	A-time	is	conceived	as	a	fluid	object	flowing	over	another	fluid	object	at	some	inexplicable	rate.			Additional	problem	is	that	any	type	of	physical	flow	takes	place	in	relation	to	something	external	to	it,	for	to	flow	physically	is	to	flow	from	one	external	point	to	another	external	point.		Therefore,	were	time	to	flow,	it	would	flow	in	relation	to	external	points	of	reference	which	themselves	must	be	temporal	points,	for	surely	time	cannot	flow	in	relation	to	spatial	points.		This,	of	course,	would	mean	that	there	are	at	least	two	times:	one	that	flows	and	one	that	is	static	in	relation	to	which	the	former	flows.		For	a	pure	A-theorist,	however,	this	should	be	unacceptable,	since	he	does	not	admit	the	reality	of	static	time.		Therefore,	the	second-order	time	in	relation	to	which	the	first-order	time	flows	must	itself	be	fluid.		This	would	mean	that	it	in	turn	must	flow	in	relation	to	a	third-order	fluid	time	and	so	ad	infinitum.		2.2.4 Ned	Markosian	takes	issue	with	such	analyses	of	the	notion	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage.62		He	rejects	the	hypothesis	that	“If	time	flows	or	passes,	then	there	is	some	second	time-dimension,	with	respect	to	which	the	passage	of	normal	time	is	to	be	measured.”63		Markosian	thinks	that	“it	is	sensible	to	compare	the	pure	passage	of	time	to	time	itself.”64		Accordingly,	on	his	account,	“the	question	“How	fast	does	time	pass?”	is	a	sensible	question	with	a	sensible	answer:	time	passes	at	the	rate	of	one	hour	per	hour.”65		In	arguing	his	case,	Markosian	appeals	to	the	authority	of	
																																																																				62	Ned	Markosian,	“How	Fast	Does	Time	Pass?”		Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	53	(1993),	pp.	829-44.		Markosian’s	paper	largely	draws	on	Smart’s	rate	of	temporal	passage	argument	he	gave	in	“The	River	of	Time.”	63	Ibid,	p.838.	64	Ibid,	p.843.	65	Ibid,	p.843.	
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Arthur	Prior,	who	indeed	held	that	the	notion	of	time	passing	at	a	certain	the	rate,	e.g.,	sec/sec	is	perfectly	cogent;	the	notion	of	time	passage,	Prior	asserted,	did	not	need	to	involve	the	concept	of	a	second-order	time.66		To	demonstrate	the	alleged	validity	of	his	claim,	Prior	draws	a	parallel	between	accelerated	motion,	expressed	as	meter/sec/sec,	and	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	expressed	as	sec/sec.		Evidently,	Prior	is	misled	here	by	the	superficial	similarity	of	the	two	concepts	and	does	not	realize	that	unlike	the	sec/sec	rate,	the	meter/sec/sec	rate	does	express	a	certain	magnitude.		More	importantly,	the	dimension	of	acceleration	is	not	meter/sec/sec,	but	[meter/sec]/sec;	a	standard	fraction.		Thus,	with	a	little	algebra,	it	becomes	meter/sec*sec.		The	important	point	is	that	we	have	the	dimension	of	time	in	the	denominator	and	something	else	in	the	numerator.		The	coherence	of	that	sort	of	fraction,	however,	does	not	show	the	coherence	of	a	fraction	with	time	in	the	numerator	and	denominator.67	Markosian	also	contemplates	an	antirealist	reply	to	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	argument;	namely,	that	“the	passage	of	time	is	a	change	whose	rate	simply	cannot	be	measured,	so	that	there	is	no	need	to	posit	any	second	time-dimension	with	respect	to	which	the	passage	of	normal	time	is	to	be	measured.”68		I	find	this	thinking	unconvincing	for	the	following	reasons.		To	begin	with,	Markosian’s	antirealist	position	is	a	non	sequitur,	for	whether	or	not	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	is	measurable	in	principle	is	not	in	question	here.		Let	us	therefore	turn	to	his	other	suggestion.		Markosian’s	contention	is	that	time	passes	at	the	rate	of	a	temporal	unit	
																																																																				66	A.	Prior,	Papers	on	Time	and	Tense	(new	edition)	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003),	p.9.	67	I	owe	this	observation	to	Michael	Levin.	68	N.	Markosian	(1993),	p.843.	
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per	temporal	unit,	where	both	temporal	units	are	of	the	same	temporal	dimension.69		But	how	could	this	be?		Rate	is	a	speed	of	either	relational	(extrinsic)	or	non-relational	(intrinsic)	change.		An	example	of	the	former	would	be	the	speed	of	a	moving	car,	an	example	of	the	latter	would	be	the	rate	of	crop	growth.70		It	is	one	of	the	basic	tenets	of	mathematical	physics	that	rates	are	measured	by	chronometers	plus	non-temporal	measuring	devices,	such	as	measuring	tapes,	scales,	etc.		Accordingly,	in	order	for	us	to	determine	a	rate	of	either	qualitative	or	quantitative	change	at	least	two	distinct	Cartesian	dimensions	(coordinates),	one	of	which	is	temporal,	are	needed.		For	instance,	in	Figure	11,	the	rate	of	crop	growth	is	expressed	using	two	distinct	Cartesian	dimensions	of	time	and	weight.							 Fig.	11	The	rate	of	crop	growing	expressed	using	two	Cartesian	coordinates.	Surely,	we	cannot	express	the	rate	of	this	particular	qualitative	change	using	just	either	time	or	weight	units;	both	parameters	are	needed.		Gram	per	gram,	meter	per	meter,	and	such	parings	simply	cannot	give	us	the	rate	of	change.		Why	then	one	
																																																																				69	The	term	“dimension’”	in	this	instance	denotes	Cartesian	coordinates,	i.e.,	a	mode	of	measure.			70	Not	all	changes	go	at	a	rate.		Being	a	presidential	candidate	and	then	being	a	president,	for	instance,	is	an	example	of	such	a	change.		We,	however,	can	ignore	this	complication	as	having	no	bearing	on	the	issue	in	hand.	
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should	think	that	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	is	somehow	excluded	from	this	elementary	principle	of	mathematical	physics?		Temporal	unit	per	the	same	type	temporal	unit	is	no	more	a	rate	of	change	than	gram	per	gram	or	meter	per	meter	is.		What	then	can	be	said	about	such	a	peculiar	change	as	temporal	flow?		Well,	if	time	flows,	it	must	flow	at	a	certain	rate.		This	can	be	expressed	as	Ratet	=1sec/1sec*	where	the	second	occurrence	of	“second”	refers	to	a	second-order	time	unit.		The	reality	of	a	second-order	time	is	essential	to	time	passage.		Without	such	a	two-dimensional	time	hypothesis	we	are	simply	in	the	lurch	when	it	comes	to	expressing	the	rate	of	temporal	flow.			I	see	no	way	around	this	conclusion.	It	might	be	argued	that	the	rate	of	temporal	flow	can	be	expressed	without	an	appeal	to	second-order	time	by	using	two	distinct	temporal	units	of	measure,	namely	B-intervals	and	A-units.		In	this	case,	the	rate	of	temporal	flow	would	be	expressible	as	B-interval/A-unit.		Although	this	idea	can	be	expressed	using	Cartesian	coordinates,	as	shown	in	Figure	12,	its	ostensible	legitimacy	is	misleading.		On	this	analysis,	A-time	is	conceived	as	an	object	moving	over	the	B-dimension	at	a	rate	of	a	certain	number	of	B-points	per	A-units.		But	A-time	is	not	an	object,	it	itself	is	a	dimension;	it	is	nonsensical	to	say	that	it	moves	over	B-time							
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						 	Fig.	12	A-time	is	not	an	object,	it	is	a	dimension.	P.	van	Inwagen	has	another	argument	against	the	rate	of	temporal	passage.		He	points	out	that	minute	per	minute	is	not	really	a	rate	because	one	minute	divided	by	one	minute	gives	us	1	and	1	is	not	a	rate:	“Sixty	seconds	per	minute”	is	not	an	answer	to	this	question,	[How	fast	does	time	move?]	for	sixty	seconds	is	one	minute…	and	‘1’	is	not,	and	cannot	ever	be,	an	answer	to	a	question	of	the	form,	‘How	fast	is	such-and-such	moving?’—	no	matter	what	“such-and-such”	may	be.”71	Eric	Olson	echoes	van	Inwagen:	The	real	problem	with	saying	that	time	passes	at	one	second	per	second	is	not	that	this	is	a	funny	sort	of	rate,	but	that	it	is	no	rate	of	change	at	all.		One	second	per	second	is	one	second	divided	by	one	second.		And	when	you	divide	one	second	by	one	second,	you	get	one.		Not	one	of	anything,	just	one.		Dividing	anything	by	itself,	unless	it	is	zero,	gives	you	one.		Sixty	seconds	per	minute	and	twenty-four	hours	
																																																																				71	Peter	van	Inwagen,	Metaphysics	(Bolder,	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	2002),	p.59.	
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per	day	are	also	one,	because	sixty	seconds	is	equal	to	one	minute	and	twenty-four	hours	is	one	day.		And	one	is	not	a	rate	of	change.		A	thing	can	change	at	a	rate	of	one	mile	per	hour	or	one	degree	per	minute,	but	not	at	a	rate	of	one.”72	Hud	Hudson,	N.	Markosian,	R.	Wasserman,	and	D.	Whitcomb	disagree	with	both	van	Inwagen	and	Olson.73		Their	analysis,	however,	is	amiss,	for	it	hinges	on	wrongly	equating	the	rate	of	change	in	physical	systems,	in	their	case	chronometers,	with	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	itself.		They	write	Suppose	that	a	car	is	passing	at	a	constant	rate	of	1	kilometer	per	minute.		Letting	‘C’	abbreviate	‘the	rate	of	the	car’s	passage’	and	‘k/m’	abbreviate	‘kilometers	per	minute’,	we	have	C	=	1	k/m.			Now	consider	the	following	principle:	The	Inverse	Rate	Equivalence	Principle	(IREP):	n	
x/y	=	1_n y/x	.		IREP	tells	us	that	if	the	xs	pass	at	a	rate	of	n	per	y,	then	the	
ys	pass	at	a	rate	of	1_n 	per	x.		So,	for	example,	if	Montana	completes	passes	at	a	rate	of	20	per	game,	then	the	games	go	by	at	a	rate	of	.05	per	completion.		Applying	IREP	to	the	case	of	the	car	gives	us	1	k/m	=	1	
m/k.		In	other	words,	if	the	car	passes	at	a	rate	of	one	kilometer	per	minute,	then	time	passes	at	a	rate	of	one	minute	per	kilometer	covered	
																																																																				72	E.	Olson,	“The	Rate	of	Time’s	Passage,”	Analysis,	69	(2009),	pp.3-9,	p.5.	73	H.	Hudson,	N.	Markosian,	R.	Wasserman,	&	D.	Whitcomb,	“The	Rate	of	Passage:	Reply	to	van	Inwagen”	published	online	in	2009.	
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by	the	car.		This	would	simply	be	an	alternative	way	of	expressing	the	rate	of	time’s	passage:	1	m/k	=	R.74	Surely,	it	is	not	time	that	“passes	at	the	rate	of	one	minute	per	kilometer,”	it	is	the	large	hand	of	the	clock	that	moves	a	one-minute-notch	on	the	dial	while	the	car	covers	one	kilometer.		But	let	us	grant,	if	only	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	it	is	time	itself	that	passes	as	the	car	goes	one	kilometer	per	minute.		On	the	IREP,	we	are	allowed	to	say	that	time	passes	at	the	rate	of	one	minute	per	one	kilometer.		But	consider	now	a	three-lane	highway	such	that	there	is	a	car	in	each	lane	and	they	travel	at	different	speed:	one	car	is	cruising	at	½	kilometer	per	minute,	the	second	car	passes	at	one	kilometer	per	minute,	and	third	car	zooms	at	two	kilometers	per	minute.		Should	we	not	then	say	that	on	the	IREP	time	passes	at	three	different	rates?		It	seems	to	me	that	it	is	exactly	what	the	IREP	demands.		Yet,	it	cannot	be	true	that	the	rate	of	passage	of	time	varies	from	one	moving	object	to	another.		What	in	fact	varies	is	the	speed	of	moving	objects,	not	of	the	rate	of	temporal	flow.	It	seems	to	me	there	is	no	way	that	we	can	endow	the	notion	of	the	rate	of	temporal	passage	with	a	sense	and	the	harder	we	try	the	more	obvious	it	becomes	that	all	such	attempts	are	futile;	Hudson	et	al	is	a	case	in	point.		We	thus	must	conclude	that	the	notion	of	rate	of	temporal	passage,	in	any	form	or	shape,	is	incoherent,	and	since	there	can	be	no	rate	at	which	time	flows,	there	can	be	no	temporal	flow	per	se.		
	
																																																																				74	H.	Hudson,	N.	Markosian,	R.	Wasserman,	&	D.	Whitcomb	(2009),	p.	3.	
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2.3 The	Burgeoning	Universe	Model	of	Temporal	Becoming	2.3.1 One	of	the	early	proponents	of	the	Burgeoning	Universe	model	of	temporal	becoming	was	C.	D.	Broad.		The	following	is	a	succinct	articulation	of	his	theory	which	…accepts	reality	of	the	present	and	the	past,	but	holds	that	the	future	is	simply	nothing	at	all.		Nothing	has	happened	to	the	present	by	becoming	past	except	that	fresh	slices	of	existence	have	been	added	to	the	total	history	of	the	world.		The	past	is	thus	as	real	as	the	present.		On	the	other	hand,	the	essence	of	a	present	event	is,	not	that	it	precedes	future	events,	but	that	there	is	quite	literary	nothing	to	which	it	has	the	relation	of	precedence.		The	sum	total	of	existence	is	always	increasing,	and	it	is	this	which	gives	the	temporal	series	a	sense	as	well	as	an	order.		A	moment	t	is	later	than	a	moment	t¢	if	the	sum	total	of	existence	at	t	includes	the	sum	total	of	existence	at	t¢		together	with	something	more.75	David	Zeilicovici,	a	contemporary	proponent	of	the	theory,	refers	to	it	as	the	“creationist”	picture	of	temporal	becoming	and	distinguishes	between	“event-creationist”	and	“time-creationist”	facets	of	the	theory.76		On	the	time-creationist	story	“at	any	present	moment,	future	time	does	not	exist.”77		This	means	that	newer	and	newer	moments	are	constantly	created	in	concordance	with	creation	of	events.		On	the	event-creationist	story	only	new	events	are	created	at	already	existing	time	
																																																																				75	C.	D.		Broad,	Scientific	Thought	(London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	1923),	quoted	from	Metaphysics:	
the	Big	Questions,	p.87.	76	D.	Zeilicovici,“Temporal	Becoming	minus	the	Moving-Now”	Noûs	23	(1989),	pp.	505-24.	77	Ibid,	p.	237.	
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slots	as	it	were.	On	this	theory,	events	do	not	come	from	the	province	of	the	future	and	thus	they	do	not	recede	into	the	instantaneous	province	of	the	present;	they	come	into	existence	simpliciter	and	then,	in	due	course,	are	superseded	by	newer	events.	On	the	whole,	the	Burgeoning	Universe	model	of	temporal	becoming	is	designed	to	avoid	problems	which	arise	from	treating	temporal	passage	as	a	sort	of	motion	(the	moving-now	hypothesis,	A-series	sliding	over	the	B-series	model,	and	the	like).		The	model	also	serves	as	an	antidote,	on	the	one	hand	to	an	ephemerality	of	the	presentist	universe,	and	on	the	other	hand,	to	the	Block-Universe	model	that	denies	not	only	the	reality	of	temporal	passage,	but	also	the	reality	of	change	itself.	Despite	its	theoretical	upsides,	the	theory	places	emphasis	on	explaining	the	nature	of	flux,	not	the	nature	of	temporal	passage	per	se,	that	is,	on	this	theory,	the	dynamic	character	of	the	universe	“serves	as	the	physical	analogue	of	time	flow.”78		It	is	tacitly	assumed	that	by	offering	a	dynamic	model	of	the	universe,	one	would	offer,	
mutatis	mutandis,	a	dynamic	model	of	time.		This	stratagem	is	mistaken	because	it	ignores	the	fact	that	the	growth	of	the	burgeoning	universe	is	a	form	of	change	and	as	all	changes,	it	must	occur	in	time	and,	therefore,	is	distinct	from	time.79		Explaining	the	nature	of	change	in	physical	systems	is	one	thing,	explaining	the	nature	of	time	as	such	is	altogether	another.	Unless,	of	course,	it	is	held	that	time	is	change.		But	as	far	as	I	know	no	Burgeoning	Universe	theorist	ascribes	to	this	view.		
																																																																				78	Storrs	McCall,	“A	Dynamic	Model	of	Temporal	Becoming,”	Analysis	44	(1984),	pp.	172-76.	79	It	was	known	since	Aristotle	(Physics,	Book	IV)	that	change	and	time	are	distinct	phenomena.		
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2.3.2 Let	us	now	consider	one	of	the	most	fully	developed	models	of	the	Burgeoning	Universe;	namely,	that	of	Storrs	McCall’s.80		McCall	distinguishes	four	possible	theories	of	reality:		This	is	how	he	diagrammatically	represents	them:			 			Fig.	13	Four	models	of	the	Burgeoning	Universe.	The	Minkowskian	world	is	the	Block-Universe.		The	Distinguished	Branches	world	is	the	same	as	the	Minkowskian	world	plus	all	unactualized	possibilities.		The	Multiple	Realties	world	is	the	Everett-Wheeler	world	in	which	all	possible	quantum	outcomes	are	actual.		Finally,	the	Dynamic	world	is	the	Burgeoning	Universe.		The	Minkowskian	and	Distinguished	Branches	worlds,	it	seems	to	me,	are	the	same,	since	the	former	contains	unactualized	possibilities	in	the	very	same	manner	as	the	latter	does,	that	is,	in	both	worlds	sentences	of	the	type	“It	is	possible	that____”	have	the	same	semantic	content,	i.e.,	they	refer	to	unactualized	possibilities.		In	the	Everett-Wheeler	world,	on	the	other	hand,	“It	is	possible	that____”	refers	to	actualized	possibilities.		Distinction	between	the	Minkowskian	and	Distinguished	Branches	worlds	on	one	the	hand	and	the	Everett-Wheeler	world	on	the	other	is	parallel	to	that	between	modal	realism	and	modal	antirealism.		Also,	the	Everett-Wheeler	world	
																																																																				80	Storrs	McCall,	“Objective	Time	Flow,”	Philosophy	of	Science	43	(1976),	pp.	337-62.	
Minkowskian	World	 Distinguished	Branches	World	 Multiple	Realities	World	 Dynamic	World	
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might	be	conceived	in	two	ways:	either	as	a	static	Block-Universe	or	as	a	Burgeoning	Universe.81	The	ontology	of	a	dynamic	non	Everett-Wheeler	world	could	be	conceived	in	two	opposite	ways.		On	one	picture,	the	Dynamic	world	grows	by	adding	new	slices,	so	that	at	every	new	moment	of	its	existence,	the	sum	total	of	entities	it	contains	is	different.		This	is	Broad’s	burgeoning	universe.		In	contrast,	McCall’s	burgeoning	universe	changes	not	by	adding	new	branches,	but	by	shedding	them.		The	idea	here	is	that	to	every	actual	state	of	affairs,	there	corresponds	myriads	of	possible	ones,	but	as	the	possible	states	of	affairs	become	actual	all	relative	possibilities	die	out.		In	the	very	beginning	of	McCall’s	world	there	exists	the	entire	set	of	unactualized	possibilities	plus	one	actual	state	of	affairs	and	at	the	end,	there	are	no	possibilities	at	all,	everything	is	actual,	or	which	is	the	same,	only	one	possibility	bears	the	title	of	being	the	actual.82	How	does	this	theory	help	us	to	understand	the	nature	of	fluid	time?		McCall’s	answer	is	that	time	flow	is	conceived	by	analogy	to	the	dynamic	character	of	the	universe.		I	find	this	answer	unsatisfactory.		Whether	one	explains	time	flow	by	analogy	to	a	flowing	stream	or	by	analogy	to	the	growing	universe,	all	one	does	is	to	paint	a	metaphorical	picture	of	temporal	reality.		The	challenge,	however,	is	to	offer	a	non-metaphorical	analysis	of	the	notion	of	temporal	passage.		Another,	related	deficiency	of	McCall’s	model	is	that	it	tacitly	assumes	a	second-order	time	over	which	the	universe	grows.		To	be	sure,	McCall	is	aware	of	this	difficulty:	
																																																																				81	McCall	does	not	draw	this	latter	distinction.	82	Observe	that	at	the	beginning	of	its	existence,	McCall’s	universe	is	the	same	as	the	static	Everett-Wheeler	universe	and	at	the	end	of	its	existence	it	is	the	same	as	Minkowskian	universe.		
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…	anything	that	grows	or	changes	can	do	so	only	in	time,	and	since	the	universe	is	already	a	collection	of	four-dimensional	manifolds,	a	fifth	dimension	would	be	needed	for	it	to	change	in.		What	this	shows	is	that	the	analogy	with	the	three-dimensional	tree,	which	grows	and	changes	in	time,	should	not	be	carried	too	far.		A	second	time	dimension	would	be	an	extravagance	in	a	theory	that	is	already	extravagant	enough.83			How	does	then	McCall	propose	to	deal	with	the	difficulty?		Here	is	his	solution	which:	“…we	can	say	that	the	progressive	falling	away	of	future	branches	on	the	universe-tree	does	not	“take”	time,	but	instead	“generates”	time.84		I	find	his	solution	lacking	any	coherency.	Despite	its	apparent	upsides,	the	Burgeoning	Universe	model	of	temporal	passage	does	not	have	broad	appeal	among	contemporary	temporal	theorists.		The	main	reason	for	this,	as	I	see	it,	is	that	it	being	the	middle	ground	between	Presentism	and	the	Block-Universe	hypotheses,	the	model	lacks	decisiveness	of	either	fluid-time	theory	or	its	static-time	counterpart.		It	thus	should	not	come	as	surprise	that	it	easily	loses	its	potential	recruits	to	either	strong-minded	side.		
2.4 Presentism	2.4.1 Although	Presentism	is	often	identified	with	one	or	another	theory	of	fluid	time,	it	is	completely	independent	from	any	of	them,	since	the	notion	of	the	present	
																																																																				83	Storrs	McCall	(1976),	p.	348.	84	Ibid,	p.	348.	
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does	not	require	the	notion	of	temporal	fluidity.		Let	us	first	consider	Arthur	Prior’s	paradigmatic	concept	of	the	present:	…	the	reality	of	the	present	consists	in	what	the	reality	of	anything	else	consists	in,	namely	the	absence	of	a	qualifying	prefix.		To	say	that	Whitrow’s	lecture	is	past	is	to	say	that	it	has	been	the	case	that	Whitrow	is	lecturing.		To	say	that	Scott’s	lecture	is	future	is	to	say	that	it	will	be	
the	case	that	Scott	is	lecturing.		But	to	say	that	my	lecture	is	present	is	just	to	say	that	I	am	lecturing	–	flat,	no	prefixes.		The	pastness	of	an	event,	that	is	to	say	its	having	taken	place,	is	not	the	same	thing	as	the	event	itself;	nor	is	its	futurity;	but	the	presentness	of	an	event	is	just	the	event.		The	presentness	of	my	lecturing,	for	instance,	is	just	my	lecturing.85	What	should	we	take	Prior’s	presentism	to	be?		Its	true	nature	can	only	be	appreciated	within	the	framework	of	his	program,	which	is	to	construct	a	logically	regimented	tensed	discourse	in	the	world	of	ours	that	has	neither	future	nor	past.		As	I	see	it,	Prior’s	presentism	is	rooted	in	the	commonsense	belief	that	things	which	are	no	longer	present	or	not	yet	present	simply	do	not	exist;	in	the	roster	of	existence	only	present	entities	are	listed.		Dinosaurs	are	no	longer	in	existence	and	future	events	such	as	the	Sun	growing	cold	are	not	yet	in	existence.		Indeed,	the	commonsense	belief	in	the	fundamental	distinction	between	the	ontological	status	of	
																																																																				85	Arthur	Prior,	“The	Notion	of	the	Present,”	Studium	Generale	23	(1970),	pp.	245-48.		Reprinted	in	
Metaphysics:	the	Big	Questions,	pp.	81-82.	
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the	past	and	future,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	present	on	the	other,	“can	be	given	up	briefly,	if	at	all;	and	then	only	by	a	mighty	effort	of	will!”86	The	same	commonsense	conviction	was	held	by	Saint	Augustine	for	whom	it	was	“abundantly	clear	that	neither	the	future	nor	the	past	exist,	and	therefore	it	is	not	strictly	correct	to	say	that	there	are	three	times,	past,	present,	and	future.”87		Unlike	Augustine,	however,	Prior	did	not	concern	himself	with	the	ontology	of	time,	at	least	not	primarily,	for	him	producing	a	logically	regimented	temporal	language	was	a	perfectly	self-contained	philosophical	enterprise	independent	from	any	ontological	consideration,	including	that	concerning	the	nature	of	the	present.		This	fact	is	especially	surprising	given	that	one	of	the	impetuses	behind	his	program	is	the	temporal	ontology	of	Augustinian	type.	Though	for	Prior	only	present	time	is	real	and	only	present	items	exist,	his	“present”	is	not	the	present	of	the	moving-now	theory	or	that	of	the	Burgeoning	Universe	model.		He	ties	presentness	to	existence;	in	fact,	for	him	existence	and	presentness	are	“one	and	the	same	concept,	and	the	present	simply	is	the	real	considered	in	relation	to	two	particular	species	of	unreality,	namely	the	past	and	the	future.”88		I	am	not	sure	in	what	way,	if	any,	the	real	can	form	a	relationship	with	the	unreal,	but	I	find	myself	in	agreement	with	Prior	on	his	adamant	rejection	of	the	reality	of	the	past	and	future	and	affirmation	of	the	reality	of	the	present.	
																																																																				86	Dean	Zimmerman,	“The	Privileged	Present:	Defending	an	‘A	theory	’	of	Time”	in	Contemporary	
Debates	in	Metaphysics,	T.	Sider,	J.	Hawthorne,	D.	Zimmerman	(eds.)	(Malden,	MA:	Blackwell	Publishes,	2008),	pp.	211-15.	87	St.	Augustine,	The	Confessions,	Book	XI,	§20.	88	A.	Prior	(1970),	p.	80.	
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2.4.2 Usually	Presentism	is	taken	to	be	the	thesis	that	only	present	items	exist,	there	are	no	non-present	items.89		Yet,	thus	understood,	Presentism	is	either	trivially	true	or	manifestly	self-contradictory.		It	is	trivially	true	if	the	domain	of	the	universal	quantifier	is	all	present	things,	and	it	is	self-contradictory	if	the	domain	of	the	universal	quantifier	is	unrestricted	and	encompasses	all	past,	present,	and	future	items.		Pr1	is	tautological,	Pr2	is	contradictory:	(Pr1)	For	any	present	x,	x	is	present,	(Pr2)	For	any	present	and	non-present	x,	x	is	present.	The	majority	of	presentists,	however,	see	nothing	wrong	with	(Pr1),	nor	do	they	detect	any	defect	in	the	following	biconditionals:		(i)x	is	present	iff	x	exists,		(ii)	x	exists	iff	x	is	present.			I	take	it	that	they	reason	that	since	tautological	statements	are	perfectly	consistent,	(Pr1),	being	a	tautology,	is	too	a	consistent	ontological	assertion.		Yet,	being	consistent	is	not	sufficient	for	an	ontological	assertion	to	give	as	an	explanation	of	a	phenomenon	in	question;	ontologically,	tautologies	are	empty	assertions.		Consider,	for	instance,	a	tautological	answer	to	the	question	“Why	does	the	Sun	shine?”		“The	Sun	is	shining	because	it	is	shining”	is	a	perfectly	consistent	statement,	yet,	its	‘because’	is	without	any	heuristic	value	whatsoever.		What	is	needed	here	is	an	explanation	of	why	the	Sun	shines.		Giving	an	adequate	physical	model	of	
																																																																				89	Quentin	Smith	is	a	rare	exception;	he	proposes	a	theory	of	degree	of	existence	according	to	which	both	past	and	future	items	exist,	only	to	lesser	degree	than	the	present	ones.		“Time	and	Degree	of	Existence:	a	Theory	of	‘Degree	Presentism’”	in	Time,	Reality	&	Experience,	C.	Callender	(ed.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002),	pp.	119-36.	
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thermonuclear	reaction,	on	the	other	hand,	would	constitute	an	answer	to	the	question	“Why	the	Sun	shines?”		Analogously,	limiting	present	items	to	the	existing	items	or	vice	versa	is	not	much	of	explanation.		What	is	need	here	is	a	theory	that	explains	why	there	are	no	non-present	items.	Another	objection	that	has	been	raised	against	Presentism	is	that	on	this	theory,	sentences	such	as	“Dinosaurs	were	roaming	the	earth	in	the	Jurassic	period”	and	“The	Sun	will	eventually	grow	cold”	are	not	about	what	is;	they,	therefore,	have	no	truthmakers;	it	then	follows	that	such	sentences	are	neither	true	nor	false.		But	surely,	“Dinosaurs	were	roaming	the	earth	in	the	Jurassic	period”	is	true	and	so	presumably	is	“The	Sun	will	eventually	grow	cold.”		Presentist’s	way	out	of	this	difficulty	is	to	analyze,	“Dinosaurs	were	roaming	the	earth	in	the	Jurassic	period”	and	“The	Sun	will	eventually	grow	cold”	as	“It	was	the	case	that	[Dinosaurs	are	roaming	the	earth	in	the	Jurassic	period]”	and	“It	will	be	the	case	that	[The	Sun	is	cold].”		This	analysis	gives	us	consistent	syntaxes	of	temporal	discourse	but	lacks	temporal	semantics.		One	could	have	perfectly	regimented	tensed	language	that	totally	lacks	any	ontological	import.		Indeed,	the	presentist	does	have	such	language,	the	language	in	which	tensed	elocutions	are	not	about	real	tenses.	There	exists	yet	another	difficulty	for	presentism.		Prima	facie	things	of	the	past	and	future	do	stand	in	some	sort	of	relation	with	present	things,	but	if	so,	then	it	follows	that	things	of	the	past	and	future	exist,	for	surely	existent	things	cannot	stand	in	any	relation	with	nonexistent	ones	–	Presentism	fails.		Bigelow	calls	this	argument	the	argument	from	relations:	
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Take	as	a	first	supposition	that,	in	order	for	a	relation	to	hold	between	two	things,	both	of	those	two	things	will	have	to	exist.		Call	this	the	principle	that	all	relations	are	existence	entailing.		Add	as	a	further	premise	the	supposition	that	relations	sometimes	hold	between	a	present	thing	and	something	else	which	is	not	present.		The	conclusion	follows	ineluctably,	that	some	things	exist	which	are	not	present.90	Even	after	this	brief	treatment	of	presentism,	it	should	be	evident	that	it	has	its	share	of	problems;	though,	I	must	add,	I	find	it	the	most	plausible	theory	of	time	to	date.		
2.5 B-Accounts	of	the	Phenomenology	of	Temporal	Passage	2.5.1 As	I	see	it,	there	are	only	two	alternatives	available	to	the	B-theorist	to	contend	with	the	phenomena	of	temporal	passage;	one,	as	far	as	the	B	theory	is	concerned,	is	consistent	and	the	other	is	not.		The	consistent	alternative	is	to	hold	the	A-series	to	be	entirely	delusive	and	thus	without	any	analogue	in	reality	whatsoever.		Accordingly,	since	the	phenomenon	of	temporal	flow	is	prima	facie	an	integral	part	of	human	experience,	the	consistent	B-theorist	should	delegate	construction	of	a	theory	of	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow	entirely	to	psychology.		Furthermore,	the	consistent	B-theorist	should	not	attempt	to	incorporate	such	a	psychological	theory	of	temporal	passage	into	the	structure	of	a	B	theory	of	time.		Indeed,	as	far	as	I	know,	no	B-theorist	ever	attempted	to	come	up	with	such	a	psychological/metaphysical	
																																																																				90	John	Bigelow,	“Presentism	and	Properties”	in	Philosophical	Perspectives	10,	Metaphysics,	James	E.	Tomberlin,	(ed.),	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Blackwell,	1996),	pp.	35-52.	
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hybrid.			And	this	is	for	a	good	reason.		Such	a	hybrid	theory	of	time	cannot	be	counted	as	a	metaphysical	theory	proper.	An	inconsistent	alternative	is	to	try	to	incorporate	A-theoretical	elements	into	the	structure	of	a	B	theory.		This	option	is	unacceptable	to	the	B-theorist	right	from	the	start,	for	it	generates	A/B	hybrid	theories	of	time.			Even	though	the	consistent	alternative	resolutely	relegates	explanation	of	the	nature	of	temporal	flow	to	the	province	of	psychology,	hardly	any	B-theorist	can	resist	the	temptation	to	offer	a	B-account	for	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow.		Accordingly,	there	exists	considerable	diversity	of	B-opinions	as	to	what	exactly	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow	amounts	to.		Some	B-theorists	view	any	A-account	of	the	nature	of	time	as	misleading,	specious,	and	outright	detrimental	to	the	metaphysics	of	time.		D.	C.	Williams,	for	instance,	cannot	spare	even	one	good	word	for	the	idea	of	temporal	fluidity	which	he	regards,	as	a	myth	and	“not	one	of	those	myths	which	foreshadow	a	difficult	truth	in	a	metaphorical	way,	but	one	which	is	fundamentally	false,	deceiving	us	about	the	facts,	and	blocking	our	understanding	of	them.”91		Some	other	B-theorists,	in	contrast,	are	less	adamant.		D.	H.	Mellor,	for	instance,	though	he	does	not	admit	the	reality	of	A-time,	holds	that	“the	A-scale	is	only	a	way	we	have	of	locating	events	in	time;	a	compelling	way,	indeed,	which	we	could	not	do	without,	but	not	the	way	things	are	in	reality.”92		Mellor’s	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	time,	I	believe,	warrants	a	closer	examination.	
																																																																				91	D.	C.	Williams	(1951),	p.460.	92	D.	H.	Mellor	(1998),	p	15.		In	another	place,	Mellor	articulates	the	distinction	between	A-	and	B-times	even	more	pointedly	as	the	distinction	“between	the	time	of	our	lives	and	the	time	of	reality.”	“The	Time	of	Our	Lives”	in	Philosophy	at	the	New	Millennium,	Anthony	O’Hear	(ed.),	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	pp.	45-59.	
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Mellor	does	not	deny	that	A-statements	have	truth-value,	he	maintains	that	they	do,	only	that	on	his	account	what	makes	them	true	or	false	are	not	A-facts,	which	he	deems	to	be	nonexistent,	but	B-facts.	…for	any	X,	statements	of	the	forms	‘It	is	now	X’,	‘X	was	last	week’,	‘X	is	due	tomorrow’	are	made	true	respectively	by	being	said	at	X,	in	the	week	after	X,	and	the	day	before	X	is	due.			But	those	are	all	B-series	facts,	about	when	things	happen	and	are	said,	regardless	of	which	if	any	of	those	things	and	sayings	are	present	–	which	is	why	these	B-series	facts	imply	no	contradiction.		And	that	is	why,	if	we	are	to	say	without	contradiction	what	in	reality	makes	A-series	statements	true,	we	must	take	reality	itself	to	contain	no	A-series	facts,	i.e.,	no	such	facts	as	X’s	being	now,	or	a	week	before	now,	or	due	a	day	after	now.93	Given	us	his	theory	of	A-propositions	(and	therefore	A-beliefs),	Mellor	then	turns	to	the	explanation	of	the	nature	of	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow	itself,	because,	as	he	readily	acknowledges,	“if	it	is	not	a	fact	about	the	world	that	such-and-such	events	are	happening	now,	then	something	must	be	said	about	what	else	it	is,	for	this	too	seems	not	only	true	but	a	most	important	thing	to	say	and	believe.”94		Here	is	how	Mellor	delineates	his	(non-psychological?)	model	of	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow:	…	there	are	undeniable	changes	in	us	which	explain	why	we	feel	that	time	flows	despite	the	fact	that	in	reality	it	does	not.		These	changes	are	
																																																																				93	D.	H.	Mellor	(2001),		49.	94	Ibid,	p.	50.	
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those	we	need	to	keep	making	in	our	A-series	beliefs	in	order	to	keep	them	true…		Our	beliefs	about	what	is	past,	present,	and	future	are	changing	all	the	time...		These,	and	all	other	changes	we	are	continually	making	in	our	A-series	beliefs,	are	real	changes,	with	real	causes	and	real	mental	and	physical	effects.		They	are	the	changes	that	embody	our	experience	of	the	flow	of	time.		Even	though	time	does	not	flow	in	reality,	in	our	minds	the	time	of	our	lives	really	does	flow…95	This	might	be	so;	time	might	not	flow	in	reality	but	only	appears	to	flow	to	sentient	beings.		Be	it	as	it	may,	the	central	question	still	persists	“What	makes	our	A-beliefs	about	what	is	past,	present,	and	future	to	change	all	the	time?”		If,	as	Mellor	claims,	it	is	not	something	in	the	world	that	makes	them	change,	then	surely	A-beliefs	are	delusional	and,	therefore,	cannot	be	true	of	reality.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	A-beliefs	do	reflect	real	temporal	order,	then	A-time	must	too	be	real.		Mellor,	of	course,	would	deny	this	conclusion.		He	would	say	that	A-beliefs	do	reflect	real	temporal	order,	only	that	this	temporal	order	is	the	B-order.		I,	however,	do	not	see	how	this	claim	can	be	consistently	maintained.		The	main	reason	for	my	skepticism	is	that	were	it	true	that	A-propositions	and	A-beliefs	have	as	their	truthmakers	B-states	of	affairs,	it	would	follow	that	both	types	of	temporal	proposition	are	semantically	identical.		Hence,	it	would	follow	that	A-propositions	are	translatable	into	B-propositions,	the	assumption	Mellor,	and	all	adherers	of	the	so-called	new	theory	of	B-time,	unequivocally	denies.	
																																																																				95	D.	H.	Mellor	(2001),	pp.	55-56.	
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Furthermore,	it	appears	Mellor’s	usage	of	the	term	‘real’	is	rather	loose.			On	the	one	hand,	when	it	is	applied	to	A-changes,	it	ranges	over	both	the	intentional	and	concrete	realms;	on	the	other	hand,	when	it	is	applied	to	B-facts,	it	ranges	exclusively	over	the	concrete	realm,	for	if	it	does	not,	and	since	there	are	evidently	A-changes	in	the	intentional	real,	then	it	follows	that	A-changes	take	place	in	reality	(broadly	conceived).		Indeed,	if	there	are	A-changes	in	us	and	we	are	legitimate	parts	of	reality,	then	A-changes	and	with	it	A-times	are	legitimate	parts	of	reality	as	well.		Having	said	this,	I	must	admit	that	at	least	at	first	the	idea	that	there	are	real	A-facts	in	the	intentional	realm	and	none	in	the	concrete	one	seems	rather	equitable.		There	are,	indeed,	many	things	in	the	mind	which	are	not	in	the	real	world	and	vice	versa.		If	this	is	Mellor’s	position,	then	how	should	we	interpret	his	assertion	that	A-changes,	and	with	it	A-time	“are	real	changes,	with	real	causes	and	real	mental	and	physical	effects”?			Compartmentalizing	reality	into	two	spheres,	the	mental	and	the	concrete,	would	not	do	the	trick.		It	is	precisely	against	this	fallacy	of	ontological	compartmentalization	that	A.	Prior	speaks	when	he	admonishes	philosophers	for	their	tendency	to	“speak	as	if	the	real	world	were	just	one	of	a	number	of	different	big	boxes	in	which	various	things	go	on,	the	other	boxes	having	such	labels	as	‘the	mind’,	‘the	world	of	Greek	mythology.’”96		It	seems	what	Mellor	says	is	that	A-time	is	real	(in	the	mental	box),	but	B-time	real	too	(in	the	concrete	realm	box),	only	that	the	latter	is	somehow	more	real	than	the	former.		This	Orwellian	logic	is	faulty	on	its	face.		If	A-changes	and	with	it	A-time	are	real,	then	they	are	real	period,	where	‘reality’	ranges	over	both	intentional	and	concrete	realms.	
																																																																				96	A.	Prior	(1976),	p.	80.	
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A	different	but	relevant	question	is	this:	Do,	on	Mellor’s	view,	changes	in	our	A-beliefs	occur	in	time?	or	using	his	terminology:	Are	A-beliefs	changing	all	the	time?		If	they	are	changing	all	the	time,	i.e.,	changing	in	time,	then	there	exists	real	A-time.		If,	on	the	hand,	they	do	not,	then	how	should	we	account	for	them	changing	but	not	in	time.97		I	suppose	a	friend	of	Mellor’s	B	theory		would	riposte	that	one	believing	that	P	at	one	time,	i.e.,	at	one	B-location	and	believing	¬P	at	another	time,	i.e.,	at	another	B-location,	is	exactly	what	changes	in	our	A-beliefs	amounts	to.		On	this	view,	reality	of	A-changes	is	denied	but	their	phenomenality	is	preserved.		Indeed,	no	A-time	is	required	on	this	reading	of	Mellor’s	argument.		Then	again,	if	this	is	so,	then	we	are	entitled	to	the	following	questions:	How	is	that	one	travels	from	one	B-location	to	another	for	if	he	does	not,	then	how	could	he	have	these	two	contrary	beliefs?		Surely	believing	that	P	at	one	B-location	and	then	believing	that	¬P	at	another	B-location	does	require	some	sort	of	movement	of	the	believer	(soul,	mind,	etc.)	along	the	B-time	axis.		It	seems	Mellor	cannot	avoid	the	implication	of	his	theory	of	A-beliefs	that	there	exists	a	certain	movement	of	the	A-believer	along	the	B-time	axis;	namely	the	moment	from	earlier	B-loci	to	later	ones.		I	thus	conclude	that	Mellor’s	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	flow	has	too	many	loose	ends.		2.5.2 Let	us	now	consider	the	case	of	Adolf	Grünbaum.		While	he	decidedly	relegates	temporal	passage	to	the	realm	of	human	psyche	and	gives	his	categorical	‘no’	to	the	
																																																																				97	I	take	the	idea	of	there	being	changes	without	time	rather	plausible,	but	it	is	not	how	Mellor	argues	his	case.	
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question	whether	there	exists	temporal	passage,	he	nonetheless	factors	the	idea	of	the	Now-manifold	into	his	schema	of	reality	as	the	following	passage	shows:	The	transience	of	the	Now	is	a	feature	of	psychological	(and	common	sense)	time	in	the	sense	that	there	is	a	diversity	of	the	Now-contents	of	immediate	awareness.		Hence	it	is	a	matter	of	fact	that	the	Now	“shifts”	in	conscious	awareness	to	the	extent	that	there	is	a	diversity	of	the	Now-contents,	and	it	is	likewise	a	fact	that	the	Now-contents	are	temporally	ordered.		But	since	these	diverse	Now-contents	are	ordered	with	respect	to	the	relation	“earlier	than”	no	less	than	with	respect	to	its	converse	“later	than,”	it	is	a	mere	tautology	to	say	that	the	Now	shifts	from	earlier	to	later.98	Grünbaum’s	notion	of	“the	Now-contents”	is	central	to	his	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	temporal	passage.		Yet,	it	is	not	entirely	coherent.		It	appears	that	Grünbaum’s	intention	is	to	convey	the	idea	that	physical	reality	is	comprised	of	B-ordered	temporal	loci	which	have	ontological	contents,	such	that	each	B-locus	permanently	has	one	and	the	same	ontological	content.		This	way,	temporal	passage	basically	amounts	to	consecutive	acts	of	awareness	of	a	sentient	being	of	sequentially	ordered	Now-contents;	at	a	given	point	on	the	B-time	axis	a	sentient	being	is	aware	of	there	being	earlier-than-now-contents	and	later-than-now-contents.		If	this	exegesis	is	correct,	then	the	use	of	‘Now’	in	this	context	is	entirely	superfluous,	in	fact	it	is	
																																																																				98	A.	Grünbaum,	Philosophical	Problems	of	Time	and	Space	(Dordrecht,	Holland:	D.	Reidel	Publishing	Company,	1963),	p.	315-16.	
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misleading;	a	term	such	as	B-located	ontological	contents	would	be	more	appropriate.		How	should	we	deal	with	this	conceptual	deficiency?	Grünbaum	holds	that	the	Now-contents	(i.e.,	ontological	contents	of	B-loci)	are	temporally	ordered	by	the	relation	of	earlier/later	than,	as	shown	in	Figure	14.		Factoring	sentient	beings	into	this	picture	of	reality	gives	us	consecutive	acts	of	awareness	of	different	Now-contents	and	thus	generating	the	notion	of	temporal	passage.		Yet,	this	temporal	awareness,	Grünbaum	argues,	does	not	provide	us	with	justification	for	holding	that	there	is	the	privileged	Now,	the	Now	that	is	shifting	“in	
the	future	direction	along	the	time-axis.”	Grünbaum	is	insistent	on	that	the	phenomenon	of	temporal	passage	“has	no	relevance	at	all	to	the	time	of	physical	events,	because	it	has	no	significance	at	all	apart	from	the	egocentric	perspectives	of	a	conscious	(human)	organism	and	from	the	immediate	experience	of	that	organism.”99				 	Fig.	14	Grünbaum’s	earlier/later	than	temporally	ordered	nows.		Is	this	a	consistent	picture	of	temporal	reality?		I	think	not,	for	in	order	for	there	to	be	different	acts	of	awareness	of	Now-contents,		consciousness,	and	with	it	the	whole	conscious	being,	must	move	at	a	certain	pace	from	one	Now-content	to	the	next,	thus	generating	a	movement	alongside	the	static	time-axis.		We	thus	have	physical	objects,	viz.	human	bodies,	moving	along	the	B-time	axis.100		The	same	
																																																																				99	A.	Grünbaum,	(1963),	p.324.	100	An	alternative	picture	would	be	of	the	B-series	moving	in	relation	to	stationary	human	bodies.		Consult	the	discussion	of	the	two	metaphors	of	temporal	passage	in	footnote	8.	
t1								t2								t3								t4									t5								t6	…….tn	the	B-time	axis	
now					now					now						now					now							now….	now	
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problem	is	generated	by	Mellor’s	view	of	the	A-believer.		Certainly,	consciousness,	mind,	and	agent	of	belief,	etc.,	cannot	move	by	itself,	it	is	not	a	disembodied	phenomenon,	so	if	it	moves	along	the	B-time	axis,	then	it	must	drag	its	corporeal	vessel	along	the	B-time	axis.		Thus,	a	given	sentient	being	first	is	aware	of	one	Now-content	by	existing	in	the	B-locus	which	houses	this	specific	Now-content,	then	it	is	aware	of	the	adjacent	Now-content	occupying	the	adjacent	B-locus,	etc.	Indeed,	Grünbaum	endorses	(though	with	some	reservation)	Herman	Weyl’s	similar	picture	of	the	phenomenon	of	temporal	passage:	“The	objective	world	simply	is,	it	does	not	
happen.		Only	to	the	gaze	of	my	consciousness,	crawling	along	the	life-line	of	my	body,	does	a	section	of	this	world	come	to	life	as	a	fleeting	image	in	space	which	continually	changes	in	time.”101		Grünbaum	(and	Mellor)	cannot	escape	the	implication	of	this	picture	of	temporal	passage	that	something	does	literally	move	along	the	B-time	axis.	Yet,	he	resolutely	upholds	the	view	that	temporal	flow	“depends	for	its	very	existence	on	the	perspectival	role	of	consciousness,	since	the	coming	into	being	(or	becoming)	of	an	event	is	no	more	than	the	entry	of	its	effect(s)	into	the	immediate	awareness	of	a	sentient	being	(man).”102	Suppose	then	that	the	phenomenon	of	temporal	passage	does	arise	from	the	unidirectional	movement	of	consciousness	along	the	B-time	axis.		Can	this	be	a	consistent	B-position?		I	do	not	see	how	this	view	can	be	upheld	by	a	consistent	B-theorist	since,	in	addition	to	the	reasons	already	discussed,	we	have	something	moving	along	B-time	axis	at	a	speed	that	can	only	be	measured	in	terms	of	a	second-
																																																																				101	H.	Weyl,	Philosophy	of	Mathematics	and	Natural	Science,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1949),	p.16.	102	A.	Grünbaum	(1963),	pp.325-26.	
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order	time.		What	this	second-order	time	could	possibly	be	is	not	at	all	clear,	nor	is	it	at	all	clear	what	the	rate	of	such	passage	could	possibly	be.103		One	thing,	however,	is	entirely	clear,	the	existence	of	this	second-order	time	cannot	be	allowed	on	a	consistent	B	theory	of	time.	One	might	defend	Grünbaum’s,	and	the	like,	views	on	the	following	grounds.		It	might	be	said,	as	indeed	is	often	said,	that	an	individual	consciousness	does	not	hop	from	one	B-locus	to	another,	but	is	evenly	spread	over	a	certain	stretch	of	the	B-time	axis,	the	stretch	which	is	even	in	length	to	its	lifespan;	it	is,	in	the	B-theorist’s	argot,	a	continuant	whose	temporally	ordered	parts	exist	together	but	not	at	the	same	time.104		This	rejoinder	is	indefensible,	for	if	it	is	one	and	the	same	individual	consciousness,	then	it	should	be	aware	of	all	relevant	Now-contents	at	once	analogously	to	one	being	aware	of	a	landscape	that	is	within	one’s	visual	field.		Indeed,	such	individuals	are	contemplated	by	the	theologians,	they	designate	them	by	the	term	‘sempiternal	beings’	as	oppose	to	eternal	beings	proper.		But	we	are	dealing	here	with	ordinary	conscious	beings	which	are	aware	of	one	and	only	one	‘Now-content’	at	any	given	moment.		It	might	be	further	countered	that	a	conscious	continuant	is	not	a	monolith	stretched	over	B-distances,	but	a	conglomerate	of	fully	conscious	fully	functional	temporally	ordered	parts	(beings)	each	of	which	is	aware	of	its	own	Now-content,	the	Now-content	that	is	specific	to	the	B-locus	inhabited	by	the	conscious	part	which	is	endemic	to	this	B-locus.		On	this	picture	of	reality	a	conscious	continuant	is	comprised	of	innumerable	conscious	beings.		This	picture	of	reality	
																																																																				103	A	perfectly	parallel	problem	is	discussed	in	subsections	2.2.3-2.2.4.	104	I	will	delve	extensively	into	this	and	related	issues	in	the	next	Chapter.	
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must	be	rejected	on	the	grounds	of	Ockham’s	razor,	as	well	as	for	certain	additional	reasons.105		2.5.3 In	my	conversations	with	Derek	Parfit,	an	avowed	B-theorist,	he	once	conveyed	the	impression	that	the	problem	of	temporal	passage	is	indeed	wearisome	for	the	B-theorist,	a	fact,	which	I	take	it,	suggests	that	until	and	unless	the	problem	is	resolved,	the	B	theory	cannot	be	considered	to	be	whole.		Indeed,	the	fact	that	the	moving-now	is	an	unalienable	constituent	of	human	experience	is	as	captivating	as	it	is	puzzling	for	the	B-theorist.		Carnap	reports	that	Einstein,	a	B-theorist	by	default,	was	captivated	by	the	notion	of	the	moving-now:	Once	Einstein	said	that	the	problem	of	the	Now	worried	him	seriously.		He	explained	that	the	experience	of	the	Now	means	something	special	for	man,	something	essentially	different	from	the	past	and	the	future,	but	that	this	important	difference	does	not	and	cannot	occur	within	physics.		That	this	experience	cannot	be	grasped	by	science	seemed	to	him	a	matter	of	painful	but	inevitable	resignation.106	An	even	more	vivid	case	of	this	theoretical	wavering	is	Hans	Reichenbach.		The	early	Reichenbach	is	a	paradigmatic	A/B	theorist	who	holds	that	“an	essential	content	is	omitted	from	[the	four-dimensional]	picture.”107			This	essential	content	Reichenbach	identifies	with	the	moving-now.		Yet,	in	his	last	book,	Reichenbach	
																																																																				105	I	would	delve	extensively	into	these	reasons	in	the	next	Chapter.	106	R.	Carnap,	"Carnap's		Intellectual	Biography,"	in	The	Philosophy	of	Rudolf	Carnap,	P.	A.	Schilpp		(ed.),	1963,		pp.	3-84,	p.37.	107	H.	Reichenbach,	“Die	Kausalstruktur	der	Welt	und	der	Unterschied	von	Vergangenheit	und	Zukunft.”	Quoted	from	A.	Grünbaum,	Philosophical	Problems	of	Time	and	Space,	pp.	318.	
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allocates	only	a	minor	introductory	chapter	to	the	question	of	temporal	fluidity	which	he	now	thinks	“reveals	the	highly	emotional	content	associated	with	the	experience	of	time”	and	warns	us	to	guard	against	the	temptation	“to	look	for	answers	[to	the	question	of	temporal	passage]	that	satisfy	emotions	rather	than	clarify	meanings.”108		And	although	the	later	Reichenbach	still	thinks	“that	physics	can	account	for	time	flow	and	for	Becoming,”109	the	bulk	of	the	book	is	devoted	to	the	physics	of	B-temporal	order,	which	certainly	has	no	use	for	the	notion	of	temporal	flow.	The	undeniable	phenomenological	experience	of	temporal	fluidity	prompts	the	considerable	majority	of	B-theorists	to	interpret	it	as	a	purely	psychological	phenomenon.	This	is	surely	a	consistent	position.		Yet,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	the	entire	array	of	diverse	opinions	as	to	what	exactly	this	phenomenology	of	temporal	fluidity	amounts	to	converge	on	some	or	another	notion	of	consciousness	‘crawling’	along	the	B-time	axis.		Apparently	this	majority	finds	it	impossible	to	completely	avoid	an	allusion	to	something	(consciousness)	moving	alongside	the	static	B-time	axis	thus	admitting,	however	tacitly,	the	reality	of	objective	time	flow.		It	seems	that	a	pure	B	theory	is	as	unachievable	as	a	pure	A-series	is;	though,	of	course,	for	different	reasons.		But	even	when	we	consider	the	notion	of	B-time	per	se,	it	still	reveals	itself	as	essentially	an	inconsistent	hypothesis.		I	now	shall	turn	to	the	exposition	of	a	number	of	such	inconsistencies.				 	
																																																																				108	H.	Reichenbach,	The	Direction	of	Time	(Mineola,	New	York:	Dover	Publications,	1971),	p.	2.	109	H.	Reichenbach	(1971),	p.	17.	
82	
Chapter	III:	Eternalism	
	
3.1 The	Argument	against	Object-Eternalism	3.1.1 Eternalism,	understood	as	a	metaphysical	thesis,	is	about	the	makeup	of	physical	realty;	it	hinges	on	two	premises.		One	premise	is	topological	–	the	universe	is	a	set	of	temporally	ordered	entities	(slices,	segments,	events,	etc.).		The	other	premise	is	ontological	–	these	temporally	ordered	entities	are	existentially	on	a	par,	they	are	all	equally	part	of	reality.110		The	conjunction	of	these	two	premises	yields	the	inference	that	temporal	distances	do	not	have	an	effect	on	existence;	regardless	of	how	far	apart	the	universe’s	temporally	ordered	entities	are,	they	are	all	equally	real,	all	equally	in	existence.		In	the	eternalist’s	universe,	the	E-universe	for	short,	being	trumps	time.111	In	this	section,	I	will	be	dealing	primarily	with	the	problems	of	object-eternalism,	the	conjecture	that	the	E-universe	is	a	temporally	ordered	set	(toset)	of	
																																																																				110	In	line	with	what	these	constituents	are	taken	to	be,	eternalism	branches	into	two	major	types:	object-eternalism	and	event-eternalism.		The	former	hinges	on	the	idea	that	the	universe	is	comprised	of	temporally	ordered	concrete	three-dimensional	segments	which	are	all	equally	in	existence	(T.	Sider	2001),	whereas	the	latter	is	articulated	in	terms	of	the	idea	that	it	is	only	events,	not	objects,	which	are	temporally	extended	equally	real	entities	(D.H.	Mellor	1998).		The	majority	of	eternalists	are	object-eternalists.		But	both	camps	presuppose	time-eternalism,	the	conjecture	that	there	exists	an	ordered	set	of	equally	real	temporal	loci.		Though	time-eternalism	is	an	essential	component	of	the	two	strains	of	the	eternalist’s	hypothesis,	nobody	espouses	pure	time-eternalism,	the	picture	of	reality	according	to	which	there	are	ontologically	vacuous	temporal	loci,	that	is,	that	there	exists	pure	B-time	devoid	of	objects/events.		For	this	reason,	in	my	dealings	with	eternalism,	I	will	restrict	myself	to	the	analysis	of	object-and	event-eternalism	and	will	address	issues	pertaining	to	time-eternalism	only	when	it	is	called	for	and	even	then	only	tangentially.	111	So	construed,	eternalism	is	akin	to	the	block-universe	hypothesis	and	four-dimensionalism.		All	three	theories,	of	course,	are	deeply	rooted	in	the	B	theory	of	time.		There	are,	of	course,	numerous	subtle	differences	between	these	three	theories.		For	present	purposes,	however,	I	will	ignore	them	and	employ	the	term	‘eternalism’	as	referring	to	an	umbrella	thesis	that	covers	a	family	of	metaphysical	hypotheses	each	of	which	pivots	on	the	notion	of	space-like	time,	viz.	B-time.	
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concrete	equally	real	three-dimensional	segments.		Since	the	E-universe’s	temporally	ordered	segments	are	all	equally	in	existence,	it	follows	that	the	object-eternalist	should	take	such	terms	as	“the	universe’s	first	temporally	ordered	segment,”	“the	universe’s	second	temporally	ordered	segment,”	etc.,	to	be	wholly	topological;	that	is,	reflecting	the	static	space-like	temporal	ordering	of	the	segments,	not	the	order	of	their	coming	into	being.		In	the	E-universe,	there	are	simply	no	such	things	as	
existentially	prior	or	later	temporally	ordered	segments,	they	are	all	came	into	existence	at	once,	exist	at	once	and	will	go	out	of	existence	at	once,	if	the	E-universe	is	a	finite	entity,	or	have	ever	been	in	existence	en	masse,	if	the	E-universe	is	an	everlasting	entity.		In	short,	all	temporally	ordered	segments	of	the	E-universe	are	of	the	same	age,	the	same	age	the	E-universe	is,	whatever	this	age	might	be.112		Henceforth,	I	shall	refer	to	this	notion	of	existential	equality	of	the	temporally	ordered	segments	the	ontological	parity	principle.113	This	doctrine	of	ontological	egalitarianism	is	essential	to	object-eternalism,	for	if	it	fails,	then	either	an	A	or	A/B	theory	must	be	factored	into	its	theoretical	framework.	These	theories,	however,	are	wholly	incompatible	with	the	eternalist’s	hypothesis.		This	fact	can	be	clearly	seen	upon	the	following	reflection:	if	the	temporally	ordered	segments	of	the	E-universe	do	not	come	into	being	all	together,	but	consecutively,	then	in	the	beginning,	there	was	the	first	segment,	then,	in	due	
																																																																				112	Notice	that	on	the	eternalist’s	account	the	age	of	the	universe	is	not	what	it	is	now	at	present	time,	i.e.,	roughly	13.5	billion	years,	but	what	it	‘will	be’	at	the	end	of	its	existence,	if	the	universe	is	a	finite	entity.			I	have	put	the	simple	future	form	of	the	verb	‘to	be’	in	single	quotes	to	indicate	that	this	is	not	an	ordinary	sense	of	future	tense,	for	on	the	eternalist’s	account,	the	universe	is	as	old	at	its	end	as	it	is	old	in	its	beginning;	it	is	always	of	the	same	age.		I	will	address	this,	to	put	it	bluntly,	as	an	outright	bizarre	consequence	of	the	eternalist’s	hypothesis	in	due	course.	113	I	believe	Richard	Gale	refers	to	the	same	principle	when	he	speaks	of	“democratic	equality	of	all	times.”	The	Philosophy	of	Time,	R.	M.	Gale	(ed.)	(London:		Macmillan,	1968).	
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course,	the	second	segment	came	into	existence	and	so	on.		In	turn,	this	apparently	dynamic	reality	might	be	of	two	types.		If	to	the	first	segment	the	second	segment	is	added,	and	then	the	third	segment	is	added	to	the	block	comprised	of	the	preceding	two	segments	and	so	forth,	then	we	would	have	a	burgeoning	universe.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	second	segment	replaces	the	first	segment	and	the	rest	replace	each	other	in	sequential	order,	so	that	at	any	given	moment	of	the	E-universe’s	existence	there	exists	only	one	segment,	then	we	would	have	a	pure	presentist’s	universe.		Apparently,	none	of	these	two	scenarios	is	acceptable	to	the	object-eternalist.		Moreover,	the	temporally	ordered	segments	of	the	E-universe	not	only	come	and	go	at	once,	they	continually	exist	at	once,	for	if	they	do	not	then	as	before	we	have	a	dynamic	universe.		Hence,	in	the	E-universe,	no	temporally	ordered	segment	goes	into	or	out	of	existence	by	itself;	either	all	segments	exist	together	as	one	whole	or	there	is	no	such	thing	as	the	E-universe.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	the	ontological	parity	principle	has	migrated	into	the	object-eternalist’s	ontology	from	the	commonsense	ontology	of	space.		Since	spatial	distances	have	no	effect	on	being	–	regardless	of	how	spatially	far	apart	objects	are	they	are	all	equally	real	–	so,	it	is	held	by	the	object-eternalist,	temporal	distances	are	ontologically	neutral	as	well	–	regardless	of	how	temporally	far	apart	the	segments	are,	they	all	are	equally	in	existence.		Michael	Rea	succinctly	puts	the	object-eternalist’s	belief	as	follows:	“non-present	objects	are	like	spatially	distant	objects:	they	exist,	just	not	here,	where	we	are.”114		Apparently,	this	reasoning	is	rooted	in	and	
																																																																				114	M.	C.	Rea,	“Four-Dimensionalism”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Metaphysics,	Michael	Loux	and	Dean	Zimmerman	(eds.)	(Oxford,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003),	pp.	246-80;	p.246.		Rea’s	usage	of	the	demonstrative	‘here’	is	not	fitting	in	this	context.		A	more	accurate	eternalist’s	position	should	
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justified	by	the	spatial	simile,	the	conjecture	that	temporal	separations	are	analogous	to	spatial	separations	in	all	relevant	aspects.115		In	the	E-universe,	being	trumps	time	precisely	because	in	it	time	is	a	space-like	phenomenon.		Arthur	Prior	aptly	labeled	this	notion	of	time	“the	tapestry	view	of	time,”	a	view	about	which	he	thought	“logicians	ought	to	retrace	their	steps.”116		I	think	Prior	was	right	in	this	regard.	Note	that	on	object-eternalism,	so	construed,	temporally	ordered	segments	should	not	be	taken	to	be	the	E-universe’s	temporal	parts	per	se,	as	unfortunately	often	is	the	case.		Conceivably,	time	has	temporal	parts,	i.e.,	t-points.		But	how	could	anything	else	besides	time	have	temporal	parts?		Hence,	the	segments	should	be	understood	as	temporally	ordered	concrete	parts	of	the	E-universe.		Thus,	the	term	“temporal	part,”	when	it	is	applied	to	the	temporally	ordered	segments	of	the	E-universe,	should	be	regarded	as	a	misnomer.117		Furthermore,	a	consistent	eternalist	should	not	construe	the	segments	as	four-dimensional	entities,	but	as	three-dimensional	instantaneous	cross-sections	of	a	four-dimensional	whole.118		For	if	the	E-universe	is	comprised	of	four-dimensional	segments,	then	each	segment	is	extended	in	its	own	temporal	dimension,	as	it	were.		Hence,	there	would	be	as	many	temporal	
																																																																				read	something	like	this:	“non-present	objects	are	like	spatially	distant	objects:	they	exist,	just	not	now,	
when	we	are.”	115	I	shall	say	more	about	the	spatial	simile	in	section	3.4.		116	Arthur	Prior,	“Some	Free	Thinking	about	Time”	in	Metaphysics:	the	Big	Questions,	Peter	van	Inwagen	&	Dean	Zimmerman	(eds.)	(Malden	Massachusetts:	Blackwell	Publishers,	1998),	pp.104-07.	117	On	the	ambiguity	of	the	term	“temporal	part”	consult,	for	instance,	E.	J.	Lowe’s	“Theories	of	persistence	and	the	notion	of	‘temporal	parts,’”	in	Questions	of	Time	and	Tense,	R.	Le	Poidevin	(ed.)	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1998).	118	The	instantaneity	condition	is	integral	to	the	object-eternalist’s	picture	of	reality	because	if	the	segments	are	durative	entities,	then	they	ought	to	be	comprised	of	subsegments	which	in	turn	are	either	durative	or	instantaneous	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.		However,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	concrete	objects	can	be	instantaneous	entities;	it	is	usually	events	which	are	either	instantaneous	or	not.		I	shall	not	further	dwell	on	this	problem,	for	there	exist	much	more	serious	inconsistencies	and	outright	contradictions	in	the	object-eternalist’s	hypothesis.	
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dimensions	as	there	are	4/D	segments,	plus	the	common	B-temporal	dimension.		Such	a	lavish	temporal	ontology	must	be	rejected	as	uneconomical,	if	not	for	any	other	reason.		3.1.2 The	foregoing	construal	of	the	notion	of	the	E-universe	might	tempt	us	to	take	it	to	be	the	largest	possible	spacetime	worm	stretched	along	the	B-time	axis,	as	shown	in	Figure	15.		This	visualization	of	the	E-universe,	however,	is	not	entirely	accurate.		The	accurate	picture	would	be	this.		If	we	visualize	a	given	segment	of	the	E-universe,					 Fig.	15	The	spacetime	worm	stretched	along	the	B-time	axis.	say	the	segment	co-present	with	my	writing	this	sentence,	as	a	sphere	with	all	its	atoms,	molecules,	stars,	galaxies,	etc.,	then	the	E-universe	would	be	represented	as	a	lineup	of	temporally	ordered	spheres	each	containing	exactly	the	same	amount	of	matter	and	energy	as	its	neighbor	(this	is	the	required	on	the	principle	of	conservation	of	mass/energy)	only	that	the	arrangement	of	matter/energy	would	be	unique	to	each	sphere.		At	the	first	B-point	on	the	B-time	axis,	we	have	a	small,	dense,	and	hot	sphere,	in	the	middle	of	the	B-time	axis	there	exist	large	spheres	characterized	by	vast	empty	spaces	hither	and	thither	speckled	with	stars,	dust	
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clouds,	and	galaxies,	and	at	the	last	B-point,	we	are	back	to	small,	dense,	and	hot	sphere.119		This	picture	of	reality	is	graphically	depicted	in	Figure	16.						 Fig.	16	The	E-Universe	When	object-eternalism,	so	construed,	is	taken	to	its	logical	conclusion,	it	reveals	itself	as	essentially	an	inconsistent	hypothesis,	for	its	two	central	premises	are	in	effect	incompatible.		On	the	topological	premise,	the	instantaneous	three-dimensional	segments	are	temporally	ordered,	viz.	exist	at	different	times.		On	the	ontological	premise,	however,	they	have	always	existed	(or	at	least	as	long	as	the	E-universe	exists).		A	given	segment	occupies	a	certain	(instantaneous)	temporal	location,	yet	its	lifespan	is	equal	to	that	of	the	E-universe	itself;	it	is	both	a	momentary	entity	and	something	with	an	indefinitely	long	lifespan.		Demonstrably,	being	instantaneous	and	many	billions	years	old	are	incompatible	properties.		More	pointedly,	if	the	E-universe	is	an	eternal	entity,	then	all	its	segments	both	exist	instantaneously	and	eternally,	they	are	both	instantaneous	and	eternal	entities.	The	object-eternalist,	no	doubt,	would	deny	that	the	lifespan	of	an	instantaneous	segment	is	both	instantaneous	and	eternal;	he	would	say	that	each	
																																																																				119	This	picture	of	the	E-universe	presupposes	Big	Bang/Big	Crunch	theory.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	E-universe	is	an	eternal	entity,	then	we	would	not	have	the	first	and	the	last	spheres.	
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segment	exists	at	one	and	only	one	temporal	location	and	that	its	lifespan	is	equal	in	length	to	the	length	of	that	location.		Yet,	on	the	ontological	parity	principle,	which,	we	have	seen	is	integral	to	the	object-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	when	the	object-eternalist	speaks	about	all	temporally	ordered	segments	existing	en	masse,	or	a	given	instantaneous	segment	always	being	in	existence,	he	is	required	to	use	some	notion	like	“for	all	time,”	or	“unceasingly,”	or	“everlastingly,”	or	“continuously,”	etc.		An	account	of	there	existing	equally	real,	yet	temporally	ordered	segments	inevitably	runs	into	this	topological	instantaneity/ontological	eternality	contradiction.	The	object-eternalist	simply	cannot	escape	such	implications	of	his	theory.	Now,	each	instantaneous	segment	of	the	E-universe	must	be	a	full-blooded	three-dimensional	object.		For	instance,	the	segment	that	is	simultaneous	with	my	writing	these	lines	is	the	whole	universe	with	all	its	atoms,	stars,	galaxies,	etc.,	and	such	is	true	about	any	other	segment.		Such	terms	as	“temporal	segments,”	“temporal	slices,”	“temporal	slivers,”	and	the	like,	therefore,	are	rather	misleading.		One	might	conceive	of	temporal	segmentation	by	analogy	to	slicing	a	fruit–	here	is	one	slice	of	an	apple,	here	is	another…	all	slices	together	equal	the	whole	apple.		In	the	temporal	segmentation,	however,	should	such	a	phenomenon	exist,	each	temporal	slice	of	the	apple	is	a	whole	apple	and	there	are	infinitely	many	such	apples,	each	slightly	different	from	its	temporal	neighbor.		As	mentioned	earlier,	each	segment	of	the	E-universe	has	a	definite	mass	which	is	equal	to	the	mass	of	its	temporal	neighbor,	but	since	the	number	of	these	segments	is	infinite,	then	so	must	be	the	mass	of	the	whole	E-universe.		This	conclusion	is	in	blunt	conflict	with	the	contemporary	scientific	outlook.		The	universe	does	not	have	an	infinite	mass,	it	has	a	finite	mass	at	any	one	
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time;	or	at	least	its	mass	is	not	infinitely	larger	than	that	of	the	temporal	segment	in	which	I	am	writing	this	sentence.	The	object-eternalist	might	counter	that	the	scientist	when	he	estimates	the	mass	of	the	universe	refers	to	one	and	only	one	of	its	segments.		Suppose	the	object-eternalist	is	right,	should	not	then	the	E-universe	with	its	infinite	mass	be	the	subject	of	the	scientific	analysis?		As	far	as	I	know,	cosmology	is	not	about	the	E-universe.		It	is	about	the	fluid	universe	with	the	finite	and	constant	mass.		In	the	matters	of	scientific	hypothesis	about	observable	reality,	the	scientist’s	hypothesis	takes	precedent	over	a	philosophical	speculation.		The	object-eternalist’s	conjecture,	therefore,	must	be	abandoned	as	contrary	to	the	modern	scientific	outlook	on	reality.	Another	objection	to	the	reality	of	the	E-universe	can	be	drawn	from	the	following	consideration.		Since	there	can	be	no	scientific	tool	in	principle	that	could	enable	us	to	observe	the	gamut	of	the	instantaneous	three-dimensional	segments	of	the	E-universe	in	its	entirety,	or	even	just	a	two-segmental	part	of	it,	because	for	such	an	observation	to	take	a	place,	the	observer	must	have	an	atemporal	viewpoint,	the	E-universe	hypothesis	must	be	abandoned	as	not	being	scientifically	verifiable	in	principle.		Hence,	as	far	as	natural	science	is	concerned,	object-eternalism	is	not	a	viable	hypothesis.		3.1.3 The	version	of	eternalism	hitherto	discussed	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	[E]	 The	E-universe	is	a	toset	of	equally	real,	instantaneous,	three-dimensional	segments.	
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Suppose	then	[E]	is	true.		Take	now	a	concrete	object	x,	such	that	x	is	not	a	momentary	entity.			On	the	object-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	such	object	is	a	continuant,	a	thing	whose	parts	exist	together	but	not	at	the	same	time;	it,	therefore,	is	comprised	of	temporally	adjacent	instantaneous	three-dimensional	parts.		Since	we	are	dealing	here	with	a	concrete	object,	it	follows	that	these	parts	must	be	concrete	as	well.		Surely,	concrete	objects	cannot	have	three-dimensional	abstract	parts.		Nor	can	some	temporally	ordered	three-dimensional	parts	of	concrete	objects	be	more	concrete	than	their	other	parts.		Concreteness,	like	existence,	does	not	come	in	degrees.120		And	even	if	we	would	allow	the	possibility	of	concreteness	to	come	in	degrees,	the	question	would	arise	which	of	temporally	ordered	three-dimensional	parts	of	x	should	we	take	to	be	more	concrete	than	the	others?		Certainly	not	those	which	are	in	a	closer	proximity	to	the	present,	for	on	the	eternalist’s	picture	of	temporal	reality	there	is	no	such	thing	as	the	present.		It,	therefore,	is	not	open	to	the	eternalist	to	hold	a	degree	of	concreteness	hypothesis.		Hence,	if	x	is	a	temporally	extended	three-dimensional	object,	then	on	the	pain	of	inconsistency,	the	eternalist	has	no	choice	but	to	hold	that	all	of	x’s	temporally	ordered	three-dimensional	parts	are	equally	concrete.	Now,	since	all	concrete	objects	are	in	space,	all	temporally	ordered	three-dimensional	parts	of	concrete	continuants	must	be	in	space	as	well.		It	cannot	be	
																																																																				120	Quentin	Smith	in	fact	does	subscribe	to	the	idea	that	existence	comes	in	degrees;	present	objects	on	his	view	are	indeed	more	real	than	non-present	ones,	‘degree	presentism’	he	call	his	conjecture.		“Time	and	Degree	of	Existence:	a	Theory	of	‘Degree	Presentism’”	in	Time,	Reality	&	Experience,	C.	Callender	(ed.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002).		I	find	this	view	of	temporal	reality	severely	wanting.		Existence	is	an	all	or	nothing	phenomenon.		Indeed,	what	sense	can	be	made	of	notions	of	less-and	more-existing	entities?		Suppose	x	is	a	less	existing	entity	than	y.		We	then	are	entitled	to	ask:	“by	how	much	is	it	less	existing?”		Could	an	answer	be,	say,	“by	half”?		I	do	not	see	how	this	can	be	an	answer,	for	no	sense	can	be	made	of	the	notion	of	a	half-existing	entity.	
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overstated	that	on	a	consistent	object-eternalism,	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	are	not	only	temporally	adjacent	(temporally	ordered);	they	also	must	be	spatially	adjacent	(spatially	ordered)	since	they	all	exist	in	space.		This	spatial	proximity	of	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	is	a	very	peculiar	feature	of	the	E-universe,	indeed.		Apparently,	the	space	in	which	these	temporally	ordered	parts	are	situated	is	not	our	ordinary	three-dimensional	space,	for	if	it	were,	then	temporal	worms	would	be	observable	phenomena,	in	fact,	such	a	world	would	be	teeming	with	temporal	worms.		Hence,	on	the	object-eternalism,	a	hyperspace	that	houses	temporally	ordered	three-dimensional	parts	of	continuants	must	be	postulated.		Positing	such	hyperspace	is	not	contrary	only	to	the	contemporary	scientific	picture	of	reality;	it	is	quite	unnecessary	on	the	principle	of	theoretical	economy.			Additional	difficulty	arises	when	it	is	realized	that	in	order	to	house	the	three-dimensional	parts	of	continuants,	the	hyperspace	must	itself	be	three-dimensional.		Hence,	if	such	hyperspace	were	to	exist,	then	ordinary	three-dimensional	objects	would	not	be	three-dimensional,	but	in	fact	six-dimensional,	or	rather	seven-dimensional,	that	is,	they	would	be	extended	in	three	ordinary	spatial	dimensions,	in	three	hyper-spatial	dimensions,	plus	the	one	temporal	dimension.		Apparently,	on	this	picture	of	reality,	our	ordinary	space	and	the	hyperspace	must	share	the	same	time,	for	if	not,	then	the	hyperspace	has	its	own	hypertime	and	therefore,	continuants	in	addition	to	being	temporally	extended	would	be	hyper-temporally	extended	as	well.		Either	seven-dimensional	or	eight-dimensional	picture	of	reality	are	uneconomical	hypotheses	in	the	extreme;	they,	therefore,	should	be	unequivocally	rejected	and	with	them	we	should	reject	the	eternalist’s	metaphysics.	
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Take	now	an	object	at	rest.		According	to	the	object-eternalist,	it	has	some	of	its	temporally	ordered	parts	at	the	same	place,	literary	there	are	multitudes	of	such	parts	sharing	the	very	same	place,	and	the	longer	the	continuant	is	at	rest	the	more	of	its	temporally	parts	share	the	same	place.		Is	this	a	plausible	picture	of	reality?		I	think	not.		The	objector	might	rejoin	that	there	is	not	only	the	temporally	ordered	multitude	of	temporal	parts	of	the	continuant	at	rest,	there	is	also	the	temporally	ordered	multitude	of	places	such	that	each	place	is	occupied	by	only	one	and	only	one	part	of	the	continuant.		We,	however,	are	entitled	to	the	following	question:	“Where	are	these	places?”		The	only	plausible,	at	least	initially,	answer	to	this	question	is	that	they	are	next	to	each	other.		But	this	use	of	‘next’,	as	we	have	seen,	gets	the	object-eternalist	in	trouble,	for	it	requires	posting	of	a	hyperspace.		It	appears	that	object-eternalism	is	an	untenable	hypothesis.		3.1.4 On	object-eternalism,	I,	writing	these	lines,	am	not	wholly	present;	I	am	only	a	minute	part	of	the	whole	extended	over	certain	temporal	distances,	an	entity	whose	parts	exist	together,	but	not	at	the	same	time.		But	prima	facie,	I	am	wholly	present;	here	are	my	two	arms,	two	legs,	I	also	have	my	thoughts,	my	feelings,	etc.		I	am,	by	all	accounts,	a	whole	human	being	and	I	am	here/now.		Having	here/now	a	body,	thoughts,	desires,	etc.,	are	Moorian	facts.		Even	if	we	accept	the	main	premise	of	object-eternalism	that	there	are	continuants,	still	I	am	here/now,	not	there/then.		Am	I	then	an	instantaneous	part	of	a	continuant?		“Yes,”	emphatically	says	the	object-eternalist.		Well,	here	is	a	question	for	him:	How	an	instantaneous	sentient	being	can	be	aware	of	duration,	succession,	and	the	like	phenomena?		Apparently	he	cannot,	for	
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in	order	for	the	duration-awareness	to	arise,	the	very	same	sentient	being	must	first	exist	at	one	temporal	point,	then	at	another,	etc.		Without	such	successive	‘hopping’	from	one	temporal	point	to	another	there	could	not	be	the	duration-awareness.		But	on	the	object-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	a	part	of	a	continuant	is	forever	confined	to	one	and	only	one	4D-point;	it	is,	and	has	always	been	at	this	point;	it	has	never	been	anywhere	else;	it	is	not	a	spatiotemporal	traveler,	this	4D-point	is	its	only	spatiotemporal	dwelling,	its	eternal	prison	as	it	were.	Peter	Geach,	utilizing	Quine’s	example,	speaks	of	related	trouble	with	object-eternalism.		“Tabby	at	t	eating	mice,”	says	Geach,	is	a	perfectly	legitimate	proposition	because	“a	cat	can	eat	mice	at	time	t,	but	a	temporal	slice	of	a	cat,	Tabby-at-t,	cannot	eat	mice	anyhow.”		Geach	then	concludes	that	“temporal	slices	are	merely	‘dreams	of	our	language.’”	121		Indeed,	eating	a	mouse,	or	walking,	or	having	a	thought	are	processes,	but	instantaneous	three-dimensional	slices	of	a	four-dimensional	whole	ex	
hypothesis	are	not	capable	of	participating	in	such	processes,	no	matter	how	short	these	processes	might	be.		The	objector	might	reply	that	even	though	instantaneous	objects	cannot	participate	in	processes,	a	temporally	ordered	set	of	such	objects	can.		Tabby	at	t1	takes	one	bite,	Tabby	at	t2	takes	another,	and	so	on	until	the	mouse	is	totally	consumed.		The	problem	with	this	ostensible	way	out	is	that	since	Tabby-at-t	is	an	instantaneous	entity,	so	there	must	be	an	infinite	number	of	bites	between	the	beginning	and	the	end	of	the	cat’s	meal.		A	mighty	mouse	this	one	must	be	for	each	bitten	off	morsel	has	a	definite	mass;	it	thus	follows	that	the	continuant	the	MOUSE	has	an	infinite	mass.		A	mighty	mouse,	indeed!	
																																																																				121	Peter	Geach,	“Some	Problems	about	Time”	in	Metaphysics:	The	Big	Questions,	p.198.	
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An	outsider	to	this	metaphysical	quandary	might	wonder	why	continuants	must	have	an	infinite	number	of	temporally	ordered	parts.			The	answer	is	that	on	object-eternalism,	temporally	ordered	segments	are	instantaneous	entities,	thus,	given	that	continuants	are	durative	entities,	between	the	beginning	and	end	of	a	continuant’s	lifespan	there	lie	an	infinite	number	of	its	temporally	ordered	parts.		“But	why	these	temporally	ordered	parts	must	be	instantaneous?”	our	philosophical	novice	might	further	inquire.		Well,	if	they	are	not,	then	each	part	itself	must	be	comprised	of	subparts.		This	means	that	temporally	ordered	parts	are	themselves	continuants.		The	question,	therefore,	arises	whether	these	subparts	themselves	are	instantaneous	entities	and	so	ad	infinitum.		Apparently	the	object-eternalist	assumes	an	atomistic	conception	of	temporal	order;	temporal	points	are	taken	to	be	durationless	analogously	to	metaphysical	atoms	being	extensionless.		Accordingly,	temporally	ordered	segments	of	continuants	which	occupied	the	durationaless	temporal	loci	are	themselves	durationaless.122	Let	us	now	ask	the	following:	Can	a	sentient	part	of	a	sentient	continuant	think;	can	it,	for	instance,	say	“I	am	thinking”?		I	do	not	see	how	this	could	the	case.			Each	individual	sentient	part	of	this	whole	can	possess	only	a	minute	fraction	of	this	simple	self-reflection.		Indeed,	to	come	up	with	even	the	simplest	of	thoughts	there	is	required	some	sort	of	cognitive	process	which	unfolds	over	a	certain	period	of	time.		Apparently,	an	instantaneous	part	a	sentient	continuant	is	not	capable	of	holding	the	simplest	of	thoughts.		Being	a	fleeting	entity,	its	momentary	thought	is	just	an	
																																																																				122	Though,	strictly	speaking,	duration	is	an	attribute	of	events	not	concrete	objects.		Hence,	when	the	object-eternalist	speaks	of	instantaneous	temporal	parts	of	a	continuant	he	should	mean	that	it	is	lifespans	of	these	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	which	are	durationaless.	
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immeasurably	short	spark	of	consciousness	not	capable	of	even	the	most	trivial	inference	(inferences	after	all	are	processes);	and	it	can	have	only	one	such	spark,	not	one	at	a	time,	but	the	only	one,	period;	it	has	always	had	it	and	it	will	always	have	it	and	nothing	else.	Who	does,	then,	do	the	thinking?		It	surely	cannot	be	a	continuant	even	though	it	has	an	infinite	number	of	brains!	Let	me	elaborate	a	bit	on	this	last	point.		The	universe,	says	the	object-eternalist,	is	“populated	by	spacetime	worms,	sums	of	instantaneous	stages	from	different	times.”123		Such	temporally	extended	entities	(tempi	res	extensa),	Scholastics	called	ens	successivum,	things	which	are	“comprised	of	many,	all	of	which	exist	not	together.”124		On	this	ontology,	as	we	have	seen,	I,	writing	this	passage,	am	not	wholly	present	now;	only	an	infinitely	minute	part	of	me	is	present	here/now.		The	bulk	of	me	is	not	here/now.		Thus,	it	is	only	a	part	of	me	that	is	the	author	of	this	passage.		In	fact,	since	it	takes	some	time	to	write	this	passage,	there	are	many	parts	of	me,	which	are	authors	of	its	corresponding	parts.		So,	on	this	conception	of	reality,	the	present	passage	is	being	co-authored	by	an	infinite	number	of	authors;	there	are	infinitely	many	authors	claiming	exclusive	rights	to	separate	parts	of	this	passage.		One	says,	“I	have	written	this”	and	the	other	says,	“And	I	am	the	author	of	this,”	and	so	forth.		But	there	are	an	finite	amount	of	words	in	this	passage.		Thus,	it	follows	that	each	word	is	written	by	infinitely	many	parts	of	me.		What	is	more,	all	these	parts	must	somehow	communicate;	otherwise,	there	would	not	be	any	cohesiveness	to	the	passage.		“I	
																																																																				123	Ibid,	p.	53.	124	St.	Augustine,	The	Confessions,	Book.	IV,	Chapter	11.		Quoted	from	Roderick	Chisholm’s	“Identity	through	Time,”	in	Metaphysics	Kim	J.	and	Sosa	E.	(eds.)	(Oxford	&	Malden,	Massachusetts:	Blackwell	Publishers,	1999),	p	273-83.	
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write	this	and	you	write	that,”	says	one	of	my	parts	to	another,	and	its	spatiotemporal	neighbor	replies,	“OK,	but	please	give	an	argument	why	this	should	be	so.”		But	it	takes	time	to	converse.		How	much	time?		Well,	infinitely	many	parts	apparently	converse	for	infinitely	long	time.		Apparently,	the	object-eternalist’s	ontology	not	only	violates	Ockham’s	razor	by	populating	the	universe	with	too	many	entities;125	it	is	nonsensical	on	its	face;	it,	therefore,	must	be	emphatically	rejected.	It	is	such	ontological	implications	of	object-eternalism	that	I	find	particularly	objectionable;	indeed,	bizarre	in	the	extreme.		I,	however,	do	not	object	to	object-eternalism	on	the	ground	of	it	being	“a	crazy	metaphysic.”126		After	all,	some	initially	counterintuitive	views	about	the	structure	of	reality	have	turned	out	to	be	true.		For	instance,	the	idea	that	the	earth	is	a	sphere	was	in	great	conflict	with	the	pre-scientific	
Weltanschauung.		For	many	sagacious	individuals	of	the	day,	it	seemed	an	awfully	strange	idea	that	the	antipodeans	should	walk	upside-down.		Yet,	when	the	correct	scientific	perspective	has	been	obtained,	this	portrait	of	the	then	known	universe	looked	perfectly	cogent.		Let	us	also	heed	Frege’s	counsel	and	keep	in	mind	that	in	theoretical	investigations	“the	point	is	not	whether	they	are	natural,	but	whether	they	go	to	the	root	of	the	matter	and	are	logically	beyond	criticism.”127		Is	the	object-eternalism	logically	beyond	criticism?		It	completely	fails	in	this	respect.		Owing	to	this	and	other	inconsistencies,	which	cannot	be	extricated	in	principle	from	the	conceptual	edifice	of	object-eternalism,	the	hypothesis	must	be	rejected.	
																																																																				125	Incidentally,	it	has	always	puzzled	me	that	Quine,	the	self-proclaimed	lover	of	barren	landscapes,	was	a	keen	proponent	of	this	lavish	ontology.	126	Sider	(2001),	Chapter	6,	Section	3,	entitled	“A	Crazy	Metaphysic.”	127	G.		Frege,	The	Foundations	of	Arithmetic,	a	logico-mathematical	enquiry	into	the	concept	of	number;	second	revised	edition,	J.L.	Austin	(tr.)	(Evanston,	Illinois:	Northwestern	University	Press,	1980),	p.	xi.	
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3.2 The	Argument	against	Event-Eternalism	3.2.1 When	one	upholds	event-eternalism,	the	hypothesis	that	there	exists	the	all-inclusive	toset	of	events,	then	the	following	picture	emerges.		Each	instant	on	B-time	axis	‘houses’	a	class	of	instantaneous	events.		Members	of	each	such	class,	therefore,	are	aligned	within	a	specific	to	it	hyperplane	of	simultaneity.		A	serial	set	of	all	such	classes	would	then	constitute	the	totality	of	all	past,	present,	and	future	events.		Certainly,	instantaneous	“…events	can	be	partitioned	into	equivalence	classes	of	simultaneous	events	that	then	can	be	completely	ordered	by	an	asymmetric	and	transitive	relation	such	as	is	earlier	than.”128		Almost	two	centuries	ago,	Immanuel	Kant	considered	a	similar	prospect	of	there	existing	such	a	temporal	totality	of	all	past,	present,	and	future	events:	For	if	you	were	to	represent	time	by	a	straight	line	produced	to	infinity,	and	simultaneous	things	at	any	point	of	time	by	lines	drawn	perpendicular	to	it,	the	surface	generated	will	represent	the	world	of	
phenomena	[mundum	phaenomenon],	in	respect	both	of	substance	and	of	accidents.”129	Figure	17	is	a	diagrammatic	representation	the	temporal	totality	of	events.		Doted	vertical	lines	represent	hyperplanes	of	simultaneity	populated	by	endemic	to			
																																																																				128	Steven	Savitt,	“On	Absolute	Becoming	and	the	Myth	of	Passage”	in	Time,	Reality,	&	Experience,	Craig	Callender	(ed.)	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002),	p.162.		Whether	in	reality	there	exists	such	a	toset	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is,	of	course,	altogether	a	different	question.		As	I	shall	show	in	this	section,	existence	of	such	a	toset	involves	a	certain	contradiction.	129	Immanuel	Kant,	The	Inaugural	Dissertation.		Quoted	from	Alan	Gabbey’s	“The	Empirical	Credentials	of	Absolute	Space	and	some	Puzzles	about	Simultaneity.”		The	paper	was	presented	at	NYU	2006	
Conference	on	Issues	in	Modern	Philosophy,	subtitled	“Understanding	Space	and	Time.”	
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						 Fig.	17	The	temporal	totality	of	events.	them	instantaneous	events	(these	are	represented	by	four-pointed	stars).		Each	hyperplane	of	simultaneity,	therefore,	is	a	locus	of	a	specific	equivalence	class	of	instantaneous	events.		These	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	in	turn,	are	ordered	by	the	relation	of	earlier/later	than.		Accordingly,	instantaneous	events	are	atomic	elements	of	durative	events;	paths	of	the	latter	are	represented	by	horizontal	solid	lines	running	through	the	hyperplanes	of	simultaneity.	On	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	while	all	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	stand	in	the	fixed	relation	of	linear	order,	they	are	also	all	in	existence;	there	are	simply	no	such	things	as	nonexistent	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events;	all	such	classes	are	equally	in	existence.		This,	let	us	recall,	is	the	ontological	parity	principle;	it	is	the	cornerstone	of	the	eternalist’s	ontology.		Nathan	Oaklander	expresses	the	principle	vis-à-vis	both	instantaneous	and	durative	events	as	follows:	“an	ontologically	adequate	representation	of	time	will	not	contain	expressions	that	reflect	the	coming	into	existence	and	ceasing	to	exist	of	events	over	and	above	their	tenseless	locations	at	different	dates.”130	
																																																																				130	Nathan	Oaklander	(2004),	p.	40.	
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In	section	3.1,	I	offered	what	might	be	called	an	existential	argument	for	the	ontological	parity	principle.		There	is,	however,	an	additional	argument	for	the	ontological	parity	principle.	The	principle	can	be	viewed	as	a	direct	consequence	of	the	general	fact	that	relations	are	existence	entailing.		Certainly,	no	relation	obtains	between	an	existent	relatum	and	a	nonexistent	one	or	between	nonexistent	relata;	all	relata	necessarily	must	exist	for	a	relation	to	obtain.		Let	us	express	the	principle	of	the	existence	entailment	of	relations	as	follows:	[EER]	For	any	x	and	y,	if	x	and	y	stand	in	a	relation	R,	then	x	and	y	exist.	John	Bigelow	lays	out	the	principle	of	the	existence	entailment	of	relations	as	follows:	It	is;	I	maintain,	an	a	priori	truth	that	a	two-place	relation	can	only	be	manifested	when	it	holds	between	two	things,	and	in	order	for	this	to	be	so	there	must	be	two	things	which	stand	in	the	relation.		And	in	saying	‘there	must	be’	two	things	which	stand	in	the	relation,	one	is	really	asserting	that	‘there	must	exist’	two	things	–	one	is	committed	to	the	existence	of	those	things.		The	principle	of	existence	entailment	of	relations	is	an	a	priori	truth.131	Therefore,	on	condition	that	all	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	stand	in	the	fixed	relation	of	linear	order,	all	such	classes	are	equally	in	existence.		Expressed	vis-à-vis	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	the	principle	of	the	existence	entailment	of	relations	is	as	follows:	
																																																																				131	John	Bigelow,	“Presentism	and	Properties,”	in	James	E.	Tomberlin	(ed.),	Philosophical	Perspectives	
10:	Metaphysics,	(Cambridge,	MA	&	Oxford:	Blackwell,	1996),	pp.	35-52,	p	39.	
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[EER]*	For	any	two	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	X	and	Y,	if	X	and	Y	stand	in	the	precedence	relation	of	earlier/later	than,	then	X	and	Y	exist.		Graham	Priest	disagrees	with	this	line	of	reasoning;	he	argues	that	not	all	relations	are	existence	entailing,	some	instances	of	some	intentional	relations,	he	holds,	are	not	existence	entailing.		Priest	gives	the	following	example:	it	is	quite	possible	that	x	fearing	y	is	not	existence	entailing,	for	y,	which	x	fears,	might	not	exist	at	all.	132			I	believe	this	example	is	based	on	the	failure	to	observe	the	distinction	between	existence-in-intentional-realm	and	existence-in-concrete-realm.		Even	though	it	might	very	well	be	that	y	which	x	fears	does	not	exist	in	the	concrete	realm,	that	which	x	fears	de	facto	does	exist	in	the	intentional	realm.			Otherwise,	what	does	x	fear?		On	the	supposition	that	x	fears	y,	y	necessarily	exists,	albeit	it	exists	in	the	intentional	realm.133	Intentional	relations	aside,	all	physical	relations	must	be	existence	entailing	since	there	are	no	such	things	as	nonexistent	physical	objects.		Hence,	it	is	an	a	priori	truth	that	all	relata	of	physical	relations	exist.		Provided	that	the	relation	of	earlier/later	than	is	a	physical	relation,	it	follows	that	all	relata	which	stand	in	this	relation,	i.e.,	all	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	are	equally	in	existence.		We	thus	must	conclude	that	the	ontological	parity	principle	is	a	direct	consequence	of	the	principle	of	the	existence	entailment	of	relations.	
																																																																				132	Private	correspondence.	133	Similarly	with	fictional	characters.		Othello	and	Desdemona	do	not	exist;	yet,	we	say	that	they	stand	in	the	nuptial	relation.		Here,	as	with	intentional	entities,	we	have	to	distinguish	between	existences	in	the	fictional	and	concrete	realms.	
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Another	support	for	the	ontological	parity	principle	can	be	drawn	from	the	
immutability	principle	for	sets.		The	immutability	principle	can	be	stated	as	follows:		 [IP]	For	any	set	X,	X	’s	membership	is	constant.	Apparently,	the	immutability	principle	is	a	direct	consequence	of	the	axiom	of	
extensionality	that	provides	a	criterion	of	identity	for	sets:	[AE]	A=B	iff	("x)	(xÎA	º	xÎB).	The	immutability	principle	is	more	conspicuous	when	it	is	formulated	for	the	simple	binary	set	{x,y},	as	follows:	[IP]*	For	any	K,	if	K	is	{x,y};	{x,y}	iff	both	x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	K	and	nothing	else	is.134	The	immutability	principle	has	an	existential	import.		The	existential	facet	of	the	principle	comes	in	plain	sight	when	the	clause	“x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	{x,y}”	is	restated,	without	lost	or	any	distortion	of	its	meaning,	as,	“x	and	y	
are	members	of	{x,y}.”		The	conservation	of	the	meaning	is	possible	because	‘counted	among’	does	not	refer	to	a	psychological	phenomenon,	it	simply	denotes	the	fact	that	
x	and	y	are	members	of	{x,y}.		As	such,	“counted	among”	in	“x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	{x,y}”	is	redundant.		In	turn,	the	clause	“x	and	y	are	members	of	{x,y},”	can	be	rephrased	to	emphasize	the	existential	import	of	the	immutability	
																																																																				134	[IP]*	can	be	proven	as	follows.		Consider	a	set	K	such	that	K	has	just	two	members	x	and	y.		Suppose	then	that	x	is	not	counted	among	the	members	of	K.		Then,	K	=	{y}.		Therefore,	on	the	axiom	of	
extensionality	that	provides	a	criterion	of	identity	for	sets,	K	≠	K.		Therefore,	either	both	x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	K,	or	K	≠	K,	but	since	in	all	situations,	K	=	K,	then	also	in	all	situations	both	x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	K.			Suppose	next	that	y	is	not	counted	among	the	members	of	K.		Then	again,	K	≠	K.		We	then	repeat	the	preceding	proof.		Therefore,	both	x	and	y	are	counted	among	the	members	of	K.		Suppose	finally	that	a	new	member	z	is	added	to	K.		This	supposition	too	entails	that	K	≠	K.		Therefore,	z	is	not	counted	among	the	members	of	K.		We	thus	conclude	that	no	member	of	K	can	be	subtracted	from	K	and	no	new	member	can	be	added	to	K	–	in	all	
situations,	the	set-membership	of	K	is	constant.	
102	
principle	even	more	explicitly,	though	perhaps	somewhat	awkwardly,	as,	“x	and	y	exist	as	members	of	{x,y}.”		This,	latter	paraphrase	is	justified	because	“__	is	a	member	of	__’”	is	equivalent	to	“__exists	as	a	member	of	__.”135		On	this	latter	paraphrase	of	the	clause,	it	becomes	apparent	that	the	immutability	principle	for	sets	entails	the	ontological	parity	principle	for	sets,	and,	all	things	being	equal,	for	the	toset	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events.		Let	us	thus	express	the	immutability	principle	for	sets	as	follows:	[IP]**	For	any	K,	if	K	is	{x,y};	{x,y}	iff	exist	(x,y).	This	terse	formulation	brings	out	the	fact	that	in	the	present	context	‘exist’	acts	like	a	two-place	existential	relation	__E	__.		Take	now	the	same	pair	{x,y}	and	restate	[IP]**	as	follows:	[IP]***	For	any	K,	if	K	is	{x,y};	{x,y}	iff	co-exist	(x,y).	Apparently,	in	[IP]***	“co-exist”	too	denotes	a	two-place	existential	relation:		__	
E__.		There	is	an	obvious	difference	between	[IP]**	and	[IP]***		in	prefixing.		But	even	a	superficial	excursion	into	the	realm	of	English	grammar	reveals	that	within	the	present	context,	the	difference	is	purely	orthographic.		As	far	as	the	present	context	is	concerned,	[IP]**	and	[IP]***	are	semantically	identical.	We	thus	have	logical	justification	for	interpreting	the	ontological	parity	principle	as	the	coexistence	principle.		Indeed,	there	is	no	logical	distinction	between	the	two	principles	whatsoever	because	for	x	and	y	to	be	equally	in	existence	is	for	x	and	y	to	coexist.		Both	principles	bring	to	the	fore	the	same	notion	of	the	ontological	
																																																																				135	To	exist,	we	might	wish	to	say,	is	to	be	a	member	of	a	set.		For	surely	anything	that	exists	is	a	member	of	a	set	and	that	which	does	not	exist	is	a	member	of	no	set,		for	there	are	no	such	sets	as	sets	of	nonexistent	objects.	
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oneness	of	x	and	y.		I,	thus,	surmise	that	the	coexistence	principle	is	an	unalienable	constituent	of	the	event-eternalist’s	ontology	(of	the	eternalist’s	ontology	in	general).		On	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	there	exists	the	toset	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	such	that	all	members	of	this	set	coexist.		Though	this	might	seem	as	a	rather	trivial	conclusion,	it,	as	shall	be	evident	in	the	next	subsection,	reveals	an	inherent	contradiction	in	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	a	contradiction	which	cannot	be	extricated	from	its	conceptual	framework	in	principle.		3.2.2 On	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	the	relation	of	coexistence	obtains	both	between	the	members	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	and	between	the	equivalence	classes	themselves,	because	the	ontological	parity	principle,	and	thus	the	coexistence	principle,	holds	true	for	both	types	of	set.		The	event-eternalist,	however,	claims	that	we	are	dealing	here	with	two	radically	different	types	of	coexistence	because	on	his	view	the	one	that	obtains	between	the	members	the	equivalence	classes	involves	simultaneity	while	the	one	that	obtains	between	the	equivalence	classes	themselves,	i.e.,	the	cross-temporal	coexistence,	does	not.		This	ontological	claim	is	graphically	depicted	in	Figure	18.					 	Fig.	18	The	cross-temporal	coexistence	
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What	then	is	the	event-eternalist’s	justification	for	positing	these	two	markedly	different	types	of	coexistence?		Specifically,	why	does	the	event-eternalist	think	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence,	unlike	the	one	that	obtains	within	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	does	not	involve	simultaneity?		As	far	as	I	know,	the	only	recourse	that	is	available	to	the	event-eternalist	to	substantiate	this	claim	is	the	B-temporal	topology,	that	is,	the	topological	premise	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	temporally	ordered	and,	therefore,	are	temporally	differentiated	entities.		In	other	words,	the	event-eternalist’s	raison	d’être	for	holding	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	does	not	involve	simultaneity	is	that	their	temporal	ordering	explicitly	entails	that	the	equivalence	classes	are	temporally	separated,	and	thus,	not	simultaneous.		From	this	it	is	concluded,	rather	with	an	easy	heart,	that	in	the	E-universe	there	indeed	obtains	two	types	of	coexistence,	since	one	involves	simultaneity	and	the	other	does	not.	Apparently,	the	event-eternalist	assumes	that	in	the	E-universe,	assertions	such	as	events	x	and	y	exist	simultaneously/non-simultaneously	can	be	shown	to	be	true	or	false	solely	on	the	basis	of	topological	assertions,	such	as	x	and	y	are	members	of	an	unordered/ordered	set.		If	x	and	y	are	the	members	of	an	unordered	set	{x,y,…,n},	then	it	is	said	that	x	and	y	are	simultaneous;	if,	on	the	other	hand,	x	and	y	are	members	of	an	ordered	set	<x,y,…n>,	then	it	is	concluded	that	x	and	y	are	not	simultaneous.		This	supposition,	however,	is	incorrect	because	the	issue	of	whether	events	are	temporally	ordered	or	not	has	no	bearing	on	the	issue	of	whether	they	exist	simultaneously/non-simultaneously.		The	validity	of	this	claim	can	be	seen	as	
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follows.		Were	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	ordered	other	than	linearly,	or	not	ordered	at	all,	the	question	will	still	arise	whether	they	exist	simultaneously	because	they	are	members	of	a	set	and,	as	we	have	seen,	coexist.		Coexistence,	at	least	commonsensically,	does	involve	simultaneity.	Commonsensical	considerations	aside,	coexistence	in	general	(the	cross-temporal	coexistence	in	particular)	and	simultaneity,	I	maintain,	are	tightly	interwoven	in	that	in	all	situations	they	entail	one	another.		Indeed,	expressions	employed	to	articulate	cross-temporal	coexistence	vary	widely.		For	instance,	we	could	say	that	“the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	exist	in	tandem”	or	we	could	say	that	“the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	exist	all	together,”	and	so	on.		Yet,	throughout	all	these	elocutionary	transformations,	the	underlining	idea	remains	the	same	–	if	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	cross-temporally	coexist,	then	they	exist	simultaneously.		But	since	on	the	event-eternalist’s	temporal	topology	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	temporally	separated,	we	have	an	outright	contradiction	–	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	temporally	separated	and	also	simultaneous	entities.		Hence,	if	I	am	right	in	my	analysis,	event-eternalism	as	a	whole	is	a	contradictory	hypothesis.	To	see	more	clearly	why	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	cannot	coexist	without	also	being	simultaneous	let	us	take	by	way	of	example	two	such	classes	X	and	Y.		Suppose,	as	the	event-eternalist	does,	that	X	and	Y	cross-temporally	coexist	but	do	not	exist	at	once.		From	this	supposition	it	then	follows	that	
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either	first	X	exists	and	then	Y	exists	or	conversely.136	Prima	facie,	this	supposition	entails	that	X	and	Y	do	not	coexist	cross-temporally	or	in	any	other	way,	at	least	not	for	a	certain	period	of	time.		We	thus	have	an	outright	contradiction	–	X	and	Y	coexist	and	do	not	coexist.		What	about	the	period	for	which	X	and	Y	do	coexist	cross-temporally?		Well,	if	X	and	Y	do	coexist	cross-temporally,	then	they	are	simultaneous,	for	once	again,	if	they	are	not	simultaneous,	then	first	X	exists	and	then	why	Y	exists	or	conversely,	which,	of	course	means,	that	X	and	Y	do	not	coexist.		Equally,	suppose	X	and	Y	are	simultaneous,	but	do	not	coexist,	then	we	have	the	same	as	before	result	–	either	first	X	exists	and	then	Y	exists	or	conversely.		Coexistence,	therefore,	necessarily	involves	simultaneity	and	vice	versa.	Undoubtedly,	the	event-eternalist	will	hotly	contest	this	reasoning.		Specifically	he	might	argue	that	I	employ	a	strictly	ontological	notion	of	precedence,	whereas	in	the	E-universe	the	phenomenon	of	precedence	is	purely	topological.		In	the	E-universe,	says	the	event-eternalist,	there	are	no	“coming	into	existence	and	ceasing	to	exist	of	events	over	and	above	their	tenseless	locations	at	different	dates.”137		Accordingly,	the	event-eternalist	might	conclude	that	the	argument	is	invalid.	Let	me	accommodate	the	event-eternalist	by	looking	at	the	same	argument	from	a	different	angle.		Suppose	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	X	and	
Y	coexist	cross-temporally.		Coexistence,	i.e.,	the	ontological	oneness	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	as	I	have	suggested	in	the	previous	
																																																																				136	Notice	that	I	employ	strictly	ontological	senses	of	“first”	and	“then,”	and	assume	with	the	event-eternalist	that	X	and	Y	are	ordered	by	the	precedence	relation	of	earlier/later	than.			137	Nathan	Oaklander	(2004),	p.	40.	
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subsection,	is	an	equivalence	relation.		X	and	Y,	therefore,	form	an	unordered	pair	{X,Y}.		On	the	event-eternalist’s	topology,	X	and	Y	stand	in	the	precedence	relation	of	earlier/later	than.		They,	therefore,	form	an	ordered	pair	<X,Y>.		But	how	is	it	possible	that	the	same	two	relata	stand	in	mutually	exclusive	relations?		Apparently,	X	and	Y	cannot	be	both	members	of	ordered	and	unordered	pairs.		Hence,	either	X	and	Y	coexist	cross-temporally	and	are	simultaneous	or	they	are	not	simultaneous	and	do	not	coexist	cross-temporally.		This	shows	that	cross-temporal	coexistence	and	simultaneity	necessitate	one	another;	where	there	is	the	one	there	is	always	the	other.		Notice	that	neither	of	the	two	alternatives	is	acceptable	to	the	event-eternalist.		In	the	E-universe,	X	and	Y	coexist	cross-temporally	and	are	not	simultaneous.		But	this	standpoint	is	inconsistent	since	it	entails	the	contradictory	result	that	X	and	Y	are	both	members	of	ordered	and	unordered	pairs.	The	onus,	therefore,	is	on	the	event-eternalist	to	demonstrate	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	does	not	entail	them	being	simultaneous.		An	appeal	to	temporal	topology	would	not	do	in	this	essentially	ontological	assertion.		Besides,	such	an	appeal	is	entirely	unsatisfactory	because	it	simply	amounts	to	the	tautological	assertion	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	not	simultaneous	because	they	are	not	simultaneous.		This	tautology	is	not	very	illuminating,	indeed.		A	full-blooded	ontological	argument	is	required	here.		In	the	absence	of	such	an	ontological	argument,	it	is	only	reasonable	to	hold	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	does	entail	them	being	simultaneous.		Until	and	unless	such	an	ontological	argument	is	offered,	we	are	justified	to	hold	that	event-eternalism	is	a	
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self-contradictory	hypothesis,	for	it	inevitably	runs	into	the	contradictory	assertion	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	temporally	separated	entities	which	exist	simultaneously,	that	is,	they	are	and	are	not	simultaneous.	There	is	another	reason	to	think	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	entails	simultaneity.		For	if	this	were	not	so,	then	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	would	obtain	between	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	not	instantaneously	but	successively.		Yet,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	what	this	successive	coexistence	might	be.		The	event-eternalist	might	bite	the	bullet	and	reply	that	in	the	temporal	realm,	unlike	in	the	spatial	one,	there	indeed	obtained	two	types	of	coexistence:	one	type	obtains	between	the	members	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	and	occurs	instantaneously;	the	other	type	obtains	between	the	equivalence	classes	themselves	and	does	not	occur	instantaneously;	this	would	be	his	notorious	cross-temporal	coexistence.		He	might	further	argue	that	this	conclusion	follows	from	the	very	definition	of	“temporally	separated.”		Indeed,	there	surely	must	be	some	distinction	between	the	coexistence	of	temporally	ordered	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	and	the	coexistence	of	temporally	unordered	members	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events.		The	event-eternalist,	it	seems,	has	a	strong	reason	for	believing	in	the	reality	of	the	two	types	of	coexistence.		Hence,	the	onus	is	on	his	opponent	to	demonstrate	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	that	obtains	between	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	does	in	fact	entail	their	simultaneous	existence.	Turning	the	table	on	his	opponent,	however,	simply	will	not	do.		For	the	conception	of	non-instantaneous,	i.e.,	successive	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	
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classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	not	only	self-contradictory	on	its	face;	it	is	also	contrary	to	the	ontological	parity	principle,	which,	as	we	have	seen,	is	at	the	center	of	the	eternalist’s	metaphysics.		Indeed,	how	should	we	conceive	of	this	purported	successive	coexistence?		Should	we	say	that	an	equivalence	class	of	instantaneous	events	X	first	coexists	with	an	equivalence	class	of	instantaneous	events	Y,	then	Y	coexists	with	an	equivalence	class	of	instantaneous	events	Z?		If	this	were	so,	then	at	one	time	X	and	Y	would	coexist	and	at	another	time	Y	and	Z	would	coexist,	that	is,	X,Y,	and	Z	would	never	coexist	as	a	group.		In	addition,	on	the	transitivity	of	coexistence,	successive	coexistence	is	surely	not	allowed,	for	if	X	and	Y	coexist	and	Y	and	Z	coexist,	then	X,Y,	and	Z	coexist	all	together.		On	the	pain	of	inconsistency,	therefore,	the	event-eternalist	should	take	the	relation	of	cross-temporal	coexistence	to	be	instantaneous	since	its	contrary,	viz.	the	successive	cross-temporal	coexistence	is	an	unviable	proposition.		But	this	outcome,	as	we	have	seen,	is	not	acceptable	because	it	leads	to	the	familiar	contradiction.	The	outcome	of	the	foregoing	analysis	is	that	in	the	E-universe,	two	incompatible	types	of	relation	obtain	between	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events:	one	is	the	topological	relation	of	linear	ordering	and	the	other	is	the	existential	relation	of	cross-temporal	coexistence.	The	two	relations	are	at	variance	with	one	another	because	given	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	equivalence	classes	requires	them	being	simultaneous	entities,	it	is	not	possible	for	them	also	to	be	temporally	ordered	entities.		Conversely,	if	the	temporal	ordering	is	preserved,	then	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	must	go.		However,	both	relations	are	essential	to	event-eternalism.		Indeed,	the	existential	relation	of	cross-temporal	
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coexistence	that	obtains	between	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	what	makes	the	alleged	reality	of	the	temporal	totality	possible,	where	the	temporal	ordering	ex	hypothesi	is	the	required	topological	structure	of	this	temporal	totality.	We	thus	must	conclude	that	the	event-eternalist’s	ontology	is	in	conflict	with	his	topology.		Specifically,	the	ontological	parity	principle	entails	simultaneous	existence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events,	while	the	event-eternalist’s	temporal	topology	entails	the	contrary.		Event-eternalism	fails.138		3.2.3 The	event-eternalist,	I	should	think,	would	defend	himself	against	the	foregoing	criticism	by	arguing	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	in	fact	a	timeless	coexistence.		I	picture	him	saying	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	ARE	in	existence	together,	where	“ARE”	is	a	timeless	designator.		On	this	conception	of	cross-temporal	coexistence,	for	instance,	though	the	B-topologically	consecutive	outbreaks	of	World	War	I	and	World	War	II	ensue	together	with	one	another	and	everything	else,	this	togetherness,	this	en	
bloc	existence,	is	not	simultaneous;	the	two	momentous	events	in	the	world	history	coexist	timelessly.		Yet,	when	pressed	on	the	nature	of	this	timeless	coexistence,	all	that	the	event-eternalist	does	is	to	point	at	the	B-temporal	topology	(as	he	also	does	in	drawing	the	distinction	between	the	two	types	of	coexistence	discussed	in	previous	subsection).		Events,	says	the	event-eternalist,	are	eternally	pegged	to	their	respective	temporal	loci;	they,	therefore,	“do	not	stand	in	temporal	relations	to	each	other	(or	
																																																																				138	The	argument	from	coexistence	is	mutatis	mutandis	is	also	an	argument	against	object-eternalism.	
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anything	else)….		This	aspect	of	the	B	theory		can	be	summarized	by	the	aphorism	
Time	is	timeless.”139	This	response,	however,	is	inadequate	because	no	explanation	is	given	as	to	how	exactly	should	we	interpret	this	atemporal	reading	of	“ARE”	in	such	statements	as	“The	outbreaks	of	World	War	I	and	World	War	II	ARE	in	existence	in	tandem.”		Specifically,	the	event-eternalist	does	not	offer	us	an	explanation	to	what	phenomenon	this	atemporal	term	exactly	refers.		Simply	saying	that	it	refers	to	the	B-facts	of	the	two	occurrences	existing	in	their	respective	B-loci	is	not	at	all	sufficient	because	it	is	tantamount	to	the	saying	that	the	two	events	are	there,	in	the	two	B-temporal	locations,	and	not	anywhere,	or	rather,	anywhen	else.		Once	again	we	have	here	an	unworkable	appeal	to	the	B-temporal	topology	in	a	matter	altogether	ontological.		A	different	response	is	needed	here	because	the	issue	in	hand	is	not	topological,	but	all-and-all	ontological	in	nature,	for	it	deals	with	the	question	of	how	things	are	and	not	how	they	are	ordered.		Again,	the	atemporal	ARE	of	the	event-eternalist	is	a	wholly	ontological	category.		The	event-eternalist,	however,	refuses	to	interpret	his	atemporal	ARE	as	an	ontological	category.		This	is	quite	understandable	because	such	a	reading	requires	an	answer	to	the	question	how	things	ARE	timelessly,	that	is,	how	things	exist	timelessly.		This	notion	of	timeless	existence,	however,	is	altogether	incongruous	because	it	implies	that	things	persist	but	their	persistence	does	not	occur	in	time,	that	it	is	not	a	temporally	measurable	phenomenon.140	
																																																																				139	Nathan	Oaklander	(2004),	p.	311.		In	this	passage	Oaklander	speaks	about	B-facts	such	x	is	at	tn.		Apparently	the	statement	mutatis	mutandis	is	applicable	to	any	B-entity,	be	it	an	event	or	an	object.	140	I	will	say	more	on	this	notion	of	atemporal	persistence	in	section	3.5.	
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Furthermore,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	does	this	atemporal	“ARE”	differ	from	“at	the	same	time,”	or	“at	once”	or	some	other	such	expression.		The	notion	apparently	involves	some	sense	of	sameness	and	since	it	is	asserted	that	it	is	not	the	sameness	of	time,	the	only	other	candidate,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	is	the	sameness	of	atemporal	coexistence.		So,	what	the	event-eternalist	should	then	say	is	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	coexist	atemporally.		But	this	clarification	is	not	particularly	helpful	because	“atemporal,”	once	again	is	not	defined.		There	is,	of	course,	a	negative	definition,	that	is,	that	it	is	neither	the	shortest	possible	period	of	time	nor	the	longest	possible	one	and	none	in	between.		But	this	negative	definition	surely	cannot	be	acceptable	to	the	event-eternalist	because	it	implies	there	being	some	simultaneous	super-moment	which	involves	no	period	of	time	whatsoever	but	which	nonetheless	somehow	encompasses	all	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events.		Indeed,	how	this	notion	of	atemporality	is	different	from	the	notion	of	simultaneity?		As	far	as	I	know,	the	event-eternalist	does	not	have	a	coherent	fully-developed	notion	of	atemporality	or	timelessness	or	eternality	and	such.		In	fact,	in	his	theory	such	notions	are	rudimentary	at	best.		Until	and	unless	the	event-eternalist	fully	develops	his	theory	of	timelessness,	he	is	not	allowed	to	use	it	in	his	rejoinders	to	the	questions	concerning	an	atemporal	reading	of	ARE.		In	fact	he	is	not	allowed	to	use	this	notion	of	atemporal	ARE.	An	additional	problem	that	arises	for	the	event-eternalist	is	that	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	being	wholly	temporal	entities,	i.e.,	being	temporally	ordered	entities,	can	enter	into	an	essentially	atemporal	relation.		It	is	an	a	priori	truth,	at	least	on	two-valued	logic,	that	nothing	
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can	be	both	temporal	and	atemporal.		The	standard	event-eternalist’s	reply	to	this	and	the	like	criticism	is	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	exist	temporally	in	their	respective	B-loci	and	also	that	they	exist	timelessly.		We	thus	are	dealing	here	with	two	types	of	existence:	one	type	is	temporal,	and	the	other	type	is	atemporal.		Yet	again	the	same	problem	arises	–	how	the	same	entities	can	exist	temporally	and	atemporally?		Levin	has	a	similar	objection	in	mind	when	he	writes	that	“the	central	tenet	of	B	theory	is	that	the	occurrence	of	an	event	at	a	time	is	timeless.”141		It	turns	out	that	on	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis,	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	indeed	both	temporal	and	atemporal	entities.		But	in	what	mysterious	way	is	atemporality	interwoven	into	an	essentially	temporal	fabric	of	the	E-universe?		Since	no	explanation	is	forthcoming,	all	the	event-eternalist	says	is	that	they	coexist	eternally,	that	they	simply	ARE,	so	the	onus	is	on	him	to	show	that	in	the	temporal	realm	there	obtains	an	atemporal	relation,	that	is,	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	both	temporal	and	atemporal	entities.		But	I	think	we	can	safely	surmise	that	the	notion	of	something	being	both	temporal	and	atemporal	is	a	nonstarter	on	its	face.142			
																																																																				141	M.		Levin,	“Compatibalism	and	Special	Relativity,”	Journal	of	Philosophy	104,	pp.433-63,	p.443.	142	A.	Prior	tackles	a	similar	problem.		He	held	that	events	can	indeed	be	very	short	and	also	have	an	indefinitely	long	history.		Prior	justifies	this	view	by	distinguishing	between	being	a	part	of	(whole)	history	and	having	a	personal	history,	“between	the	history	that	an	event	has,	and	the	bit	of	history	that	it	is.”		A.	Prior,	Papers	on	Time	and	Tense,	p.	10.		Thus,	an	instantaneous	event	is	an	instantaneous	part	of	the	(whole)	history	of	the	universe,	but	it	also	has	its	private	history,	as	it	were,	which	might	be	indefinitely	long.		I	find	this	essentially	eternalist’s	reasoning	incompatible	with	Prior’s	presentism.		More	importantly,	it	is	self-contradictory	on	its	face,	for	the	history	of	the	universe	is	comprised	of	temporally	ordered	instantaneous	private	histories.		An	instantaneous	event	has	no	other	(indefinitely	long)	history	apart	from	its	instantaneity,	its	instantaneous	history	is	a	part	of	the	history	of	the	universe,	but	it	itself	has	no	parts.		It,	therefore,	cannot	have	an	indefinitely	long	history,	for	if	it	does	have	such	a	history,	then	this	history	must	have	parts.		It	follows	then	that	these	parts	are	not	parts	of	the	whole	history	of	the	universe,	but	in	some	inexplicable	way	are	parts	of	an	autonomous	history.	
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The	event-eternalist	might	argue	that	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	being	B-ordered	is	not	at	all	in	conflict	with	them	also	existing	atemporally	because	the	former	is	a	topological	issue	whereas	the	latter	is	an	ontological	one.		By	upholding	the	principle	of	topological/ontological	autonomy,	the	event-eternalist	meets	my	criticism	half-way.		I	too	think	that	topological	and	ontological	matters	should	be	addressed	separately.		Let	us	analyze	this	notion	of	atemporal	cross-temporal	coexistence	irrespective	of	any	topological	consideration.		Consider	now	the	following:	
(a) The	E-universe	came	into	and	eventually	will	go	out	of	existence.143	From	the	conjunction	of	(a)	and	the	ontological	parity	principle,	we	obtain	the	following	corollary:	
(b) The	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	come	into	existence,	are	in	existence,	and	go	out	of	existence	concomitantly.144	Within	the	conceptual	framework	of	event-eternalism,	we	get	the	concomitance	corollary	as	follows.		Suppose	(b)	does	not	hold.		Then	the	following	is	true:	
(c) The	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	come	into	existence,	are	in	existence,	and	go	out	of	existence	consecutively.	
																																																																				143	No	doubt,	the	event-eternalist	will	be	quite	uncomfortable	with	(a),	since	“came	into	existence”	and	“will	go	out	of	existence”	are	essentially	tensed	expressions.		Be	it	as	it	may,	there	is	nothing	in	his	hypothesis	that	precludes	him	from	holding	that	the	universe	is	finite	on	both	ends.	144	Because	there	are	three	additional	possibilities;	namely,	(i)	the	universe	begins	but	does	not	end,	(ii)	it	does	not	begin	but	ends,	(iii)	the	universe	is	everlasting;	there	are	four,	in	total,	variants	of	the	corollary.		However,	for	present	purposes,	it	is	immaterial	which	of	the	four	scenarios	we	take	as	case	in	point.		Suppose	the	universe	begins	but	does	not	end,	then	the	segments	come	into	existence	and	exist	concomitantly.		On	the	reverse	scenario,	the	segments	go	out	of	existence	concomitantly.		And	in	the	case	of	the	everlasting	universe,	the	segments	are	in	existence	concomitantly	for	all	eternity.		Accordingly,	the	concomitance	claim	stands,	with	minor	elucidatory	adjustments,	in	all	four	scenarios.	
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However,	if	(c)	is	true,	then	event-eternalism	is	false,	for	(c)	entails	a	dynamic	picture	of	temporality.		Therefore,	if	event-eternalism	is	true,	then	so	must	be	(b)	–	the	E-universe	is	comprised	of	temporally	separated,	yet	concomitantly	existing	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events.	Is	it	then	this	concomitant	existence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	which	the	event-eternalist	takes	to	be	their	eternal	coexistence?	Is	this	what	is	meant	when	it	is	sais	that	they	eternally	ARE?		As	far	as	I	can	tell,	this	is	the	only	plausible	interpretation	of	the	event-eternalist’s	notion	of	“ARE.”		But,	as	I	have	pointed	earlier,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	this	notion	of	concomitant	existence	is	different	from	the	notion	of	their	existing	at	once,	i.e.,	simultaneously.		Certainly,	to	exist	concomitantly	is	to	exist	at	once;	and	so	the	familiar	contradiction	arises	again	–	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	and	are	not	simultaneous.	The	event-eternalist,	I	suppose,	will	object	to	the	concomitance	corollary	on	the	grounds	that	“equivalence	classes	X	and	Y	exist	concomitantly”	is	a	time-referring	expression	semantically	equivalent	to	“equivalence	classes	X	and	Y	exist	at	the	same	time.”		Yet,	he	will	argue,	the	claim	that	X	and	Y	exist	at	the	same	time	is	contrary	to	his	hypothesis,	since	on	his	theory,	they	coexist	timelessly.		To	be	sure,	he	might	continue,	on	the	ontological	parity	principle,	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	do	exist	together,	that	is,	they	do	coexist,	but	from	this	it	does	not	follow	that	they	all	exist	at	the	same	time,	for	such	expressions	as	“exist	together,”	“exist	in	concert,”	“exist	in	tandem,”	and	the	like,	when	applied	to	the	equivalence	classes,	do	not	imply	the	sameness	of	time	because	they	are	strictly	ontological	not	topological	assertions.	
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The	event-eternalist	may	be	surprised	to	learn	that	in	(b),	I	do	not	take	the	clause	“are	in	existence	concomitantly”	to	do	the	job	of	a	time-referring	expression.		I	too	interpret	it	time-neutrally.		In	particular,	I	take	it	as	being	equivalent	to	such	expressions	as	“exist	en	masse,”	“exist	en	bloc,”	etc.		So	construed,	(b)	is	indeed	a	wholly	ontological	conjecture;	it	is	not	concerned	with	a	topological	issue	of	temporal	order;	it	is	not	time-referring.		As	such,	the	conjecture	addresses	the	issue	of	how	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	exist;	namely,	as	a	group,	not	how	they	are	ordered,	i.e.,	linearly.		It	is	this,	strictly	ontological,	sense	of	“concomitantly”	that	I	employ	in	(b).		For	the	sake	of	argument,	let	me	accommodate	the	eternalist	by	rephrasing	the	concomitance	corollary	in	time-neutral	terms	as	follows:	
(d) The	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	come	into	existence,	ARE	in	existence,	and	go	out	of	existence	en	masse	(where	“ARE”	is	a	time-neutral	designator).	Now,	assume	that	(d)	does	not	hold,	then	it	is	never	the	case	that	the	number	of	the	equivalence	classes	is	constant.		In	the	beginning,	there	exists	the	first	equivalence	class	of	instantaneous	events,	then	their	number	increases	by	one	and	so	on.		But	on	the	ontological	parity	principle	the	number	of	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	constant.145		Hence,	either	(d)	holds	or	the	ontological	parity	principle	fails;	and	since	the	principle	is	essential	to	eternalism,	the	event-eternalist’s	hypothesis	collapses,	as	well.		The	event-eternalist,	therefore,	ought	to	accept	(d)	as	
																																																																				145	This	principle	of	the	numerical	constancy	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	entailed	by	the	immutability	principle	discussed	in	section	3.2.1.	
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an	integral	part	of	his	theory.		All	things	considered,	this	principle	is	what	event-eternalism	is	all	about,	as	opposed	to	the	growing	block	theory	and	presentism.	Notice,	however,	that	on	this	reading	of	ARE,	although	it	is	not	straightforwardly	equivalent	to	the	simultaneity	reading,	it	is	still	very	problematic	because	on	this	reading,	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	ARE	in	existence	for	a	certain		period	of	time,	in	fact	for	a	very	long	period	of	time,	the	period	equal	to	the	lifespan	of	the	E-universe.		How	is	this	reading	then	in	rapport	with	the	standard	reading	of	atemporality	which	involves	no	notion	of	time	whatsoever?	Let	me	make	an	additional	comment	on	the	topological/ontological	distinction	to	which	the	event-eternalist	often	appeals.		Specifically,	it	is	often	said	that	as	the	ontological	oneness	of	spatial	entities	does	not	imply	their	topological	oneness,	i.e.,	their	existing	at	the	same	spatial	point,	so,	the	ontological	oneness	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	does	not	entail	their	simultaneity,	i.e.,	their	existing	at	the	same	time.		This	rejoinder,	however,	is	based	on	the	spatial	simile,	which	is	nothing	but	a	metaphor	that	induces	only	psychological	comfort.		More	importantly,	what	makes	spatial	points	coexistent	is	precisely	their	being	simultaneous;	non-simultaneous	spatial	points,	if	there	are	such	things,	simply	do	not	coexist.		Therefore,	if	one	insists	on	accepting	the	spatial	simile	as	a	legitimate	theoretical	tool,	one	must	say	that	just	as	the	coexistence	of	spatial	points	entails	their	being	simultaneous,	so	the	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	entails	their	being	simultaneous	as	well.		Either	the	spatial	analogy	is	conceptually	useless,	or	it	gets	the	eternalist	into	trouble.	
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The	problem	with	conceiving	the	temporal	order	by	analogy	to	the	spatial	order	is	that	at	first	it	is	assumed	that	there	are	temporal	distances	which	are	very	much	like	spatial	distances	and	then	it	is	concluded	that	since	in	space	distant	objects	coexist	(being	trumps	space),	so	in	time,	temporally	separated	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	coexist,	as	well	(being	trumps	time).		It	is	then	concluded	that	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	not	in	variance	with	their	being	temporally	ordered.		But,	as	I	have	just	pointed	out,	spatially	distant	points	coexist	precisely	because	they	are	simultaneous;	non-simultaneous	points	do	no	coexist	in	space.		So,	if	the	spatial	simile	is	apt,	then	the	coexisting	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	should	be	deemed	to	exist	simultaneously,	which	is	again	the	contradiction	we	keep	arriving	at	–	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	are	both	temporally	separated	and	simultaneous	entities.	The	crucial	point	that	the	event-eternalist	systematically	misses	in	utilizing	the	spatial	simile,	in	employing	the	notion	of	spacious	time	in	general,	is	that,	unlike	what	is	found	in	the	temporal	domain,	in	the	spatial	domain,	ontological	facts	are	not	at	variance	with	topological	facts.		Thus,	if	we	carry	the	spatial	simile	all	the	way	through,	we	ought	to	say	that	in	the	temporal	domain,	temporal	separation	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	is	in	perfect	harmony	with	their	existing	at	once.		Apparently,	this	is	a	patent	contradiction	–	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	cannot	be	both	temporally	separated	and	simultaneous.		The	eternalist	might	grudgingly	concede	that	the	spatial	simile	goes	only	a	certain	
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distance.146		But	how	far	should	it	go?		Is	the	cross-temporal	coexistence	of	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	analogous	to	the	cross-spatial	coexistence	of	spatially	separated	objects?		The	event-eternalist	categorically	says	‘yes’	–	the	equivalence	classes	of	instantaneous	events	do	coexist	across	time	in	the	very	same	manner	as	spatially	separated	objects	coexist	across	space.		Let	us	thus	see	whether	the	spatial	simile,	which	is	at	the	center	of	the	notion	of	spacious	time,	is	at	all	a	legitimate	piece	of	reasoning.		
3.3 The	Notion	of	Temporal	Dimension	3.3.1 Time,	it	is	habitually	said	nowadays,	is	the	fourth	dimension	of	the	universe.	Philosophers	largely	upheld	the	reality	of	temporal	dimension	for	two	main	reasons.		On	the	one	hand,	the	Special	Theory	of	Relativity	and	Minkowski	Spacetime	offer	strong	scientific	justifications	for	the	this	metaphysical	picture	of	temporal	reality.147			On	the	other	hand,	McTaggart’s	A-time	/B-time	distinction	and	his	proof	of	the	unreality	of	A-time	left	the	majority	of	analytical	temporal	theorists	with	a	stark	choice	–	either	reject	with	McTaggart	the	reality	of	A-time	but	admit	the	reality	of	B-time,	viz.	the	concept	of	spacious	time,	or	reject	both	theories	and	thus	admit	that	time,	as	it	is	conceived	in	philosophy,	is	unreal.148		Apparently,	the	latter	choice	is	not	an	option	for	the	majority	of	analytical	philosophers.	
																																																																				146	Alternatively,	he	might	concede	that	the	notion	of	spacious	time	is	based	more	on	a	metaphor	than	on	reason.		147	D.	C.	Williams,	for	instance,	deems	this	metaphysical	picture	of	time	to	be	“the	very	paradigm	of	philosophical	understanding,”		“The	Myth	of	Passage,”	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	48	(1951),	pp.	457-72.	148		Many	B-theorists	are	very	doubtful	about	the	logical	validity	of	McTaggart’s	paradox;	yet,	given	the	scientific	implausibly	of	the	reality	of	A-time,	they	are	forced	to	accept	it,	warts	and	all.	
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Regardless	of	an	apparent	scientific	plausibility	of	the	notion	of	temporal	dimension	and	cogency	of	McTaggart’s	argument	for	the	unreality	of	A-time,	for	some	of	us,	the	idea	of	temporal	dimensionality	is	not	an	easy	pill	to	swallow,	for	it	is	not	without	bizarre	implications.		One	peculiar	consequence	of	the	notion	of	temporal	dimension,	for	instance,	is	that	by	employing	it	metaphysicians	are	compelled	to	conceive	temporal	duration	by	analogy	with	spatial	extension;	time	is	literally	taken	to	be	a	space-like	phenomenon,	the	fabric	of	the	universe	is	literally	stretched	in	four	directions	–	three	spatial	and	one	temporal;	time	and	space,	it	is	said,	both	have	breadth.		Let	us	label	this	view	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine.	The	belief	in	the	reality	of	temporal	dimension	is	also	reinforced	by	widespread	use	of	the	spatial	simile.		In	some	respect,	the	spatial	simile	is	instrumental	in	buttressing	the	belief	that	there	is	“a	common	topological	and	metrical	structure	between	any	given	spatial	dimension	and	the	temporal	dimension.”149		Since	it	is	firmly	held	that	both	the	spatial	and	temporal	fabrics	of	physical	reality	have	breadth,	the	object	eternalist	is	felt	well-justified	in	holding	that	temporal	expanses	are	occupied	by	temporally	extended	objects	in	the	very	same	manner	as	spatial	expanses	are	occupied	by	ordinary	three-dimensional	objects.		An	object	is	said	to	be	spatially	extended	iff	there	are	at	least	two	distinct	linearly	ordered	spatial	points	x	and	y,	mapable	onto	its	body;	analogously,	it	is	said,	an	object	is	temporally	extended	iff	there	are	at	least	two	distinct	linearly	ordered	temporal	points	x	and	y,	mapable	onto	its	body.	
																																																																				149	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.87.	
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Despite	the	scientific	backing	and	initial	philosophical	plausibility	of	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine,	it	is	not	a	theoretically	viable	conjecture.		The	notion	of	spatial	dimensionality	is	theoretically	viable	because	it	straightforwardly	conforms	to	our	sense-experience.		In	contrast,	its	temporal	analog	is	not	theoretically	viable	precisely	because	temporal	expanses	are	not	a	part	of	our	sense-experience.		Unlike	the	fact	of	there	existing	spatial	expanses,	the	existence	of	temporal	expanses	cannot	be	corroborated	by	our	senses,	because	“no	time	is	all	at	once	present.”150		There	are	landscapes,	which	we	all	can	observe	at	will,	as,	for	instance,	when	sitting	by	the	window	of	a	railcar	moving	through	a	countryside	we	enjoy	bucolic	vistas	unfolding	before	our	eyes.		But	there	are	no	timescapes	which	could	be	offered	for	our	viewing	in	any	manner	whatsoever.		There	are	simply	no	such	vantage	points,	which	could	enable	us	to	observe	temporal	vistas	in	their	entirety.151		Apparently,	observation	of	timescapes,	if	there	are	such	entities,	requires	an	atemporal	vantage	point,	a	vantage	point	which	is	not	within	the	universe.	But	suppose	there	is	such	a	vantage	point,	then	it	follows	that	at	all,	or	least	two,	temporally	separated	segments	of	the	E-universe	are	observed	at	once.		But	this	oneness	of	observation,	provided	it	is	not	an	illusion,	entails	oneness	of	existence,	viz.	existence	at	once	of	all	temporally	separated	segments	of	the	E-universe,	because	the	observe	must	be	co-present	with	each	observed	segment,	otherwise	he	cannot	observe	more	than	one	segment	at	a	time.		This,	of	course,	is	a	patent	contradiction	because	temporally	separated	segments	of	the	E-universe	ex	hypothesi	are	not	
																																																																				150	St.	Augustine,	The	Confessions,	Book	XI,	E.	B.	Pusey	(tr.)	(Random	House:	New	York,	1949),	p	251.	151	Whether	there	exist	an	extrauniversal,	and	thus,	atemporal	vantage	point	is	altogether	a	different	question.	
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simultaneous.		Let	us	look	at	the	same	argument	in	a	slightly	different	way.		Take	two	temporally	separated	entities	and	an	atemporal	observer	O	who	observes	them	at	once.		Then,	O	is	simultaneous	with	one	at	t1	and	with	the	other	at	t2	because	in	order	to	observe	an	entity	an	observer	must	be	co-present	with	this	entity,	be	in	phase	with	it.152		Now,	on	condition	that	simultaneity	is	transitive,	it	follows	that	the	two	temporally	separated	entities	exist	simultaneously.		In	figure	19,	the	contradiction	is	depicted	graphically:	if	the	observer	O	and	the	entity	at	t1	are	simultaneous	and	also	if	O	and	the	entity	at	t2	are	simultaneous,	then,	on	the	transitivity	of	simultaneity,	it	follows	that	the	two	temporally	separated	entities	are	simultaneous,	which	is	an	apparent	contradiction.153		Therefore,	temporal	vistas	are	not	observable	in	principle.				 		Fig.	19.	Transitivity	of	simultaneity.	
																																																																				152	It	might	be	argued	that	just	as	in	order	to	observe	spatially	distant	vistas	it	is	not	necessary	to	be	at	those	distant	places,	so	in	order	to	observe	temporally	separated	entities,	it	is	not	necessary	to	be	co-present	with	them.		This	reasoning	is	based	on	the	spatial	simile,	the	conjecture	that	itself	is	in	need	of	being	proven	to	be	true.		The	thing	to	consider	here	is	that	observations	of	spatially	distant	entities	are	possible	precisely	because	they	are	co-present	with	an	observer;	they	are	in	phase	with	him.		So,	if	one	takes	the	spatial	simile	to	be	true,	on	the	pain	of	inconsistency	he	ought	to	hold	that	observations	of	temporally	distant	entities	too	are	possible	iff	these	entities	are	co-present	with	an	observer,	that	is,	iff	they	are	in	phase	with	him.	153	E.	Stump	and	N.	Kretzmann	in	their	attempt	to	salvage	the	notion	of	atemporal	omniscience,	which	this	type	of	argument	directly	challenges,	introduce	a	novel	notion	of	simultaneity	which	they	think	obtains		between	an	eternal	being	and	temporal	entities;	they	label	it	ET-simultaneity	(eternal/temporal	simultaneity).		They	argue	that	ET-simultaneity	is	not	transitive	and	that,	therefore,	no	contradiction	arises.		I	believe	their	argument	is	fallacious,	but	its	analysis	would	take	us	far	a	field.		E.	Stump	and	N.	Kretzmann,	“Eternity,”	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	78	(1981),	pp.	429-58.	
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It	is	a	rather	puzzling	aspect	of	the	human	psyche	that	despite	temporal	extensions	not	being	observable	in	principle,	it	tends	to	conceptualize	time	as	being	a	fixed	continuum	of	temporal	points	populated	by	objects/events,	a	real	line	stretched	between	the	Before	and	After.		Even	though	what	we	see	with	our	eyes	does	not	correspond	with	what	we	‘see’	with	the	mind’s	eye,	the	majority	of	temporal	theorists	insist	on	the	truth	of	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine;	they	are	adamant	that	time	has	breadth	and	that,	therefore,	there	are	real	temporal	distances	which	lie	between	temporal	points/events/loci.		This	psychological	propensity	to	overwrite	empirical	experience	creates	a	severe	theoretical	tension.		On	the	one	hand,	we	conceptualize	time	as	a	continuum	of	points	and	on	the	other	hand,	we	cannot	experience	time	as	we	imagine	it	to	be	in	principle.		For,	as	I	have	argued,	such	an	experience	would	certainly	require	the	point	of	view	of	an	atemporal	being.		Enter	the	spatial	simile.		It	is	called	on	precisely	in	order	to	compensate	this	tension;	and,	I	must	admit,	it	does	its	job	well.		By	visualizing	temporal	expanses	by	analogy	with	spatial	expanses,	we	can	accept	with	a	relative	ease	timescapes	as	legitimate	constituents	of	physical	reality.		But	what	justifications	(besides	the	psychological	one)	do	we	actually	have	in	accepting	the	theoretical	legitimacy	of	the	spatial	simile	that	props	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine?		As	far	as	I	can	see,	we	have	none.154	
																																																																				154	The	eternalist,	of	course,	would	have	a	slew	of	reasons	as	to	why	we	should	accept	the	temporal	extensionality	doctrine.		See,	for	instance,	chapters	4	and	5	of	Sider	(2001).		All	these	reasons,	however,	fall	short.		The	nature	of	this	undertaking	prevents	me	from	addressing	these	reasons	in	detail,	but	I	hope	that	the	reader	will	find	arguments	which	I	offer	in	these	pages	against	object-eternalism	strong	enough	to	conclude	that	eternalism	in	general,	as	well	as	four-dimensionalism,	the	block-universe	hypothesis,	and	the	rest	of	the	bunch	are	philosophically	unsustainable	theories.	
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3.3.2 It	is	customary	to	symbolize	positions	in	the	four-dimensional	manifold	as	ordered	quadruples	of	real	numbers.		Spacetime	positions,	therefore,	are	expressible	algebraically	in	terms	of	Cartesian	coordinates,	as	shown	in	Figure	20.						 	Fig.	20	Algebraic	expression	of	spacetime	positions.		The	idea	here,	I	take	it,	is	that	as	the	two-dimensional	plane	can	be	generalized	to	a	three-dimensional	space	by	adding	to	variables	x	and	y	(in	this	case,	denoting	two	spatial	dimensions	of	a	plane)	a	third	variable	z,	(a	third	coordinate	denoting	a	third	spatial	dimension),	so	the	three-dimensional	space	can	be	generalized	to	a	four-dimensional	manifold	by	adding	a	fourth	variable	t	(the	coordinate	denoting	the	fourth	temporal	dimension).155		This	technique	of	generating	a	graph	representing	the	four-dimensional	manifold,	is,	no	doubt,	a	useful	illustrative	tool.		Indeed,	visual	thinking	plays	an	important	role	in	mathematics.		Still,	in	the	matters	of	philosophical	reasoning,	pictorial	representations,	when	used	injudiciously,	can	lead	us	astray,	as,	I	think,	is	unfortunately	the	case	when	we	picture	the	four-dimensional	manifold	by	way	of	Cartesian	coordinates.		Because	temporal	magnitude	is	laid	out	along	a	spatial	
																																																																				155	This	algebraic	method	of	generating	hyperspaces	is	called	generalization	by	addition	and	is	unbounded.		The	number	of	dimensions	that	can	be	generated	by	the	method,	therefore,	is	unlimited.	
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axis,	there	arises	a	tendency	to	view	temporal	duration	by	analogy	with	spatial	extension.		Such	tendency	must	be	resisted.			To	see	why	this	rather	natural	inclination	must	be	resisted	let	us	take	a	closer	look	at	the	theoretical	tools	of	Cartesian	geometry.		These	tools	are	not	limited	to	expressions	of	spatial	and	temporal	magnitudes;	any	physical	magnitude	whatsoever	is	expressible	by	means	of	Cartesian	coordinates.		Take,	for	instance,	physical	quantities	of	pitch,	mass,	and	temperature.		Suppose	there	is	an	object	that	emits	a	certain	pitch	at	a	certain	temperature	when	it	attains	a	certain	mass.		This	correlation	of	the	three	physical	quantities	is	expressible	by	a	set	of	ordered	triples	of	real	numbers	<x,y,z>where,	let	us	say,	x	denotes	the	set	{x	êPx}	of	units	of	pitch	measurement,	y	denotes	the	set	{x	êMx}	of	units	of	mass	measurement,	and	z	denotes	the	set	{x	êTx}	of	units	of	temperature	measurement.		We	thus	can	articulate	the	correlation	in	terms	of	Cartesian	geometry	by	simply	laying	pitch,	mass,	and	temperature	measurements	along	the	three	spatial	axes,	as	in	Figure	21:						 	Fig.	21	Non-temporal	of	Cartesian	geometry.	Evidently,	in	Figure	21,	the	dimensions	x,	y,	z	do	not	denote	three	space-like	dimensions;	instead,	they	denote	three	abstract	objects	existing	in	the	mathematical	
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space,	viz.	three	sets	of	different	units	of	measurement	visually	laid	out	along	three	spatial	dimensions.		As	Descartes	himself	said,	"All	that	I	understand	by	dimension	is	the	mode	and	aspect	according	to	which	something	is	considered	to	be	measurable."156		The	Cartesian	sense	of	‘dimension’	is	purely	mathematical;	the	fact	that	this	sense	can	be	brought	out	through	the	visual	apparatus	of	Cartesian	graphs	does	not	make	it	less	mathematical	let	alone	synonymous	with	the	physical	sense	of	‘dimension’,	which	denotes	a	measurable	physical	quantity,	whatever	this	quantity	may	be,	pitch,	length,	mass,	duration,	temperature,	etc.	Accordingly,	when	one	uses	‘temporal	dimension’	in	the	Cartesian	sense,	one	ought	to	speak	of	an	abstract	object	existing	in	the	mathematical	space,	viz.	the	set	of	all	possible	temporal	measurements,	expressed	in	the	appropriate	units.		Alternatively,	when	one	uses	‘temporal	dimension’	in	the	ontological	sense,	one	ought	to	speak	of	a	certain	physical	magnitude,	something	that	is	measurable,	but	itself	is	not	“the	mode	and	aspect”	of	measurement.157		That	is	why,	in	the	mathematical	sense	of	‘temporal	dimension’,	the	statement	“Time	is	the	fourth	dimension	of	the	universe”	means,	“The	fabric	of	the	universe,	in	addition	to	being	measurable	in	three	spatial	modes	is	also	measurable	in	one	temporal	mode”	and	in	its	ontological	sense,	the	very	same	statement	means,	“Time	is	a	measurable	physical	phenomenon.”		Both	readings	are	legitimate.		There	is,	however,	a	third,	confused	sense	of	“temporal	dimension,”	viz.	“time	is	space-like	extension.”		From	the	fact	that	temporal	magnitude	can	be	laid	
																																																																				156	R.		Descartes,	Rule	No	14.		Quoted	from	David	L.	Thompson’s	online	paper	entitled	“Time	in	Physics.”		157	By	the	same	token,	‘spatial	dimension’	also	could	be	interpreted	dually:	it	could	be	taken	to	be	an	abstract	mathematical	object,	but	also,	it	could	be	taken	to	be	an	empirical	phenomenon,	i.e.,	that	which	is	measurable	but	itself	is	not	“the	mode	and	aspect”	of	measurement.	
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out	spatially	along	a	Cartesian	axis,	friends	of	spacious	time	erroneously	infer	that	time	is	a	space-like	expanse.		This	confusion,	as	Reichenbach	points	out	has	been	detrimental	to	philosophy:	Whereas	the	conception	of	space	and	time	as	a	four-dimensional	manifold	has	been	very	fruitful	for	mathematical	physics,	its	effect	in	the	field	of	epistemology	has	been	only	to	confuse	the	issue.		Calling	time	the	fourth	dimension	gives	it	an	air	of	mystery.		One	might	think	that	time	can	now	be	conceived	as	a	kind	of	space	and	try	in	vain	to	add	visually	a	fourth	dimension	to	the	three	dimensions	of	space….		Through	the	combination	of	space	and	time	into	a	four-dimensional	manifold	we	merely	express	the	fact	that	it	takes	four	numbers	to	determine	a	world	event,	namely	three	numbers	for	the	spatial	location	and	one	for	time.		Such	an	ordering	of	elements,	each	of	which	is	given	by	four	conditions	(coordinates)	can	always	be	conceived	mathematically	as	a	four-dimensional	manifold.	158	J.	J.	C.	Smart	also	speaks	of	two	fundamentally	different	senses	“in	which	one	might	plausibly	be	said	to	be	spatializing	time.		In	one	of	these	senses	it	is	admittedly	a	reprehensible	thing	to	do.		In	the	other	of	these	senses	it	is	a	thoroughly	laudable	thing	to	do.”159		Smart	identifies	the	‘reprehensible’	sense	with	explicating	temporal	duration	by	analogy	with	spatial	extension	and	the	‘laudable’	sense	with	a	Minkowski	mathematical	model	of	spacetime.		What	Reichenbach	refers	to	as	“misunderstanding	
																																																																				158	H.		Reichenbach,	The	Philosophy	of	Space	&	Time	(New	York:	Dover	Publications,	1958),	pp.	109-11.	159	J.	J.	C.	Smart,	“Spatializing	Time,”	Mind	64	(1955),	pp.	239-41,	p.239.	
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of	mathematical	concepts”	and	Smart	labels	as	“reprehensible	sense	of	spatialzing	time,”	I	have	identified	as	the	confused	sense	of	“temporal	dimension.”		Regrettably,	it	is	this	confused	sense	of	temporal	dimensions	that	the	eternalist	employs.		3.3.3 The	eternalist,	I	have	good	reason	to	believe,	would	disagree	with	the	foregoing	analysis.		Indeed,	he	would	be	affronted	by	my	claim	that	he	employs	confused	senses	of	‘temporal	dimension’,	‘spacious	time’,	and	the	like	concepts.		But	by	criticizing	this	philosopher	for	the	confusion,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	his	mathematical	crudeness.		On	the	whole,	the	eternalist	is	a	good	philosopher	who	is	well-versed	in	mathematics	and	natural	sciences.		Setting	aside	his	renowned	scientific	erudition	and	mathematical	prowess,	in	practice,	the	eternalist	does	take	time	to	be	a	space-like	expanse;	viz.	a	linearly	ordered	set	of	temporal	points/loci.		For	him	temporal	distances	do	lie	between	temporal	points/loci	in	the	very	same	manner	as	spatial	distances	lie	between	spatial	points/loci.		The	eternalist’s	time	is	not	just	like	space;	it	is,	at	least	as	far	as	its	alleged	feature	of	dimensionality	is	concerned,	a	full-blooded	space.160		This	eternalist’s	notion	of	spacious	time,	as	I	have	previously	argued,	must	be	rejected	as	having	no	analog	in	reality.	Let	us,	however,	grant	the	eternalist	that	the	E-universe	is	extended	in	four	directions,	three	spatial	and	one	temporal.	Does	then	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine	withstand	the	scrutiny	of	conceptual	analysis	on	its	own?	I	think	not,	and	this	is	why.		The	doctrine	brings	to	the	fore	(among	many	others)	the	following	question:	Does	“dimension”	in	“The	universe	has	three	spatial	dimensions”	and	“The	
																																																																				160	Consult,	for	instance,	the	section	of	Sider	(2001)	entitled	“Space	and	Time	are	Analogous”	pp.	87-92.		
129	
universe	has	one	temporal	dimension”	denote	the	same	phenomenon?		This	is	a	crucial	question	with	which	for	the	eternalist	must	grapple.		To	see	why	this	is	so	let	us	consider	the	following	rationale.		On	condition	that	(i) space	has	three	dimensions,	(ii) time	has	one	dimension,	(iii) “dimension”	in	“spatial	dimension”	and	“temporal	dimension”	denotes	the	same	phenomenon,		it	then	follows	that	(iv) “spatial”	and		“temporal”	in	“spatial	dimension”	and	“temporal	dimension”	are	domain	modifiers;	they	‘place’	the	same	phenomenon	called	“dimension”	within	the	context	of	a	relative	domain.	Accordingly,	if	“dimension”	indeed	denotes	the	same	phenomenon	in	both	cases,	the	distinction	between	spatial	and	temporal	dimensions	is	never	substantial,	but	solely	domain-relevant.		Dimension	is	a	dimension	in	the	spatial	domain	and	it	is	a	dimension	in	the	temporal	domain.		In	other	words,	intrinsically,	spatial	and	temporal	dimensions	are	indistinguishable	–	dimension	is	a	dimension	is	a	dimension.			Schlesinger,	I	believe,	thinks	along	the	same	lines	when	he	speaks	of	“The	Doctrine	of	the	Similarity	of	Space	and	Time.”		The	doctrine	is	metaphysically	feasible,	says	Schlesinger,	only	if	the	term	“dimension”	in	both	“spatial	dimension”	and	“temporal	dimension”	bears	exactly	the	same	meaning.161		Accordingly,	if	“dimension”	in	both	“spatial	dimension”	and	“temporal	dimension”	refers	to	the	same	
																																																																				161	G.	Schlesinger,	Aspects	of	Time,	p.	6.	
130	
phenomenon,	then,	on	the	principle	of	indiscernibility	of	identicals	whatever	is	true	of	one	is	necessarily	true	of	the	other.	The	Doctrine	of	the	Similarity	of	Space	and	Time,	if	it	is	to	be	maintained	at	all,	can	only	be	done	so	with	respect	to	the	necessary	features	of	space	and	time.		The	Doctrine	would	then	amount	to	saying:	if	we	have	a	statement	about	space	that	is	necessarily	true	or	necessarily	false,	then	the	temporal	counterpart	of	that	statement	must	also	be	necessarily	true	or	false,	respectively.	162	What	are	these	“necessary	features	of	space	and	time”?		Well,	on	the	eternalist’s	account,	both	are	linearly	ordered	sets	of	points/loci.163		Let	us	recall,	this	is	the	topological	facet	of	eternalism.		Furthermore,	just	as	all	spatially	separated	points/loci	are	equally	real,	so	all	temporally	separated	points/loci	are	equally	real	as	well.		This	is	the	ontological	facet	of	eternalism.		On	the	eternalist’s	account,	therefore,	time	is	a	linear	ordering	on	a	conglomerate	of	equally	real	points/loci;	it	is	essentially	a	spacious	phenomenon.		Yet,	as	I	have	argued	earlier,	linearly	ordered	groups	of	temporall	loci	(whether	ontologically	empty	or	not)	are	simply	not	given	to	us	empirically;	there	are	simply	no	observable	timescapes;	we	in	principle	cannot	observe	temporally	separated	and	equally	existent	objects/moments/loci.		The	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine,	therefore,	cannot	be	upheld	on	empirical	grounds.		Hence,	the	existence	of	temporal	expanses	must	be	considered	ontologically	vacuous.	
																																																																				162	Ibid,	p.	6.	163	I	believe	it	is	this	idea	of	time	being	a	linearly	ordered	set	of	points/loci	that	is	behind	the	following,	characteristically	unapologetic,	object-eternalist’s	statement:	“The	temporal	procession	of	temporal	parts	is	analogous	to	the	spatial	procession	of	spatial	parts.”		Sider	(2001),	p.	217.	
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Besides,	spatial	distances	are	measurable	by	means	of	measuring	tapes	and	other	such	devises.		Here	is	a	measuring	tape;	it	is	functional	in	spatial	measurements.		On	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine	it,	therefore,	must	lend	a	hand	in	temporal	measurements.		Patently,	this	is	an	absurd	conclusion.		To	measure	temporal	magnitudes,	we	need	clocks,	not	tapes.		By	their	design,	there	is	an	unbridgeable	gap	between	spacemeters	and	chronometers.		Were	temporal	expanses	the	same	phenomenon	as	spatial	expanses,	time	would	be	measurable	not	in	seconds,	minutes	etc.,	but	in	centimeters,	meters,	etc.,	or,	conversely,	spatial	distances	would	be	measurable	not	in	in	centimeters,	meters,	etc.,	but	in	in	seconds,	minutes	etc.		This	is	obviously	an	incongruous	conclusion.	The	eternalist	might	reply	that	temporal	distances	are	not	exactly	the	same	phenomena	as	spatial	distances,	that	is,	that	we	are	dealing	here	with	similar	but	not	identical	phenomena.		Accordingly,	one	would	have	reason	to	believe	that	what	is	true	about	temporal	expanses	is	not	necessarily	true	about	temporal	expanses.		To	this	objection,	I	simply	reply	that	if	this	is	so,	then	it,	of	course,	means	that	space	and	time	do	not	have	in	common	this	alleged	feature	of	having	breadth	–	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine	completely	fails.	Conceivably,	the	temporal	dimensionality	doctrine	is	not	integral	to	eternalism.		Yet,	there	is	another,	on	the	face	of	it	unassailable,	and	thus	even	more	entrenched	idea	that	gives	initial	credence	to	this	theory;	namely,	it	is	said	that	sets	of	spatial	and	temporal	points/loci	are	both	linearly	ordered.		Just	as	there	exists	the	spatial	continuum,	so	it	is	held	by	the	eternalist,	there	exists	the	temporal	
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continuum.164		A	salient	ontological	implication	of	modeling	time	on	the	continuum	is	that	since	the	real	line	is	the	totality	of	real	numbers,	the	temporal	line	must	be	the	totality	of	instants.		This	entrenched	view	is	at	the	center	of	time-eternalism	which,	in	turn,	is	an	essential	theoretical	component	of	both	object-and	event-eternalism.		
3.4 The	Argument	against	Eternalism	from	Change	3.4.1 The	eternalist’s	picture	is	incompatible	with	our	everyday	experience	because	it	entails	an	unchanging	reality.		Change,	it	is	resolutely	maintained	by	the	eternalist,	is	an	illusion.		Providing	an	explanation	of	the	manifest	phenomenon	of	change,	therefore,	often	leads	the	eternalist	to	implausible	conjectures	such	as	the	following	one:	“The	objective	world	simply	is,	it	does	not	happen.		Only	to	the	gaze	of	my	consciousness,	crawling	upward	along	the	life-line	of	my	body,	does	a	section	of	this	world	come	to	life	as	a	fleeting	image	in	space	which	continuously	changes	in	time.”165		On	the	eternalist’s	account	of	reality,	the	E-universe	is	an	absolutely	static	entity;	it	does	not	grow	old,	for	it	never	was	young	to	begin	with,	it	came	into	existence	as	one	immutable	whole	with	all	its	temporally	ordered	segment/events	already	in	existence	–	the	Big	Bang,	the	Big	Crunch,	and	everything	else	in	between	–	it	is	continually	in	existence	as	one	immutable	whole,	and	it	will	go	out	of	existence	the	very	same	entity	it	came	into	being.		It	is	the	central	tenet	of	the	eternalist’s	picture	of	reality	that	the	E-universe	never	was	small,	dense,	and	hot,	it	never	
																																																																				164	A	scientifically	informed	eternalist	usually	speaks	of	the	spacetime	continuum.		For	present	purposes,	however,	this	nuance	is	immaterial.	165	Hermann	Weyl,	Philosophy	of	Mathematics	and	Natural	Science	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1949),	p.	116.	
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expanded	into	what	it	is	now,	and	it	will	never	collapse	into	singularity;	it	has	always	been	the	same	temporally	extended	object	with	all	its	temporally	ordered	instantaneous	segments	existing	en	bloc.		Only	its	temporally	ordered	segments	are	small,	large,	hot,	cold,	etc.		In	the	beginning,	i.e.,	at	the	first	B-temporal	location,	(the	first	B-time),	the	first	temporally	ordered	segment	of	the	E-universe	is	small,	dense,	and	hot;	in	the	in-between	B-temporal	locations	(B-times),	there	are	segments	which	are	characterized	by	vast	expanses	populated	by	celestial	bodies,	and	at	the	end,	there	again	exists	the	small,	dense,	and	hot	last	segment	of	the	E-universe	(consult	Figure	16).		It	is	these	qualitative	differences	between	the	E-universe’s	temporally	ordered	segments,	which	the	eternalist	believes	constitute	change;	change,	says	the	eternalist,	is	“qualitative	variation	between	the	distinct	temporal	parts	of	an	object.”166	On	the	eternalist’s	account,	therefore,	change	is	essentially	both	a	qualitative	and	relational	phenomenon;	it	occurs	inasmuch	as	one	object	(one	temporally	ordered	part	of	a	continuant)	is	qualitatively	different	in	relation	to	another	object	(another	temporally	ordered	part	of	a	continuant).		On	this	view,	one	and	the	same	object,	be	it	a	continuant	or	its	temporally	ordered	part,	never	changes	intrinsically	because	it	does	not	instantiate	different	sets	of	properties	at	different	times.		A	temporally	ordered	part	of	a	continuant,	which	occupies	one	and	the	same	momentary	B-locus	or	the	continuant	itself,	which	occupies	more	than	one	but	also	the	same	B-loci,	have	the	same	set	of	properties	for	all	eternity.		This	qualitative	immutability	is	the	essential	character	of	all	perduring	objects	as	opposed	to	the	enduring	objects	of	the	A/B-theorist,	the	objects	which	do	change	their	properties	
																																																																				166	Theodor	Sider	(2001),	p.212.	
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over	time	by	occupying	one	momentary	B-locus	at	an	A-time.		This	perduring/enduring	distinction	is	graphically	depicted	in	Figure	22.					 				 Fig.	22	The	perduring/enduring	distinction.	It,	therefore,	is	only	natural	that	the	eternalist	conceives	of	qualitative	change	over	time	by	analogy	to	change	across	space.		Indeed,	on	his	view,	“spatial	variation	is	in	many	ways	analogous	to	temporal	change.”167		Specifically,	it	is	believed	that	perduring	objects	change	over	time	in	the	very	same	manner	as,	say,	changes	occur	in	the	elevation	of	landscapes	–	at	one	spatial	location	the	land	is	hilly,	in	the	next	one	it	is	characterized	by	a	flat	surface,	and	so	on.		“The	landscape	is	changing,”	we	commonsensically	say,	when	traveling	through	such	diverse	landscapes.		In	the	very	same	manner,	insists	the	eternalist,	changes	occur	over	time.		At	one	temporal	location,	a	perduring	object	has	one	set	of	properties	and	at	another	it	has	a	different	set	of	properties.		On	the	eternalist’s	hypothesis,	it	is	this	qualitative	difference	
																																																																				167	Theodor	Sider	(2001),	p.216.	
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between	temporally	ordered	parts	of	a	perduring	object	which	constitutes	qualitative	change	per	se.	Evidently,	the	spatial	simile	is	at	work	in	this	conception	of	qualitative	change.		I	have	dealt	into	the	issue	of	the	spatial	simile	in	section	3.3,	but	did	not	address	the	matter	pertaining	to	the	alleged	similarity	between	qualitative	change	over	B-time	and	qualitative	change	across	space.		I	now	shall	do	so.		3.4.2 Change,	says	the	eternalist	“does	occur	in	virtue	of	unchanging	facts	about	temporal	parts.		There	are	no	good	arguments	to	the	contrary.”168		I	beg	to	differ.		The	ostensible	static	spatial	change/	static	temporal	change	similarity	is	based	on	the	unjustified	conflation	of	the	notion	of	qualitative	change	within	objects	with	the	notion	of	qualitative	difference	between	objects.		Qualitative	difference	between	two	distinct	spatially	separated	objects	x	and	y	is	not	a	genuine	qualitative	change;	in	fact,	it	is	not	a	qualitative	change	at	all;	it	is	just	that	–	qualitative	difference	between	two	distinct	objects.		If,	as	the	eternalist	claims,	space	and	time	are	in	fact	similar	in	that	both	are	static	expanses	populated	by	objects/events,	then,	as	in	the	spatial	case,	so	in	the	temporal	one,	we	would	have	a	mere	qualitative	difference	between	distinct	linearly	ordered	objects/events,	not	a	genuine	change.		Such	object-to-object	variations	are	governed	by	Leibnitz’s	Law	of	Identity	that	only	marginally	concerns	the	problem	of	identity	over	time.	There	is	a	distinctive	set	of	laws	which	governs	qualitative	change	over	time,	the	change	that	always	takes	place	within	the	self-same	object.169		Surely,	
																																																																				168	Ibid.,	p.214.	169	To	be	sure	identity	does	play	a	role	in	the	law(s)	that	governs	change	over	time,	since	we	are	dealing	here	with	self-same	objects,	but	it	is	not	sufficient	to	give	us	a	consistent	picture	of	how	the	
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just	because	x	¹	y,	it	does	not	follow	that	somehow	x	changes	into	y	or	that	“¹”	denotes	an	occurrence	of	qualitative	change.		Something	else	must	take	place	in	the	fact	that	x	
¹	y	in	order	for	the	fact	to	claim	the	mantel	of	qualitative	change;	namely,	that	x	and	y	have	to	be	the	same	object,	which	is	a	patent	contradiction.	This	condition	for	self-sameness	of	qualitative	change	over	time	is	an	integral	part	of	both	the	eternalist’s	and	his	opponent’s	conceptual	frameworks	because	continuants	very	much	like	enduring	objects	are	too	self-same	objects	and	both	types	of	objects	qualitatively	change	over	time.		Indeed,	not	even	the	eternalist	can	deny	the	fact	that	in	order	for	there	to	transpire	an	instance	of	qualitative	change	over	time	there	must	be	a	self-same	object	that	first	instantiates	one	set	of	properties	and	then	it	instantiates	another	set	of	properties.		How	perduring	and	enduring	objects	change	their	properties	over	time,	of	course,	is	the	point	on	which	the	eternalist	sharply	disagrees	with	his	opponent.		In	the	E-universe,	unlike	in	the	ordinary	universe,	intrinsic	qualitative	change	which	continuants	undergo	depends	on	extrinsic,	i.e.,	relational	qualitative	differences	between	its	temporally	ordered	parts.		The	eternalist	gives	us	rather	a	cumbersome	picture	of	how	this	esoteric	dependency	occurs:	The	analogy	between	spatial	variation	and	genuine	change	becomes	even	closer	if	temporal	parts	are	brought	into	the	picture.		A	poker	that	
																																																																				self-same	object	preserves	its	identity	through	temporal	permutations.		In	fact,	by	itself,	Leibnitz’s	Law	is	utterly	useless	in	the	matters	concerning	change	over	time.		Some	B-theorists,	however,	attempt	to	apply	Leibnitz’s	Law	in	their	dealings	with	the	problem	of	identity	over	time.		This	is	a	mistake	because	the	Law,	as	it	usually	formulated	says	that	if	objects	x	and	y	instantiate	the	same	set	of	properties,	then	
x	and	y	are	the	same	object:	"F	(Fx	º	Fy)	É	x=y.		But	no	object	instantiates	the	same	set	of	properties	over	time	because	there	are	no	such	things	as	absolutely	unchangeable	objects,	for	if	there	were	such	objects	and	if	the	B	theory	were	true,	then	it	would	follow	that	Leibnitz’s	Law	is	violated	in	the	E-universe.			There	is,	of	course,	much	to	be	said	about	identity	over	time;	this,	however,	would	take	as	far	a	field.	
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is	hot	at	one	end	and	cold	at	another	has	a	hot	spatial	part	and	a	cold	spatial	part;	the	temporal	parts	theorist	says	that	the	poker	changes	by	having	a	hot	temporal	part	and	a	cold	temporal	part.		The	difference	between	merely	spatial	variation	and	four-dimensional	change,	according	to	the	argument,	is	vanishingly	small.170	So	we	have	two	distinct	full-blooded	temporally	separated	objects:	a	poker	“that	venerable	philosophical	weapon”171	that	is	hot	at	one	end	and	cold	at	another	and	another	poker	that	is	cold	on	both	ends.		It	is	precisely	this	qualitative	relational	difference	between	these	two	objects	that,	on	the	eternalist’s	account,	brings	about	
intrinsic	qualitative	change	in	the	third	object,	the	POKER,	i.e.,	the	continuant	which	is	comprised	of	(at	least)	these	two	distinct	objects.		Should	we	accept	this	ungainly	picture	of	reality?		I	do	not	think	we	should,	and	this	is	why.		A	continuant,	in	our	case	the	POKER,	does	not	instantiate	any	one	property	at	any	one	time	(a	B-point)	because	it	is	simply	not	at	any	one	time;	ex	hypothesi,	it	is	a	temporally	extended	object.		So,	if	the	POKER	does	not	instantiate	the	property	being	hot	at	one	end	at	t1	and	it	also	does	not	instantiate	the	property	of	being	cold	on	both	ends	at	t2,	how	then	could	it	instantiate	both	properties?		If	we	take	eternalism	seriously,	we	should	say	that	either	the	POKER	does	not	instantiate	any	property	at	all,	for	to	instantiate	a	property	an	object	has	to	be	at	any	one	time,	or	that	it	instantiates	all	(or	at	least	two)	properties	at	once.		In	the	former	case,	we	have	a	propertyless	entity	and	in	the	latter	case	we	have	a	contradictory	entity.172	
																																																																				170	Theodor	Sider	(2001),	p.214.	171	D.	H.	Mellor	(2001),	p.	46.	172	A	similar	argument	appears	in	D.H.	Mellor	(1998),	Chapter	4,	section	4.	
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Once	one	posits	the	reality	of	space-like	time	populated	by	continuants,	entities	which	whose	parts	exist	together	but	not	at	the	same	time,	one	is	free	to	hold	that	variation	over	time	is	very	much	like	variation	across	space.		There	is	an	intrinsic	contradiction	in	this	picture	of	reality.		I	just	outlined	this	contradiction.		Let	me	elaborate	a	bit.		No	continuant	instantiates	any	one	property	at	any	one	B-time,	viz.	at	any	one	B-temporal	point,	because	continuants	are	not	instantaneous	entities.		It	cannot	be	said	about	a	continuant	C	that	it	instantiates	F	at	t1	and	¬F	at	t2,	because	ex	
hypothesi	it	is	not	at	either	of	these	B-times,	it	is	in	both	of	them.		It	is	temporal	parts	of	continuants	x	and	y	which	do	the	job	of	instantiating	of	properties	for	the	continuants.		At	t1	x	is	F	and	at	t2	y	is	¬F.		It	follows	then	that	either	continuants	do	not	instantiate	any	property	whatsoever,	or	they	instantiate	all	of	them	including	incompatible	ones.		In	other	words,	the	continuant	C	does	not	instantiate	F	at	one	time	and	¬F	at	another	time;	it	either	instantiates	one	or	both	of	them.		In	the	E-universe,	there	are	no	disjunctive	instantiations,	but	only	conjunctive	ones.		We	can	look	at	the	same	argument	form	a	slightly	different	angle.		Continuants	are	objects.		As	all	objects,	they	must	be	self-identical.		Their	self-identity	consists	in	what	any	self-identity	consists	–	in	the	sameness	of	properties.		It	then	follows	that	continuants	instantiate	one	and	only	one	set	of	properties,	this	sameness	is	their	passport	to	self-identity.		Hence,	continuants	are	contradictory	objects;	they	instantiate	contradictory	properties.		There	is	no	way	for	the	eternalist	to	avoid	the	consequence	of	his	picture	of	reality.	The	eternalist	willingly	neglects	such	consequences	of	his	theory	because	he	thinks	he	has	sufficient	reason	to	override	them;	namely,	he	thinks	that	eternalism	
139	
offers	answers	to	philosophical	puzzles	to	which	its	opponents	do	not.173		One	of	those	puzzles	is	the	problem	of	temporal	intrinsics.174		Positing	B-changes,	it	is	claimed,	does	solve	the	problem.		Let	us	see	whether	this	indeed	does	solve	the	problem.		The	problem	is	this.		An	object	o	instantiates	a	property	F	at	one	time	and	¬F	at	another.		Assuming	that	o	=o,	it	follows	that	oF	and	o¬F	(though	it	is	not	entirely	clear	what	this	negative	property	could	possibly	be).		Hence,	we	have	a	contradiction.		The	alleged	eternalist’s	solution	to	this	problem	is	that	objects	have	temporal	parts.		Thus,	it	is	argued,	it	is	not	the	same	object	o	that	instantiates	two	contradictory	properties,	but	two	different	parts	of	the	same	objects	x	and	y	which	are	situated	at	different	time,	i.e.,	
x	at	t1	is	F	and	y	at	t2	is	¬F.		The	problem	solved.		Or	is	it?		Surely	different	objects	can	instantiate	different	sets	of	properties,	in	fact,	they	always	do,	otherwise	they	would	be	the	same	object.		This	rejoinder,	however,	is	not	sufficient	because	there	exists	a	continent	which	is	a	temporally	extend	object	such	that	it	is	comprised	of	the	two	objects	x	at	t1	and	y	at	t2;	the	continuant,	therefore,	instantiates	both	contrary	properties	albeit	at	different	times.		Indeed,	it	is	irrelevant	that	F	and	¬F	are	instantiated	by	the	continuant	at	different	times.		For	as	long	as	x	at	t1	and	y	at	t2	are	
equally	real	parts	of	the	continuant,	it	instantiates	both	F	and	¬F.		The	problem	of	temporal	intrinsics,	therefore,	appears	in	a	different	disguise.	The	eternalist,	of	course,	would	appeal	once	again	to	the	alleged	similarity	between	variation	across	space	and	variation	over	time.		I	presume	he	would	argue	that	as	a	poker	can	be	hot	at	one	end	and	cold	at	another,	so	continuants	can	
																																																																				173	T.	Sider	(2001).		Also	consult	famous	Russell’s	statement	that	“a	logical	theory	may	be	tested	by	its	capacity	for	dealing	with	puzzles.”	“On	Denoting”	Mind	14	(1905),	p.	484.	174	David	Lewis,	On	the	Plurality	of	Worlds	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1986),	pp.202-03.	
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instantiate	property	F	at	one	time	and	¬F	at	another	time.		The	problem	with	this	rejoinder	from	the	spatial	simile	is	that	although	positing	distinct	objects	which	instantiate	contrary	properties	at	different	times	does	evade	the	problem	of	temporal	intrinsics,	since,	as	I	have	argued	earlier,	all	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	exist	at	once,	it	follows	that	continuants	instantiate	contrary	properties	at	once.		3.4.3 Qualitative	change	over	time,	says	the	eternalist,	is	nothing	but	a	qualitative	difference	between	temporally	ordered	parts	of	a	continuant.175		Take	for	instance	a	simple	continuant	C	comprised	just	of	two	temporally	ordered	parts	x	and	y.		On	the	eternalist’s	picture	its	intrinsic	qualitative	change	consists	in	mere	qualitative	difference	between	it	temporally	ordered	parts	x	and	y.		In	the	E-universe,	therefore,	intrinsic	qualitative	change	is	reducible	to	the	binary	relation	x	¹	y.		Yet,	the	eternalist’s	reason	for	this	reductionist	account	of	qualitative	change	is	unsatisfactory.		In	fact,	as	far	as	the	ontology	of	temporally	ordered	parts	is	concerned,	the	eternalist	does	not	distinguish	between	the	two	phenomena	at	all.		On	his	theory,	we	have	one	and	the	same	phenomenon;	qualitative	variation	between	temporally	ordered	parts	of	a	continuant	is	what	an	intrinsic	qualitative	change	of	the	continuant	is	taken	to	be.		Such	a	radical	departure	from	the	accepted	conceptual	norm	of	what	intrinsic	qualitative	change	of	an	object	and	what	extrinsic	qualitative	difference	between	objects	are	surely	needs	a	very	strong	overriding	justification.	
																																																																				175	The	term	‘qualitative	change’,	when	it	is	applied	to	temporally	ordered	objects,	is	somewhat	redundant	because	in	the	E-universe,	there	is	simply	no	such	phenomenon	as	non-qualitative	change;	things	do	not	move	the	E-universe	temporally	in	relation	to	each	other;	in	fact,	they	do	not	move	at	all.		Be	it	as	it	may,	I	will	continue	to	use	the	term	for	the	sake	of	clarity	of	presentation.	
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The	conceptual	norm	in	question	is	that	intrinsic	qualitative	change	over	time	unlike	relational	qualitative	difference	across	space,	or	for	that	matter	across	space-like	time,	transpires	iff	the	same	object	first	instantiates	one	set	of	properties	and	then	it	instantiates	another	set	of	properties.		This	is	what	normally	is	taken	to	qualify	as	qualitative	change	over	time;	it	is	an	intrinsic	qualitative	transformation	of	the	same	object,	“we	only	call	a	difference	in	properties	a	change	if	there	is	a	single	thing	–	the	thing	that	changes	–	which	has	the	different	and	incompatible	properties.”176		The	self-sameness	of	an	object	is	a	necessary	condition	for	a	qualitative	change	to	take	place.		This	doctrine	is	so	manifestly	self-evident	that	even	such	a	harden	eternalist	as	Sider	subscribes	to	it	as	the	following	passage	attests	“Change	just	is	variation	in	the	(intrinsic)	properties	of	a	thing	between	one	time	and	another.”177		Apparently,	“a	thing”	here	implies	“a	self-same	thing.”		Indeed,	the	phenomenon	of	qualitative	change,	as	its	name	implies,	is	a	change	in	the	quality	of	something	and	not	in	relation	of	something	to	something.		This	is	the	conceptual	norm	the	eternalist	blatantly	disregards.		What	then	is	his	justification	for	this	barefaced	contempt	of	the	norm?		Does	he	have	any?		Let	us	see.	
																																																																				176	D.	H.	Mellor	(2001),	p.	54.	177	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.214.		Though	perhaps	this	passage	might	be	considered	as	a	Freudian	slip	of	a	sort,	for	it	entails	that	in	the	E-universe,	after	all,	objects	do	change	their	intrinsic	properties.		But	what	objects	are	these?		Temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	do	not	change	their	intrinsic	properties,	nor	do	continuants	themselves	because	the	set	of	properties	a	continuant	instantiates	is	immutable.		In	the	E-universe,	therefore,	there	exists	an	additional	type	of	objects	which	are	neither	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants	nor	the	continuants	themselves	and	which	change	their	intrinsic	properties	over	time.		This	conclusion,	however,	is	contrary	to	the	eternalist’s	hypothesis.		Furthermore,	if	qualitative	change	of	a	continuant	is	for	the	continuant	to	instantiate	different	properties	at	different	B-times,	then	from	this	it	follows	that	it	is	the	continuant	itself,	not	its	parts,	that	has	to	be	at	each	of	those	times.		Yet,	this	definition	of	qualitative	change	cannot	be	acceptable	to	the	eternalist	because	it	implies	that	continuants	are	perduring	objects,	which	first	instantiate	a	certain	set	of	properties	at	one	B-time	then	another	set	of	properties	at	another	B-time,	and	so	on	(consult	the	second	diagram	of	Figure	22).	
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It	must	be	pointed	out,	however,	that	the	eternalist	is	right	in	that	changeability	of	the	self-identical	object	is	philosophically	a	problematic	concept.		I	assume	it	is	primarily	this	fact,	though	perhaps	not	exclusively	this	one,	that	he	takes	to	be	sufficient	reason	for	overriding	the	conceptual	norm.		Yet,	his	‘solution’	is	even	more	problematic	than	the	problem	it	is	designed	to	avoid,	for	it	is	a	nonstarter	on	its	face.		The	cure	is	worse	than	disease,	indeed.178	I	assume	even	the	eternalist	would	agree	that	qualitative	changes,	unlike	relational	changes,	necessary	occur	within	one	and	the	same	object	–	a	leaf	is	first	green	and	then	the	very	same	leaf	is	yellow.		The	eternalist,	however,	would	say	that	in	the	present	example,	qualitative	change	consists	in	that	the	temporally	ordered	segment	(the	green	leaf)	of	the	continuant	the	LEAF	is	qualitatively	different	from	an	adjacent	temporally	ordered	segment	(the	yellow	leaf)	of	the	same	continuant.		There	are	not	two	but	three	objects:	the	green	leaf,	the	yellow	leaf,	and	the	LEAF.		It	is	this	third	object,	the	LEAF,	that	intrinsically	changes.	Is	this	a	consistent	picture?		Well,	if	we	accept,	if	only	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	that	there	are	such	things	as	continuants	and	their	temporally	ordered	parts,	then	we	indeed	do	have	space-like	variation	in	the	temporal	realm.		But	is	this	a	description	of	a	qualitative	change?		Not	by	a	long	shot!		This	is	merely	an	account	of	a	qualitative	difference	between	two	distinct	objects,	the	green	leaf	and	the	yellow	leaf.		Yet,	an	account	of	qualitative	change	does	not	involve	multiple	objects;	it	necessarily	involves	only	one	object,	it	is	the	object	itself	that	changes.		Even	if	we	grant	to	the	
																																																																				178	I	believe	that	a	theory	of	non-temporality,	which	could	be	motivated	by	the	arguments	I	present	in	these	pages,	can	meet	all	the	difficulties	associated	with	the	problem	of	identity	over	time.		The	limited	goal	of	the	thesis,	however,	prevents	me	from	developing	or	even	outlining	such	a	theory.	
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eternalist	that	there	are	such	entities	as	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants,	this	still	would	not	justify	construing	qualitative	change	within	the	same	object	as	qualitative	difference	between	two	objects.		There	is	an	in-built	and	rather	manifest	contradiction	in	such	construal	of	qualitative	change.		Surely,	two	distinct	objects	cannot	be	one	and	the	same	object,	nor	one	and	the	same	object	can	be	two	objects.		And	surely	difference	between	two	objects	is	not	change	within	one	self-same	object.	The	eternalist,	nonetheless,	when	it	comes	to	temporally	ordered	parts	of	continuants,	does	feel	being	justified	to	override	the	norm	and	takes	qualitative	difference	between	objects	to	be	the	same	phenomenon	as	qualitative	change	within	one	and	the	same	object.		But	for	two	objects	being	qualitatively	different	does	not	give	us	change	in	a	third	object,	the	object	that	supposedly	undergoes	an	intrinsic	qualitative	change.		Why	the	qualitative	differences	between	two	temporally	ordered	parts	of	a	continuant	should	constitute	qualitative	change	in	the	continuant?		Difference	of	opinion	between	two	individuals,	for	instance,	is	not	a	qualitative	change	in	a	third	man;	yet,	when	such	difference	takes	places	in	the	mind	of	the	same	individual,	we	have	genuine	qualitative	change.		Difference	in	the	height	of	two	adjacent	trees	is	not	change	by	any	measure,	but	when	one	and	the	same	tree	grows	taller	or	is	pruned	short,	then	we	have	a	qualitative	change	proper.		Expressions	of	the	type	“x	is	F	and	y	is	G”	do	not	denote	change	in	the	same	thing,	but	only	difference	between	things.		This	seems	all	too	obvious.		Yet,	when	it	comes	to	temporally	ordered	parts,	the	eternalist	categorically	denies	this	indisputable	truth.		On	his	view,	“x	is	F	and	y	is	G”	does	denote	qualitative	change	in	the	same	object	which	is	neither	x	nor	y,	provided	that	x	and	y	are	temporally	ordered	parts	of	the	same	continuant.	
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The	eternalist	might	retort	that	all	that	changes	in	the	LEAF,	all	that	qualitative	change	is,	is	the	variation	in	intrinsic	qualities	from	x	to	y.		This	reply	is	unsatisfactory	because,	as	I	keep	pointing	out,	the	conceptual	norm	is	that	qualitative	difference	between	distinct	objects	is	not	the	same	phenomenon	as	qualitative	difference	within	a	self-same	object.		In	the	absence	of	an	overriding	argument	against	the	norm,	the	eternalist’s	opponent	is	fully	justified	in	rejecting	the	eternalist’s	tenet.	Now,	our	dynamic	reality	is	teeming	with	pure	relational	changes	such	as	first	
x	is	to	the	left	of	y	and	then	x	is	to	the	right	of	y.		These	relational	changes	are	essentially	non-qualitative	phenomena.179		There	are	also	qualitative	relational	differences	between	objects,	such	as	x	is	taller	than	y.		One	might	be	tempted	to	call	these	qualitative	relational	changes.		This	temptation	must	be	resisted	because	in	reality	there	are	qualitative	relational	changes,	such	as	first	x	is	taller	than	y	and	then	
x	is	shorter	than	y.		These	latter	changes	are	brought	about	by	qualitative	non-relational	changes	within	objects	and	ought	to	be	distinguished	from	qualitative	relational	differences.		We	thus	have	four	district	phenomena:		(i)	non-qualitative	relational	change,		(ii)	qualitative	relational	differences,		(iii)	qualitative	relational	change,		(iv)	qualitative	intrinsic	change.			
																																																																				179	It	is,	of	course,	true	that	relational	changes	can	cause	intrinsic	changes.		For	example,	when	something	becomes	closer	to	a	source	of	heat,	it	changes	intrinsically	by	becoming	hotter.		The	converse	facts	obtain	too;	intrinsic	changes	can	cause	extrinsic	changes,	as,	for	instance,	when	x	is	first	larger	than	y	and	then	it	is	smaller	than	y.		But	these	are	altogether	different	issues.		
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What	the	eternalist	has	in	mind,	however,	when	he	speaks	of	qualitative	changes	taking	place	within	a	continuant	is	a	radically	different	phenomenon.		On	his	hypothesis,	B-changes	are	both	intrinsically	qualitative,	in	that	they	take	place	within	a	self-same	temporally	extended	continuant,	but	they	are	also	qualitative	relational	differences	in	that	they	are	like	spatial	qualitative	variations	between	spatially	separated	objects.		Positing	this	fifth	exotic	species	of	change	requires	very	strong	philosophical	justification.		As	far	as	I	know	the	eternalist	does	not	have	such	a	justification;	he	simply	posits	B-changes	out	of	convenience	because	it	fits	well	within	his	schema	of	things.	Suppose	we	accept	the	eternalist	conjecture	that	continuants	change	in	virtue	of	qualitative	differences	of	their	immutable	parts.		Still,	continuants,	being	comprised	of	immutable	parts,	must	too	be	immutable	entities.		Indeed,	their	having	temporally	contiguous	and	qualitatively	different	parts	is	no	more	undergoing	change	than	for	a	spatially	extended	object,	say,	a	poker,	being	at	the	one	end	hot	and	at	another	cold	constitutes	it	undergoing	change.180		The	eternalist	readily	admits	that	such	McTaggartian	arguments	contain	no	subtle	fallacy,	no	hidden	technical	mistake,	and	there	is	no	reply	making	use	of	elaborate	distinctions	of	theory.		The	objections	may	simply	be	met	head-on.		Change	is	analogous	to	spatial	variation.		Change	does	occur	in	virtue	of	unchanging	facts	about	temporal	parts.181	
																																																																				180	Consult	McTaggart’s	argument	in	NE	§	315.	181	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.	214.	
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This	head-on	reasoning,	however,	befits	a	ram	not	a	philosopher.		First,	to	satisfy	the	demands	of	his	temporal	ontology,	the	eternalist	posits	temporally	ordered	parts,	then	facing	the	no-change	objection,	he	slides	in	his	mind	from	one	temporally	ordered	part	of	a	continuant	to	another	thus	generating	change	in	the	E-universe.			This	might	very	well	be	what	change	is	in	the	E-universe;	it,	however,	is	not	what	change	is	in	the	universe,	i.e.,	permutation	within	self-same	entities.		Change	cannot	be	reduced	to	mere	difference	between	distinct	entities;	there	can	be	no	valid	argument	for	this	reductionist	analysis	of	the	nature	of	change.		
3.5 The	Argument	against	Eternalism	From	Persistence	3.5.1 The	eternalist	posits	the	reality	of	the	E-universe,	the	largest	possible	four-dimensional	aggregate	of	temporally	ordered	objects/events.		The	E-universe,	therefore,	as	a	whole	persists.		The	entire	structure	of	the	E-universe,	as	depicted	in	Figure	16,	is	continually	in	existence.		However,	the	existential	claim	“the	E-universe	persists”	presents	the	eternalist	with	a	certain	predicament,	for	any	persistence,	including	that	of	the	E-universe,	is	necessarily	a	process,	and	processes,	as	we	all	know,	unfold	in	time.		Hence,	first	the	E-universe	exists	at	t1,	then	it	exists	at	t2,	and	so	on.		Yet,	this	time	over	which	the	E-universe	persists	apparently	cannot	be	the	familiar	B-time	of	eternalism,	because,	as	we	have	seen,	on	a	consistent	eternalist’s	hypothesis,	B-time	is	no	more	and	no	less	than	the	E-universe’s	internal	topological	structure.		
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The	E-universe	carries	B-time	within,	as	it	were;	there	is	no	B-time	outside	the	E-universe	over	which	it	can	persist	as	a	whole.182	This	internal	time/external	time	distinction	can	be	seen	more	clearly	upon	the	following	reflection.		Consider	the	central	tenet	of	eternalism:	in	the	beginning	of	the	E-universe	there	were	the	first,	the	last,	and	all	intermediary	B-segments.		Apparently,	the	clause	“in	the	beginning”	cannot	refer	to	the	first	moment	in	the	B-series	because	
ex	hypothesi	the	whole	E-universe	with	its	first,	last,	and	all	the	intermediary	parts/events	is	not	at	the	first	B-moment,	only	a	minute	part	of	it	is;	the	bulk	of	it	is	spread	along	the	entire	length	of	the	B-time	axis	(consult	Figure	16).		The	only	consistent	conclusion	then	is	that	when	the	E-universe,	the	whole	E-universe	that	is,	with	all	its	B-temporally	ordered	parts/events,	has	the	moment	of	its	beginning,	this	moment	cannot	be	identified	with	the	first	moment	of	B-time.		Therefore,	there	must	be	a	moment	of	a	higher-order	time	that	is	the	first	moment	of	the	existence	of	the	entire	structure	of	the	E-universe.		The	eternalist	thus	is	presented	with	the	following	dilemma:	either	the	E-universe	does	not	persist	at	all,	which	of	course	means	that	it	does	not	exist,	or	there	exists	a	higher-order	time	over	which	the	E-universe	as	a	whole	does	persist.	The	eternalist,	I	believe,	will	contend	that	the	idea	of	the	E-universe	persisting	as	a	whole	does	not	inevitably	entail	it	persisting	over	a	second-order	time.		The	E-universe,	he	will	argue,	persists	over	the	first-order	B-time	by	simply	being	‘stretched’	
																																																																				182	The	argument	from	persistence	is	directed	primarily	against	object-eternalism.		But,	it	seems	to	me,	
mutatis	mutandis	it	can	be	successfully	applied	to	event-eternalism.		For	instance,	if	we	take	events	to	be	entities,	then	the	E-universe	would	be	a	continually	existing	conglomerate	of	temporally	separated	entities,	that	is,	it	would	persist	over	time	in	the	same	very	manner	as	the	E-universe	of	object	eternalism.	
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along	the	B-time	axis.		The	idea	of	the	E-universe	being	laid	out	along	the	B-time	axis,	the	eternalist	will	say,	is	all	that	there	is	to	the	idea	of	it	persisting	over	time.		This	is	another	instance	of	the	eternalist’s	head-on	reasoning.		This	essentially	topological	notion	of	persistence	is	not	what	we	commonly	take	persistence	to	be;	persistence	has	nothing	to	do	with	topology,	it	is	solely	an	ontological	notion.		An	entity	is	said	to	persist	iff	it	comes	into	existence,	is	continually	in	existence	for	a	certain	period	of	time,	and	goes	out	of	existence,	or	it	is	perpetually	in	existence.		A	consistent	eternalist,	therefore,	should	hold	that	the	E-universe	as	a	whole,	with	all	its	temporally	ordered	parts/events	came	into	existence,	it	is	continually	in	existence,	and	it	will	go	out	of	existence.	For	that	reason,	at	the	very	first	moment	of	the	E-universe’s	existence	there	exist	all	B-times	populated	by	its	segments/events.	The	first	B-moment,	the	last	B-moment,	and	all	the	B-moments	in	between	are	literary	present	at	the	very	first	moment	of	the	E-universe’s	existence.		It	is	quite	apparent	that	this	moment	is	the	moment	of	a	higher-order	time,	for	if	it	is	not,	then	the	entire	set	of	B-moments	populated	by	temporally	ordered	parts/events	is	at	the	first	B-moment.		This	is	patently	a	nonsensical	proposition.		The	same	of	course	goes	for	the	second	moment	of	the	E-universe’s	existence	and	all	other	such	moments.		The	entire	set	of	the	first-order	B-moments,	together	with	all	temporally	ordered	parts/events	populating	them	is	at	the	second	B-moment	and	so	on.		But	how	the	last	B-moment	and	all	the	intermediate	B-moments	between	it	and	the	first	B-moment	can	be	at	any	B-moment?		This	is	surely	a	nonsensical	proposition!		This	is	why	on	a	consistent	eternalist’s	account,	the	persistence	of	the	E-universe	entails	a	higher-order	time.		On	the	pain	of	
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inconsistency,	therefore,	the	eternalist	must	admit	that	“the	E-universe	persists”	entails	that	it	persists	over	a	higher-order	time	and	not	that	it	is	spread	over	the	entire	length	of	the	B-time	axis.	Perhaps,	at	least	initially,	the	lifespan	of	a	temporally	extended	object	can	be	conceived	as	running	the	length	of	the	corresponding	stretch	on	the	B-time	axis,	as	depicted	in	the	first	diagram	of	Figure	22.		By	the	same	token,	the	existence	of	the	E-universe	itself	might	be	conceived	as	running	the	entire	length	of	the	B-time	axis,	as	depicted	in	Figure	16.		Then	again,	the	initial	plausibility	of	this	conception	of	persistence	dissipates	the	very	same	moment	we	realize	that	it	entails	a	contradictory	picture.		Beginnings	and	ends	of	temporally	extended	objects	are	demarcated	by	corresponding	points	on	the	B-time	axis;	and	yet,	these	objects,	being	interminable	parts	of	the	E-universe,	persist	as	long	as	the	E-universe	itself	persists.		But,	as	I	have	argued	earlier	in	this	Chapter,	it	surely	cannot	be	both	that	a	temporally	extended	object	has	the	lifespan	of	a	certain	length	and	also	that	its	lifespan	is	equal	to	that	of	the	lifespan	of	the	E-universe.		As	for	the	E-universe	itself,	were	this	topological	conception	of	persistence	true,	then,	as	I	pointed	out	in	the	preceding	two	paragraphs,	it	would	follow	that	the	first	and	the	last	and	the	all	intermediate	moments	of	the	E-universe’s	existence	exist	at	the	first	moment	and	then	they	exist	at	the	second	B-moment	and	so	on.	Prima	facie	this	is	an	absurd	conclusion.		That	is	why	the	persistence	of	the	E-universe	cannot	be	its	being	spread	over	the	length	of	the	B-time	axis.		If	the	E-universe	persists,	then	there	ineluctably	must	be	a	time	outside	the	E-universe’s	boundaries,	the	time	over	which	it	persists,	the	time	at	which	it	came	into	
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existence,	continually	exists,	and	will	go	out	of	existence.		Again,	this	time	cannot	be	the	B-temporal	order,	the	time	that	is	within	the	E-universe.		3.5.2 In	addition	to	the	idea	of	the	E-universe	persisting	over	a	higher-order	time,	there	are	two	additional	options	available	to	the	eternalist	in	interpreting	“the	E-universe	persists.”		It	could	either	be	said	that	the	E-universe	persists	timelessly,	or	it	could	be	said	that	it	persists	simpliciter.		Let	us	now	consider	all	three	case-scenarios	in	that	order.	What	could	be	said	about	the	E-universe	persisting	over	a	higher-order	time?		Since	the	eternalist	is	a	B-theorist,	this	higher-order	time	should	be	understood	as	a	B-time.		The	claim	therefore	would	be	that	the	E-universe	persists	over	a	higher-order	B-time.		This	claim,	however,	is	in	conflict	with	Leibnitz’s	Law.		To	see	why	this	is	so	consider	an	immutable	object;	say	a	metallic	sphere	at	the	temperature	of	absolute	zero.		Assume	that	the	sphere	persists	over	B-time.		Since	the	sphere	is	unchangeable,	all	of	its	B-ordered	segments	are	identical	in	all	respects,	save	them	being	temporally	differentiated,	as	depicted	in	Figure	23.		Apparently,	the	existence	of	such	a	conglomerate	of	identical	spheres	is	not	permissible	on	Leibnitz’s	Law,	for	no	two	objects	are	distinct	solo	numero.			 		Fig.	23	Violation	of	Leibnitz’s	Law.	
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Now,	one	of	the	fundamental	tenets	of	eternalism	is	that	the	E-universe	is	an	immutable	object;	nothing	can	be	added	to	or	subtracted	from	it,	nothing	can	be	rearranged	within	it,	and	nothing	can	change	its	monadic	or	polyadic	properties;	it	is	an	island	of	absolute	stability	in	the	ocean	of	eternity.		Since	the	E-universe	is	an	immutable	entity,	the	idea	of	it	persisting	over	a	higher-order	B-time	implies	that	there	exist	as	many	identical	E-universes	as	there	are	t-points	in	this	higher-order	B-series.		Evidently,	this	picture	of	reality	too	is	not	permissible	on	Leibnitz’s	Law.		Moreover,	what	we	have	here	is	a	second-order	E-universe	comprised	of	an	infinite	number	of	first-order	E-universes	(this	order	of	things	as	depicted	in	Figure	24).		On	condition	that	the	second-order	E-universe	is	too	a	persisting	object,	the	existence	of	a	third-order	E-universe	persisting	over	a	third-order	B-time	must	be	postulated	and	so	
ad	infinitum.		We	thus	have	a	case	of	vicious	infinite	regress.					 	Fig.	24.	Vicious	infinite	regress.			Additionally,	as	I	have	previously	argued,	as	all	segments/events	of	the	first-order	E-universe	exist	at	once,	so	by	the	same	token,	the	temporal	parts	of	the	second-order	E-universe,	i.e.,	the	infinite	number	of	first-order	E-universes,	are	simultaneous	entities	as	well.		The	same,	of	course	goes	for	the	segments	of	the	third-order	E-universes	and	the	rest.		This	order	of	things	involves	a	contradiction	because	it	entails	
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simultaneity	of	temporally	separated	entities.		We	thus	must	conclude	that	the	notion	of	the	E-universe	persisting	over	a	second-order	B-time	must	be	rejected	because	it	(a)	violates	Leibnitz’s	Law,	(b)	generates	a	vicious	infinite	regress,	(c)	is	contradictory.		3.5.3 I	should	think	that	the	eternalist	will	object	to	the	foregoing	analysis	on	the	grounds	that	on	his	view	the	“E-universe	persists”	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	temporality.		Instead,	he	would	argue,	“The	E-universe	persists”	should	be	construed	atemporally.		Let	us,	therefore,	first	consider	the	eternalist’s	account	of	atemporality	and	then	see	whether	or	not	“the	E-universe	persists	atemporally”	makes	any	sense.		The	following	I	take	to	be	a	representative	account	of	the	eternalist’s	notion	of	atemporality:	…	a	four-dimensionalist	will	say	that	my	current	temporal	part	is	atemporally,	sitting,	69	inches	tall,	and	wearing	a	(temporal	part	of	a)	hat.		Likewise,	the	four-dimensionalist	will	say	that	my	current	temporal	part	is,	atemporally,	part	of	the	larger	spacetime	worm	that	is	me.…	We	can	think	of	the	four-dimensionalist’s	notions	of	atemporal	parthood,	and	atemporal	exemplification	in	general,	as	being	those	we	employ	when	we	take	an	‘atemporal	perspective’	and	contemplate	the	whole	of	time.183	We	have	been	told	by	the	eternalist	that	the	idea	of	atemporal	parthood	stems	from	a	certain	atemporal	perspective,	from	a	contemplation	of	“the	whole	of	time.”		But	what	exactly	is	this	atemporal	perspective?		Why	should	this	relation	between	
																																																																				183	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.56.	
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temporally	ordered	parts	of	the	E-universe	be	taken	to	be	atemporal?		Take,	for	instance,	such	vastly	temporally	separated	entities	as	dinosaurs	and	personal	computers.		In	statements	like	“there	are	dinosaurs	and	personal	computers,”	the	eternalist	claims	that	he	employs	an	atemporal	usage	of	the	verb	“to	be.”		Dinosaurs	and	personal	computers	ARE	atemporally,	or	eternally	(hence	the	name	“eternalism”)	temporally	ordered	parts	of	the	E-universe.		This	is	what	atemporal	parthood	is	supposed	to	be.		Yet,	this	notion	of	atemporal	parthood	is	inconsistent	because	we	have	perfectly	temporal,	i.e.,	temporally	ordered	entities	existing	at	tn	and	at	tm	which	stand	in	an	essentially	atemporal	relation.		Apparently,	this	inconsistent	account	of	the	eternalist’s	notion	of	atemporality	cannot	be	the	alleged	B-atemporality.			What	then	about	this	atemporal	perspective,	this	contemplation	of	“the	whole	of	time”	from	which	this	puzzling	notion	of	atemporal	parthood	stems?		As	I	see	it,	the	most	plausible	construal	of	the	eternalist’s	notion	of	atemporality	is	that	the	eternalist	distinguishes	between	B-time	and	B-existence,	i.e.,	between	the	B-topology	and	the	B-ontology.		When	the	eternalist	speaks	of	temporality,	he	speaks	of	B-topology,	whereas	when	he	speaks	of	atemporality,	he	speaks	of	B-ontology.		On	the	B-topology,	the	B-segments	are	temporal	entities	insofar	as	they	are	temporally	ordered.		On	the	B-ontology,	on	the	other	hand,	the	B-segments	enter	into	an	atemporal	relation	of	being	equally	real	constituents	of	the	E-universe.		On	this	view,	therefore,	B-time	plays	no	role	in	the	temporally	ordered	segments	being	parts	of	the	E-universe;	they	are	non-temporally	parts	of	it.		On	the	eternalist’s	account,	therefore,	the	B-segments,	taken	as	temporally	ordered	entities,	are	bona-fide	temporal	entities;	(this	is	the	eternalist’s	temporal	perspective,	i.e.,	the	B-topological	perspective);	yet,	
154	
taken	as	the	elements	of	the	temporal	totality,	they	are	atemporal	entities	(this	is	the	eternalist’s	atemporal	perspective,	i.e.,	the	B-ontological	perspective).		Thus,	the	temporally	ordered	entities	partake	in	the	atemporal	existence	by	way	of	being	equally	real	parts	of	reality;	they	atemporally	are	temporally	ordered	parts	of	it;	their	participation	in	the	atemporal	parthood,	viz.	their	ontological	oneness	is	what	B-atemporality	comes	to.		We,	therefore,	should	take	the	eternalist’s	“atemporal	perspective”	to	be	the	B-ontological	perspective,	no	more	and	no	less.	Let	us	now	grant	to	the	eternalist	that	“the	E-universe	persists”	does	not	imply	temporal	persistence;	it	persists	atemporally	in	the	sense	specified	above.		But	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	this	notion	of	atemporal	parthood	can	be	applied	to	the	E-universe	as	a	whole.		Specifically,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	what	this	atemporal	persistence	of	the	E-universe	could	possibly	be	because	it	does	not	stand	in	the	relation	of	atemporal	parthood	to	anything	else;	there	is,	after	all,	only	one	E-universe.		The	notion	of	atemporal	perspective	the	eternalist	advocates	makes	at	least	a	tenuous	sense	when	it	is	construed	as	the	ontological	oneness	of	the	B-segments,	but	it	makes	no	sense	at	all	when	it	is	applied	to	the	E-universe	as	a	whole.	Since	the	eternalist	does	not	provide	us	with	any	other	atemporal	reading	of	“the	E-universe	persists,”	we	have	to	try	to	fill	the	gap	ourselves.		Following	the	long-standing	philosophical	tradition	of	distinguishing	between	two	types	of	timelessness,	namely	sempiternity	and	eternity	proper,184	let	us	distinguish	accordingly	between	
																																																																				184	Boethius’	Consolation	of	Philosophy,	Book	V,	Section	6	is	one	of	the	most	explicit	sources	of	this	tradition.		However,	the	distinction	is	articulated	in	St.	Augustine’s	De	Civ.	Dei.	XI	6	XII	16	and	goes	back	as	far	as	the	Hellenistic	philosophy,	most	notably,	Plotinus’	Inneads	III,	7,	and,	to	some	extent,	Plato	himself.		On	this	subject,	see,	for	instance,	E.	Stump’s	and	N.	Kretzmann’s	(1981)	informative	discussion.	
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two	such	readings	of	“the	E-universe	persists	timelessly.”	On	the	sempiternal	reading,	the	timeless	existence	of	the	E-universe	means	that	it	exists	everlastingly.		On	the	eternity	proper	reading,	the	E-universe	does	not	exist	in	time	at	all.		This	latter	sense	of	atemporal	existence	is	what	the	theologians	call	the	eternal	Now	or	Present	of	God,	a	zero-duration	point	that	neither	begins	nor	ends,	nor	is	it	an	element	of	any	temporal	series.185	Now,	the	sempiternal	reading	of	“the	E-universe	persists	timelessly”	implies	existence	over	time,	an	everlasting	time,	to	be	sure;	yet,	time	nonetheless.		This	sempiternal	reading,	therefore,	is	susceptible	to	the	criticism	I	have	leveled	in	subsection	3.5.2.		Consider	now	the	eternity	proper	reading.		The	E-universe	exists	at	zero-duration	t-point	such	that	this	t-point	is	not	an	element	of	any	temporal	series.		
Prima	facie,	the	notion	of	the	E-universe	existing	at	zero-duration	t-point	implies	absence	of	temporal	duration	of	however	short	length.		On	this	reading,	however,	the	essentially	temporal	flesh	of	the	E-universe	floats	in	timeless	ether,	as	it	were.		But	the	E-universe,	as	we	have	seen,	is	comprised	of	bona-fide	temporal	objects,	viz.	the	B-segments/events.		We	thus	are	dealing	here	with	temporal	entities	persisting	atemporally;	the	B-segments/events,	therefore,	are	both	temporal	and	atemporal	entities.		We	thus	have	an	outright	contradiction.		Perhaps	we	could	attribute	to	God	this	eternal	existence	at	zero-duration	t-point,	God	after	all	is	an	eternal	entity,	but	no	temporal	entity	could	be	said	to	exist	eternally	in	this,	or	for	that	matter,	any	other	
																																																																				185	This	notion	of	eternal	Now	is	beset	with	many	inconsistencies	and	outright	contractions.		The	limited	goal	of	present	undertaking,	however,	prevents	me	from	addressing	the	issue.		For	illuminating	discussion	of	the	issue	see,	for	instance,	William	Lane	Craig’s	“The	Eternal	Present	and	Stump-Kretzmann	Eternity.”		The	article	is	published	online.	
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sense.		Hence,	neither	the	sempiternal	nor	eternal	reading	of	“the	E-universe	persists	atemporally”	can	be	acceptable.	Finally,	what	could	be	said	about	the	simpliciter	reading	of	“the	E-universe	persists”?		This	reading	is	elliptical;	it,	therefore,	is	opened	to	numerous,	often	mutually	exclusive,	interpretations.		For	instance,	on	some	accounts,	“simpliciter”	means	atemporally,	as	in	the	following:	“I	sit	in	a	chair	at	one	time	but	not	another	because	my	earlier	temporal	part	sits	(simpliciter,	atemporally)	in	a	temporal	part	of	the	chair	whereas	my	later	temporal	parts	fail	to	sit	in	the	corresponding	later	temporal	parts	of	the	chair.”186		This	notion	of	atemporal	existence,	as	we	have	seen,	is	contradictory.		What	other	readings	of	“the	E-universe	persists	simpliciter”	can	there	be?		Well,	‘simpliciter’	means	‘without	further	qualification’.		Should	it	then	be	said	that	the	E-universe	just	persists,	period?		This	is	surely	not	a	very	illuminating	stance.		Besides,	“the	E-universe	persists”	could	only	mean	that	it	persists	either	atemporally	or	temporally;	there	surely	is	no	state	in	between,	but	none	of	these	mutually	exclusive	readings,	as	we	have	seen,	withstands	scrutiny.	Another	thing	to	consider	about	the	idea	of	the	E-universe	persisting	simpliciter	is	this.		Temporal	considerations	intricately	intertwine	with	the	notion	of	persistence.		As	“things	which	exist	are	somewhere	(the	non-existent	is	nowhere	–	where	is	the	goat-stag	or	the	sphinx?),”187	so	too	things	which	persist	are	somewhen.		“X	persists	simpliciter”	inevitably	carries	either	temporal	or	eternal	implication.		To	state	that	“x	persists	simpliciter”	is	either	to	imply	that	it	persists	over	a	certain	
																																																																				186	T.	Sider	(2001),	p.56.	187	Aristotle,	Physics,	Book	IV,	1:30,	The	Complete	Works	of	Aristotle,	J.	Barnes	(ed.)	(Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1984).	
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period	of	time	or	that	it	persists	eternally.		But	neither	temporal	nor	eternal	sense	of	“The	E-universe	persists”,	as	we	have	seen,	is	satisfactory.		The	simpliciter	reading,	theretofore,	too	must	be	deemed	as	philosophically	inadequate	because	none	of	its	interpretation	is	adequate.	I,	thus,	conclude	that	none	of	the	three	readings	of	“the	E-universe	persists”	i.e.,	temporal,	atemporal,	and	simpliciter	withstands	scrutiny.		For	this,	and	all	other	reasons	discussed	in	this	Chapter,	eternalism	must	be	rejected	as	a	philosophically	inept	hypothesis.	
158	Afterword	I	began	this	study	with	an	examination	of	McTaggart’s	argument	for	the	unreality	of	temporal	passage,	which	is	at	the	center	of	his	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time	per	
se.		Since	our	metaphysical	conception	of	temporality	is	exhausted	by	the	concepts	of	fluid	and	static	time,	separate	arguments	against	the	reality	of	both	times	are	required	to	give	us	an	argument	for	the	unreality	of	time.		McTaggart	has	an	argument	against	the	reality	of	the	A-series,	but	he	does	not	have	one	against	the	reality	of	the	B-series.		His	program,	therefore,	is	incomplete.		In	the	second	chapter,	additional	arguments	against	the	reality	of	the	A-series	were	presented	along	with	the	arguments	against	the	reality	of	hybrid	A/B	series.		In	the	third	chapter,	the	B	theory	of	time	was	taken	up	exclusively.		It	was	argued	that	the	B	theory	of	time	is	as	inadequate	as	its	counterpart,	the	A	theory,	is.		It	appears	that	neither	the	A	model,	nor	the	B	model,	and	by	extension,	none	of	hybrid	A/B	models	of	time,	are	adequate	to	give	us	a	satisfactory	philosophical	account	of	the	nature	of	time.		This	outcome	leaves	us	with	the	following	predicament.		On	the	one	hand,	we	cannot	deny	the	indispensability	of	either	A	or	B	models	of	time.		On	the	other	hand,	neither	model	is	adequate	to	give	us	a	coherent	metaphysical	theory	of	time.		Time,	as	it	is	conceived	by	
philosophers,	therefore,	must	be	deemed	to	be	unreal.		The	question	whether	there	can	be	constructed	a	non-philosophical	theory	of	time	that	does	not	rely	on	the	two	models	lies	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	thesis.
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